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Terms of Reference 
 
REVIEW OF THE NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 
 
I, Mark Dreyfus QC MP, Attorney-General of Australia, having regard to: 
 the 20 years of operation of the Native Title Act 1993 (the Act) 
 the importance of the recognition and protection of native title to Indigenous 
Australians and the broader Australian community 
 the importance of certainty as to the relationship between native title and other 
interests in land and waters 
 Australia's statement of support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples 
 the need to ensure that the native title system delivers practical, timely and 
flexible outcomes for all parties, including through faster, better claims 
resolution 
 significant and ongoing stakeholder concern about barriers to the recognition of 
native title 
 delays to the resolution of claims caused by litigation, and 
 the capacity of native title to support Indigenous economic development and 
generate sustainable long-term benefits for Indigenous Australians. 
I REFER to the Australian Law Reform Commission for inquiry and report, pursuant 
to subsection 20(1) of the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996, 
Commonwealth native title laws and legal frameworks in relation to two specific areas, 
as follows: 
 connection requirements relating to the recognition and scope of native title 
rights and interests, including but not limited to whether there should be: 
 a presumption of continuity of acknowledgement and observance of 
traditional laws and customs and connection 
 clarification of the meaning of ‘traditional’ to allow for the evolution and 
adaptation of culture and recognition of 'native title rights and interests' 
 clarification that ‘native title rights and interests’ can include rights and 
interests of a commercial nature 
 confirmation that ‘connection with the land and waters’ does not require 
physical occupation or continued or recent use, and 
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 empowerment of courts to disregard substantial interruption or change in 
continuity of acknowledgement and observance of traditional laws and 
customs where it is in the interests of justice to do so. 
 any barriers imposed by the Act’s authorisation and joinder provisions to 
claimants’, potential claimants’ and respondents’ access to justice. 
In relation to these areas and in light of the Preamble and Objects of the Act, I request 
that the Commission consider what, if any, changes could be made to improve the 
operation of Commonwealth native title laws and legal frameworks. 
Scope of reference 
In performing its functions in relation to this reference, the Commission should 
consider: 
(a)  the Act and any other relevant legislation, including how laws and legal 
frameworks operate in practice 
(b)  any relevant case law 
(c)  relevant reports, reviews and inquiries regarding the native title system and the 
practical implementation of recommendations and findings, including the 
Taxation of Native Title and Traditional Owner Benefits and Governance 
Working Group, the Review of Native Title Organisations and the Productivity 
Commission inquiry into non-financial barriers to mineral and energy resource 
exploration 
(d)  the interests of key stakeholders, and 
(e)  any other relevant matter concerning the operation of the native title system. 
Consultation 
In undertaking this reference, the Commission should identify and consult with key 
stakeholders, including: 
(a)  relevant Commonwealth, State, Territory and local governments, departments 
and agencies 
(b)  the Federal Court of Australia and the National Native Title Tribunal 
(c)  Indigenous groups, Native Title Representative Bodies and Native Title Service 
Providers, and Prescribed Bodies Corporate 
(d)  industry, including the agriculture, pastoral, fisheries, and minerals and energy 
resources industries, and 
(e)  any other relevant groups or individuals. 
Timeframe for reporting 
The Commission is to report by March 2015. 
Dated 3 August 2013 
Mark Dreyfus QC MP 
Attorney-General 
Participants 
 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission  
President  
Professor Rosalind Croucher 
Commissioner in Charge 
Professor Lee Godden 
Part-time Commissioner 
The Hon Justice Nye Perram, Federal Court of Australia 
Executive Director 
Sabina Wynn 
Senior Legal Officer 
Justine Clarke 
Legal Officers 
Judith Bonner until February 2014 
Robyn Gilbert 
Sonya Kim, August—October 2014 
Dr Julie Mackenzie  
Dr Steven Robertson, from July 2014 
Advisory Committee Members 
Professor Megan Davis, Director, Indigenous Law Centre, University of New South 
Wales 
Mr Jason Behrendt, Legal Executive, Chalk & Fitzgerald, Lawyers & Consultants 
Mr Hans Bokelund, Chief Executive Officer, Goldfields Land and Sea Council 
Dr Valerie Cooms, Quandamooka (Chair of the Prescribed Body Corporate) and 
former CEO of QSNTS 
Ms Alice Cope, Executive Manager, United Nations Global Compact Network 
Australia 
Ms Sally Davis, Senior Lawyer, Australian Government Solicitor 
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Professor Mick Dodson AM, Director, National Centre for Indigenous Studies, 
Australian National University 
The Hon Paul Finn, retired Federal Court Judge 
Dr Jonathan Fulcher, Partner, HopgoodGanim 
Mr Mick Gooda, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, 
Australian Human Rights Commission 
Ms Jenny Hart, Assistant Crown Solicitor, Native Title Section, Crown Solicitor’s 
Office 
Mr Vance Hughston SC, Windeyer Chambers 
Mr Graeme Neate, former President, National Native Title Tribunal (1999-2013) 
The Hon Justice Anthony North, Federal Court of Australia 
Dr David Martin, Anthropos Consulting 
Dr Lisa Strelein, Director, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Studies  
Associate Professor Maureen Tehan, Associate Director, Centre for Resources, Energy 
and Environmental Law, University of Melbourne 
Ms Raelene Webb QC, President, National Native Title Tribunal 
Legal Interns 
Lidija Bujanovic 
Alisha Mathew 
Tim Maybury 
Sean Mulcahy 
Jack Murray 
Laura Neill 
Amila Perera 
Alison Whittaker 
 
 
 
Proposals and Questions 
 
* Note: Proposals and Questions below refer to the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).  
 
2. Framework for Review of the Native Title Act 
Question 2–1  Should the proposed amendments to the Native Title Act have 
prospective operation only? 
Question 2–2  Should the proposed amendments to s 223 of the Native Title Act 
only apply to determinations made after the date of commencement of any 
amendment? 
5. Traditional Laws and Customs 
Proposal 5–1   The definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act should 
be amended to make clear that traditional laws and customs may adapt, evolve or 
otherwise develop. 
Proposal 5–2   The definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act should 
be amended to make clear that rights and interests may be possessed under traditional 
laws and customs where they have been transmitted between groups in accordance 
with traditional laws and customs. 
Proposal 5–3   The definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act should 
be amended to make clear that it is not necessary to establish that 
(a)  acknowledgment and observance of laws and customs has continued 
substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty; and 
(b)  laws and customs have been acknowledged and observed by each generation 
since sovereignty. 
Proposal 5–4   The definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act should 
be amended to make clear that it is not necessary to establish that a society united in 
and by its acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs has 
continued in existence since prior to the assertion of sovereignty. 
6. Physical Occupation 
Proposal 6–1   Section 62(1)(c) of the Native Title Act should be amended to 
remove references to ‘traditional physical connection’. 
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Proposal 6–2   Section 190B(7) of the Native Title Act should be amended to 
remove the requirement that the Registrar must be satisfied that at least one member of 
the native title claim group has or previously had a traditional physical connection with 
any part of the land or waters, or would have had such a connection if not for things 
done by the Crown, a statutory authority of the Crown, or any holder of a lease. 
7. The Transmission of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Culture 
Proposal 7–1  The definition of native title in s 223(1)(a) of the Native Title Act 
should be amended to remove the word ‘traditional’. 
The proposed re-wording, removing traditional, would provide that: 
 The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the 
communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where: 
 (a)  the rights and interests are possessed under the laws acknowledged, and 
the customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait 
Islanders; and 
 (b)  the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and 
customs, have a connection with the land or waters; and 
 (c)  the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia. 
Question 7–1   Should a definition related to native title claim group identification 
and composition be included in the Native Title Act? 
Proposal 7–2   The definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act should 
be further amended to provide that: 
 The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the 
communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where: 
(a)  the rights and interests are possessed under the laws acknowledged, and 
the customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait 
Islanders; and 
(b)  the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and 
customs, have a relationship with country that is expressed by their 
present connection with the land or waters; and 
(c)  the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia. 
Question 7–2   Should the Native Title Act be amended to provide that 
revitalisation of law and custom may be considered in establishing whether ‘Aboriginal 
peoples and Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a connection with 
land and waters’ under s 223(1)(b)? 
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Question 7–3  Should the reasons for any displacement of Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders be considered in the assessment of whether ‘Aboriginal peoples 
or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land 
or waters’ under s 223(1)(b)? 
Question 7–4  If the reasons for any displacement of Aboriginal peoples or Torres 
Strait Islanders are to be considered in the assessment of whether ‘Aboriginal peoples 
or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land 
or waters’ under s 223(1)(b), what should be their relevance to a decision as to whether 
such connection has been maintained? 
Question 7–5  Should the Native Title Act be amended to include a statement in 
the following terms: 
 Unless it would not be in the interests of justice to do so, in determining whether 
‘Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have 
a connection with the land or waters’ under s 223(1)(b): 
 (a)  regard may be given to any reasons related to European settlement that 
preceded any displacement of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait 
Islanders from the traditional land or waters of those people; and 
 (b)  undue weight should not be given to historical circumstances adverse to 
those Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders. 
8. The Nature and Content of Native Title 
Proposal 8–1   Section 223(2) of the Native Title Act should be repealed and 
substituted with a provision that provides:  
 Without limiting subsection (1) but to avoid doubt, native title rights and 
interests in that subsection: 
 (a)   comprise rights in relation to any purpose; and 
 (b)  may include, but are not limited to, hunting, gathering, fishing, 
commercial activities and trade. 
Proposal 8–2  The terms ‘commercial activities’ and ‘trade’ should not be 
defined in the Native Title Act. 
Question 8–1  Should the indicative listing in the revised s 223(2)(b), as set out in 
Proposal 8–1, include the protection or exercise of cultural knowledge? 
Question 8–2   Should the indicative listing in the revised s 223(2)(b), as set out in 
Proposal 8–1, include anything else? 
9. Promoting Claims Resolution 
Question 9–1  Are current procedures for ascertaining expert evidence in native 
title proceedings and for connection reports, appropriate and effective? If not, what 
improvements might be suggested? 
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Question 9–2  What procedures, if any, are required to deal appropriately with the 
archival material being generated through the native title connection process? 
Question 9–3  What processes, if any, should be introduced to encourage 
concurrence in the sequence between the bringing of evidence to establish connection 
and tenure searches conducted by governments? 
Question 9–4  Should the Australian Government develop a connection policy 
setting out the Commonwealth’s responsibilities and interests in relation to consent 
determinations? 
Question 9–5  Should the Australian Government, in consultation with state and 
territory governments and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander representative bodies, 
develop nationally-consistent, best practice principles to guide the assessment of 
connection in respect of consent determinations?   
Question 9–6  Should a system for the training and certification of legal 
professionals who act in native title matters be developed, in consultation with relevant 
organisations such as the Law Council of Australia and Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander representative bodies? 
Question 9–7  Would increased use of native title application inquiries be 
beneficial and appropriate? 
Question 9–8  Section 138B(2)(b) of the Native Title Act requires that the 
applicant in relation to any application that is affected by a proposed native title 
application inquiry must agree to participate in the inquiry. Should the requirement for 
the applicant to agree to participate be removed? 
Question 9–9  In a native title application inquiry, should the National Native 
Title Tribunal have the power to summon a person to appear before it? 
Question 9–10  Should potential claimants, who are not parties to proceedings, be 
able to request the Court to direct the National Native Title Tribunal to hold a native 
title application inquiry? If so, how could this occur? 
Question 9–11  What other reforms, if any, would lead to increased use of the 
native title application inquiry process? 
10. Authorisation 
Proposal 10–1  Section 251B of the Native Title Act should be amended to allow 
the claim group, when authorising an application, to use a decision-making process 
agreed on and adopted by the group. 
Proposal 10–2  The Australian Government should consider amending s 251A of 
the Native Title Act to similar effect. 
Proposal 10–3  The Native Title Act should be amended to clarify that the claim 
group may define the scope of the authority of the applicant. 
 Proposals and Questions 11 
Question 10–1  Should the Native Title Act include a non-exhaustive list of ways in 
which the claim group might define the scope of the authority of the applicant? For 
example: 
(a)  requiring the applicant to seek claim group approval before doing certain acts 
(discontinuing a claim, changing legal representation, entering into an 
agreement with a third party, appointing an agent); 
(b)  requiring the applicant to account for all monies received and to deposit them in 
a specified account; and 
(c)  appointing an agent (other than the applicant) to negotiate agreements with third 
parties. 
Question 10–2 What remedy, if any, should the Native Title Act contain, apart 
from replacement of the applicant, for a breach of a condition of authorisation? 
Proposal 10–4  The Native Title Act should provide that, if the claim group limits 
the authority of the applicant with regard to entering agreements with third parties, 
those limits must be placed on a public register. 
Proposal 10–5  The Native Title Act should be amended to provide that the 
applicant may act by majority, unless the terms of the authorisation provide otherwise. 
Proposal 10–6  Section 66B of the Native Title Act should provide that, where a 
member of the applicant is no longer willing or able to act, the remaining members of 
the applicant may continue to act without reauthorisation, unless the terms of the 
authorisation provide otherwise. The person may be removed as a member of the 
applicant by filing a notice with the court. 
Proposal 10–7  Section 66B of the Native Title Act should provide that a person 
may be authorised on the basis that, if that person becomes unwilling or unable to act, a 
designated person may take their place. The designated person may take their place by 
filing a notice with the court. 
11. Joinder 
Question 11–1  Should s 84(3)(a)(iii) of the Native Title Act be amended to allow 
only those persons with a legal or equitable estate or interest in the land or waters 
claimed, to become parties to a proceeding under s 84(3)? 
Question 11–2  Should ss 66(3) and 84(3) of the Native Title Act be amended to 
provide that Local Aboriginal Land Councils under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 
1983 (NSW) must be notified by the Registrar of a native title application and may 
become parties to the proceedings if they satisfy the requirements of s 84(3)? 
Proposal 11–1  The Native Title Act should be amended to allow persons who are 
notified under s 66(3) and who fulfil notification requirements to elect to become 
parties under s 84(3) in respect of s 225(c) and (d) only. 
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Proposal 11–2  Section 84(5) of the Native Title Act should be amended to clarify 
that: 
(a)  a claimant or potential claimant has an interest that may be affected by the 
determination in the proceedings; and 
(b)  when determining if it is in the interests of justice to join a claimant or potential 
claimant, the Federal Court should consider whether they can demonstrate a 
clear and legitimate objective to be achieved by joinder to the proceedings. 
Proposal 11–3  The Native Title Act should be amended to allow organisations that 
represent persons, whose ‘interest may be affected by the determination’ in relation to 
land or waters in the claim area, to become parties under s 84(3) or to be joined under 
s 84(5) or (5A). 
Proposal 11–4  The Native Title Act should be amended to clarify that the Federal 
Court’s power to dismiss a party (other than the applicant) under s 84(8) is not limited 
to the circumstances contained in s 84(9). 
Proposal 11–5  Section 24(1AA) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) 
should be amended to allow an appeal, with the leave of the Court, from a decision of 
the Federal Court to join, or not to join, a party under s 84(5) or (5A) of the Native Title 
Act. 
Proposal 11–6  Section 24(1AA) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) 
should be amended to allow an appeal, with the leave of the Court, from a decision of 
the Federal Court to dismiss, or not to dismiss, a party under s 84(8) of the Native Title 
Act. 
Proposal 11–7 The Australian Government should consider developing principles 
governing the circumstances in which the Commonwealth should either: 
(a)  become a party to a native title proceeding under s 84; or 
(b)  seek intervener status under s 84A. 
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Review of the Native Title Act 
What is this Inquiry about? 
1.1 This Inquiry into the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) focuses on the legal 
requirements for recognising native title rights and interests and proving connection; 
the nature and content (scope) of native title rights and interests; the legal processes for 
authorisation of an applicant to bring a native title claim; and the procedures governing 
when persons become parties to an application for a determination of native title. 
1.2 Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders may bring an application for a 
determination of native title rights and interests (a claim) under the Native Title Act. 
Section 223 of the Act defines native title: 
(1)  The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the 
communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres 
Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where: 
 (a)  the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws 
acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal 
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and 
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 (b)  the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and 
customs, have a connection with the land or waters; and 
 (c)  the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia. 
1.3 In summary, native title has origins in the laws acknowledged and the customs 
observed by Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders.
1
 Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders must prove that they have maintained a connection with their 
land and waters since before European settlement. 
1.4 In the native title claim process, it is necessary to identify which Aboriginal 
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders are the native title claimants, and the claimants must 
validly authorise persons in the group to bring a claim. In a successful claim, the court 
determines who holds native title.
2
 
1.5 Native title intersects with many other interests in the Australian community. 
The Native Title Act contains provisions that set out the persons and organisations that 
are parties to a native title claim. Relevant state and territory governments and, at 
times, the Commonwealth government, are respondents to a native title claim. Other 
persons holding interests in the claim area, such as a mining lease, may also be a party. 
The Act has provisions setting requirements for persons seeking to join a native title 
claim. 
Why is reform needed? 
1.6 The recognition and protection of native title is a central object of the Native 
Title Act. The Preamble identifies the beneficial purposes of the Act. Reforms around 
connection requirements, authorisation and joinder are important to ensure that the 
native title law and legal frameworks effectively achieve such purposes. 
1.7 Currently, due to a combination of factors, the law for determining native title is 
very complex. Contributing to this complexity is the progressively technical 
interpretation of the definition of native title, under the Native Title Act. Aboriginal 
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders must establish a number of requirements that do not 
appear in the text of the definition in s 223.
3
 The Native Title Act and associated case 
law require an involved process for identifying and assessing the evidence for proving 
native title. An approach to refocus on the core elements in defining native title and 
connection may be beneficial. 
1.8 While it is important that claims are rigorously tested, these requirements can 
result in long time frames for determinations. Such considerations, however, must be 
balanced by the acknowledgment that it is necessary to invest sufficient time and 
resources in the claims process to secure enduring outcomes for all parties. 
                                                        
1  Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96.  
2  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 225. 
3  For example, ‘[T]he reference to rights or interests in land or waters being possessed under traditional 
laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed by the peoples concerned, requires that the 
normative system under which the rights and interests are possessed (the traditional laws and customs) is 
a system that has had a continuous existence and vitality since sovereignty’: Members of the Yorta Yorta 
Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [47]. The law is covered in detail in Ch 4. 
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1.9 Therefore, reforms are needed to ‘connection requirements’ to simultaneously 
reduce complexity, while ensuring that the claims process facilitates long-term 
sustainable outcomes for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The claims 
process also must accommodate the range of interests in the Australian community. 
1.10 It is important that the ‘right people for country’ are identified in the claims 
process and that persons bringing the native title claim (the applicant) are duly 
authorised by the claim group. Reforms are needed to ensure the authorisation process 
within a claim group is robust and to reduce potential conflict. Further, there must be 
effective opportunities for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to test the 
transparency of the authorisation process—if necessary, in the court system. 
1.11 Reforms must consider the impacts upon all participants in the native title 
system, as native title operates across many sectors in Australian society. Certainty is 
an important consideration for third parties who may deal with native title claimants. 
1.12 In this context, the ALRC has had regard to the complexity of law, procedure 
and practice; but also the highly significant policy and economic arena in which native 
title is implemented. 
1.13 The ALRC was asked to consider what, if any, changes could be made to 
improve the operation of Commonwealth native title laws and legal frameworks.
4
 The 
challenge is to consider change in the native title system that advances the recognition 
and protection of native title in accordance with the Native Title Act,
5
 while ensuring 
that reforms support a robust and productive relationship between all participants. 
Consultations and submissions 
1.14 The Discussion Paper commences the second stage in the consultation processes 
in this Inquiry. The first stage included the release of the Issues Paper, Review of the 
Native Title Act 1993 (IP 45), generating 40 public submissions.
6
 The ALRC Inquiry 
team has undertaken more than 100 consultations around Australia gathering 
information and views on the Native Title Act. Both the Issues Paper and this 
Discussion Paper may be downloaded free of charge from the ALRC website. Hard 
copies may be obtained on request by contacting the ALRC on (02) 8238 6333. 
1.15 In releasing this Discussion Paper, the ALRC again calls for submissions to 
build on the evidence base so far established and to inform the final stage of the 
Inquiry leading to the Final Report, which is to be provided to the Attorney-General by 
the end of March 2015. 
1.16 With the release of this Discussion Paper, the ALRC invites individuals and 
organisations to make submissions in response to the specific proposals and questions, 
or to background material and analysis. 
                                                        
4  The Terms of Reference are set out in full on the ALRC website: <www.alrc.gov.au>. 
5  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 10. 
6  Public submissions are available on the ALRC website: <www.alrc.gov.au>. 
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The scope of Inquiry 
1.17 The Terms of Reference direct the ALRC to inquire into, and report on, 
Commonwealth native title laws and legal frameworks in the following areas: 
 connection requirements for recognition and scope of native title; 
 nature and content of native title; 
 authorisation; and 
 joinder. 
Connection requirements for recognition and scope of native title 
1.18 Connection requirements relate to how native title is established and proven 
under the Native Title Act. ‘Connection’ is not specifically defined in the legislation, 
but the term appears in s 223(1)(b) of the Native Title Act.
7
 As a term of more general 
usage, it refers to the provisions in s 223 defining native title and associated sections, 
such as the originating process for the application for a determination of native title, 
not only s 223(1)(b). 
1.19 In regard to connection, the ALRC was asked to consider the following five 
options for reform: 
 a presumption of continuity of acknowledgment and observance of traditional 
laws and customs and connection; 
 clarification of the meaning of ‘traditional’ to allow for the evolution and 
adaptation of culture and recognition of ‘native title rights and interests’; 
 clarification that ‘native title rights and interests’ can include rights and interests 
of a commercial nature; 
 confirmation that ‘connection with the land and waters’ does not require 
physical occupation or continued or recent use; and 
 empowerment of courts to disregard substantial interruption or change in 
continuity of acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs 
where it is in the interests of justice to do so. 
1.20 The Inquiry may consider any other improvements to the law and legal 
frameworks for connection requirements. 
1.21 Connection requirements consider both the factual matters relevant to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ laws and customs, as well as the legal 
rules that govern how native title is proven. This legal architecture owes much to Mabo 
v Queensland [No 2] (‘Mabo [No 2]’).
8
 
                                                        
7  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 223 (1)(b). 
8  Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
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1.22 The statutory provisions dealing with connection requirements for native title 
rights and interests form one section of the Native Title Act. The Inquiry, under its 
Terms of Reference, is to focus on these areas of law. The ALRC acknowledges the 
extent to which the native title claims process necessarily interacts with other sections 
of the Act, and the many other components in the native title system.
9
 
1.23 Recognition encompasses the acknowledgment of the historical occupancy of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in Australia and it animates the relevant 
legal rules in that 
the metaphorical result of applying rules whereby rights and interests are defined at 
common law as having vested, at the time of annexation, in the members of an 
Aboriginal society by reason of its traditional laws and customs and the way in which 
they define its relationship to land and waters. It is not a ‘mere’ metaphor. Its choice 
reflects a desire to give effect legally to the human reality involved in the ordinary 
meaning of ‘recognition’.10 
Nature and content of native title 
1.24 The nature and content (scope) of native title rights and interests is determined 
by reference to the factual circumstances of each claim.
11
 Section 223(2) of the Native 
Title Act relevantly provides ‘[w]ithout limiting subsection (1), rights and interests in 
that subsection includes hunting, gathering, or fishing, rights and interests’. The court, 
in making a determination of native title under s 225 of the Act, must set out 
(b)  the nature and extent of the native title rights and interests in relation to the 
determination area; and 
(c)  the nature and extent of any other interests in relation to the determination area; 
and 
(d)  the relationship between the rights and interests in paragraphs (b) and (c) (taking 
into account the effect of this Act). 
Authorisation 
1.25 Authorisation forms an initial step in bringing an application for a determination 
(claim) of native title under s 61 of the Native Title Act. Under s 251B of the Act there 
is a process that establishes which persons from a claim group have the authority to 
bring the claim. Those persons are the ‘applicant’ and can deal with matters arising in 
relation to the claim.
12
 
1.26 The ALRC is to consider any potential barriers to access to justice imposed by 
the authorisation procedures in the Native Title Act. 
                                                        
9  Association of Mining and Exploration Companies, Submission 19. 
10  Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 (10 June 2005) [948]. 
11  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 223(2), 225. 
12  Ibid s 62(1)(iv). 
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1.27 There is an important meeting point between the law around ‘connection and 
recognition of native title’ and questions of claim group membership and authorisation. 
It is a matter of simple justice that native title determinations should be made only in 
favour of the traditional owners of each area of land … Just as importantly, the 
ongoing demands of governance and decision-making in relation to native title lands 
require a clear and shared understanding of how different groups and subgroups fit 
together. These two considerations highlight the paramount importance of identifying 
the ‘right people for country’.13 
Joinder 
1.28 The applicant is always a party to a claim, as well as the respective governments 
involved. There may be many other parties too. Most persons become parties at the 
initial notification stage. Other persons may seek to become a party after this stage. 
Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders as well as non-Indigenous Australians can 
seek joinder. Joinder raises issues about potential barriers to access to justice, and the 
good ordering and productive relationships between all participants—Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous—within the native system.
14
 
The Preamble and objects of the Native Title Act 
1.29 In examining what, if any, changes could be made to Commonwealth native title 
laws and legal frameworks, the Terms of Reference direct the ALRC to be guided by 
the Preamble and objects of the Native Title Act. 
The Preamble 
1.30 The Preamble to the Native Title Act affirmed that ‘[t]he people whose 
descendants are now known as Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders were the 
inhabitants of Australia before European settlement’.
15
 
1.31 The Preamble lists relevant matters for the Parliament of Australia in enacting 
the law—it is the ‘moral foundation’ for the Act.
16
 The matters include: the 
uncompensated and involuntary dispossession of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait 
Islanders; their comprehensive social disadvantage in Australian society; and the 1967 
amendment to the Constitution.
17
 
1.32 The Preamble captures the Commonwealth Parliament’s intention to 
ensure that Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders receive the full recognition 
and status within the Australian nation to which history, their prior rights and 
interests, and their rich and diverse culture, fully entitle them to aspire.18 
                                                        
13  Nick Duff, ‘What’s Needed to Prove Native Title? Finding Flexibility Within the Law on Connection’ 
(Research Discussion Paper 35, AIATSIS, June 2014) 17. 
14  Association of Mining and Exploration Companies, Submission 19. 
15  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) Preamble. 
16  Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 (10 June 2005) [942]. 
17  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) Preamble. See also Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 (10 June 
2005) [939]. 
18  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) Preamble. 
 1. Introduction 19 
1.33 The Preamble references international law ‘by recognising international 
standards for the protection of universal human rights and fundamental freedoms’.
19
 
1.34 The Act was identified as an opportunity ‘to do justice to the Mabo decision in 
protecting native title and to ensure workable, certain, land management’.
20
 The 
Preamble notes that the ‘broader Australian community requires certainty and the 
enforceability of acts potentially made invalid because of the existence of native 
title’.
21
 
1.35 The Native Title Act was to be a special law:
22
 
The Parliament of Australia intends that the following law will take effect according 
to its terms and be a special law for the descendants of the original inhabitants of 
Australia … for securing the adequate advancement and protection of Aboriginal 
peoples and Torres Strait Islanders.23 
1.36 The Act and claims process were part of a proposed broader package, as ‘many 
Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders, because they have been dispossessed of 
their traditional lands, will be unable to assert native title rights and interests’.
24
 A 
Special Fund for land acquisitions has been implemented.
25
 The proposed social justice 
package has not eventuated. 
1.37 Central Desert Native Title services submitted that the guiding principles should 
be seen as consistent with ‘the characterisation of the NTA as beneficial legislation’.
26
 
The objects of the Act 
1.38 The objects in s 3 of the Native Title Act align with the Preamble. They are 
(a)   to provide for the recognition and protection of native title; and 
(b)   to establish ways in which future dealings affecting native title may proceed and 
to set standards for those dealings; and 
(c)  to establish a mechanism for determining claims to native title; and 
(d)  to provide for, or permit, the validation of past acts, and intermediate period 
acts, invalidated because of the existence of native title. 
                                                        
19  Ibid. 
20  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 November 1993, 2878 (Paul 
Keating).  
21  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) Preamble. 
22  Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 462. Sean Brennan notes the complex 
interaction between statutory presumptions and interpretive principles when construing the Native Title 
Act: Sean Brennan, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Indigenous Property Rights’ (2010) 21 Public Law 
Review 239, 252. 
23  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) Preamble. 
24  Ibid. 
25  The National Farmers Federation submitted that examination of the feasibility of greater reliance on the 
land fund should precede reform of the legislation. National Farmers’ Federation, Submission 14. 
26  Central Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26. 
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1.39 The introduction of the Native Title Act was promoted as a ‘practical building 
block of change’ and ‘the basis of a new relationship between indigenous and non-
Aboriginal Australians’.
27
 The legislation was ‘enacted against the fabric of the 
common law and in response to the recognition of native title in Mabo [No 2]’.
28
 Later 
cases have adopted differing positions on the extent of common law influence.
29
 
1.40 The Native Title Act operates within Australia’s federal system of government 
with divided, but at times overlapping, spheres of legislative powers and executive 
responsibilities between the Commonwealth and state and territory governments.
30
 The 
powers to grant interests of land in the tenure-based system of land law rest with state 
governments, as the inheritors of the colonial land law structures.
31
 In conjunction, 
state and territory governments have extensive land management, environmental 
protection, infrastructure provision, land use planning and other responsibilities that 
interface with native title rights and interests.
32
 
1.41 The Native Title Act is a valid exercise of the Commonwealth’s legislative 
power pursuant to s 51(xxvi) of the Constitution.
33
 As valid Commonwealth 
legislation, pursuant to s 109 of the Constitution, it is binding upon the states and 
territories.
34
 
1.42 There is no similar statutory scheme for determining Indigenous peoples’ claims 
of the extent of the Native Title Act in comparable jurisdictions.
35
 In New Zealand, the 
Waitangi Tribunal has a compensation and settlement function predicated upon the 
Treaty of Waitangi.
36
 In Canada, the courts have continued to play the major role in 
developing the common law of aboriginal rights and aboriginal title—albeit against the 
back drop of significant treaty and constitutional protections for First Nations 
peoples.
37
 
1.43 The objects reflect practical mechanisms to facilitate co-existence but reinforce 
the fundamental schema of native title imported from Mabo [No 2].
38
 The interplay 
                                                        
27  Maureen Tehan, ‘A Hope Disillusioned, an Opportunity Lost? Reflections on Common Law Native Title 
and Ten Years of the Native Title Act’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 523, 539 citing The 
Hon Paul Keating, ‘Speech by the Honourable Prime Minister, PJ Keating MP, Australian Launch of the 
International Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, Redfern, 10 December 1992’ (1993) 3 Aboriginal 
Law Bulletin 4, 5. 
28  Melissa Perry and Stephen Lloyd, Australian Native Title Law (Lawbook Co, 2003) 3. 
29  Ibid.  
30  Richard H Bartlett, Native Title in Australia (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2004) 88. 
31  Walker v State of South Australia (No 2) [2013] FCA 700 (19 July 2013) [29]. 
32  See, eg, Lisa Strelein, Dialogue About Land Justice: Papers from the National Native Title Conference 
(Aboriginal Studies Press, 2010). 
33  The relevant power operates in respect of ‘the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to 
make special laws’ Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (Cth) s 51 (xxvi). 
34  Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, [79]. 
35  Bartlett, above n 30, 39. 
36  Giselle Byrnes and David Ritter, ‘Antipodean Settler Societies and Their Complexities: The Waitangi 
Process in New Zealand and Native Title and the Stolen Generations in Australia’ (2008) 46 
Commonwealth &amp; Comparative Politics 54. 
37  V Marshall, Submission 11. 
38  Hal Wootten, ‘Mabo at Twenty: A Personal Retrospect’ in Toni Bauman and Glick Lydia (eds), The 
Limits of Change: Mabo and Native Title 20 Years On (AIATSIS, 2012) 431, 441.  
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between recognition, extinguishment and protection of native title rights and interests 
are central to understanding the functional structures within the Act.
39
 The Act ensures 
that ‘constitutional and legislative protections afforded to other property holders are 
enjoyed by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. This includes the 
requirement that compensation be paid on just terms’.
40
 
Guiding principles 
1.44 In addition to guidance from the Preamble and objects of the Native Title Act, 
the ALRC developed five guiding principles for reform. The ALRC invited comment 
on these principles in the Issues Paper. 
Principle 1: Acknowledging the importance of the recognition of native 
title 
Reform should acknowledge the importance of the recognition and protection of 
native title for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and the Australian 
community. 
1.45 The principle that reform to the Native Title Act should adhere to the importance 
of the recognition and protection of native title received support in many 
submissions.
41
   
1.46 In a legal sense, recognition may be thought of as 
[l]ying at the heart of the common law of native title and the Act … It is embedded in 
a matrix of rules defining the circumstances in which recognition will be accorded to 
native title rights and interests and those in which it will be withheld or withdrawn. 
The idea of recognition operates in a realm of legal discourse. It may be seen as a kind 
of translation of aspects of an indigenous society’s relationship to land and waters into 
a set of rights and interests which exist under non-indigenous laws.42 
1.47 The importance of a determination of native title is captured in that 
[r]ecognition of native title is significant for the individual native title holders, the 
native title holding body and the broader Australian community. It will usually also 
give rise to an entitlement to compensation for some past extinguishment, to exclusive 
rights in some areas, and to statutory procedural rights, including the ‘right to 
negotiate’.43 
                                                        
39  Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, [76]–[78]. 
40  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
41  Law Council of Australia, Submission 35; National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, Submission 32; 
North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; Minerals Council of Australia, Submission 8; 
Association of Mining and Exploration Companies Inc, Submission to the Australian Attorney-General’s 
Department, Review of the Native Title Act 1993—Draft Terms of Reference, 2013. 
42  Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 (10 June 2005) [948]. 
43  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
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1.48 The Australian Human Rights Commission highlighted the ongoing importance 
of the recognition and protection of native title as 
reforms to both the Native Title Act and the native title system more generally have 
been ad hoc and only ‘tinkered around the edges’. This has resulted in a native title 
system that has created some opportunities for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
communities, but which remains slow and cumbersome in the delivery of outcomes.44 
1.49 Some commentators argued that ‘recognition’ is no longer a barrier to achieving 
outcomes under the Act.
45
 The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australian 
questioned the assumption that ‘the system established under the NTA for the 
recognition of native title has somehow failed or is “unduly limiting”’.
 46
 In respect of 
any proposed reforms, their submission ‘cautions against amending the core provisions 
of the NTA that concern the recognition of native title without probative and objective 
evidence to this effect’.
47
 
1.50 Just Us Lawyers stressed the need to return a balance to the Act.
 48
 
Principle 2: Acknowledging interests in the native title system 
Reform should acknowledge the range of interests in achieving native title 
determinations that support relationships between stakeholders. 
1.51 It is inherent to the nature of native title rights and interests in land and waters 
that a claim will interact with many other interests.
49
 Section 225 of the Native Title 
Act sets out, with respect to a determination, the relationship between native title and 
other interests in a claim area. The precise interaction will depend upon the law and 
custom of the relevant claimant group, and the specific interests held by others in the 
area concerned.
50
 
1.52 Section 253 of the Native Title Act defines an interest in land and waters.
51
 The 
guiding principles extend that meaning to encompass consideration of a wider range of 
interests including those of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, 
governments at all levels, the courts, industry and commerce, and community 
organisations that may be involved in the native title system. A determination of native 
title takes effect as a judgment in rem—a legal right that is enforceable against third 
parties over time.
52
 
                                                        
44  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
45  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
46  Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, Submission 21. 
47  Ibid. 
48  Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. 
49  An act in relation to native title is defined in Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 226. 
50  Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Native Title—A Constitutional Shift?’ (Speech Delivered at the JD Lecture 
Series, The University of Melbourne, 24 March 2009). 
51  The operation of this section is examined in detail in Ch 11. 
52  Western Australia v Fazeldean on behalf of the Thalanyji People (No 2) [2013] FCAFC 58 (6 June 2013); 
Perry and Lloyd, above n 28, 108; Munn for and on behalf of the Gunggari People v Queensland (2001) 
115 FCR 109. 
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1.53 The many interests involved in any native title determination can also include 
overlapping claims or disputed claims by Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
Particular issues in terms of ‘access to justice’ arise for native title claimants and 
potential claimants.
53
 
1.54 ‘Co-existence’ captures the idea that there are complex inter-relationships 
between native title holders and the wider community.
54
 Agreement-making has built 
relationships between all stakeholders in the native title system.
55
 
1.55 Nonetheless, the Western Australian Government submission called for an 
additional principle for ‘ensuring consistency and compatibility with the development 
of Australia's unique political and legal history, including its history of European 
settlement.
56
 
1.56 Relevant industry groups acknowledged the importance of fostering 
relationships. 
Members of the MCA recognise that industry’s engagement with Indigenous peoples 
needs to be founded in mutual respect and in the recognition of Indigenous 
Australian’s rights in law, interests and special connections to land and waters. This 
point is made even more acute by the fact that more than 60 per cent of minerals 
operations in Australia have neighbouring Indigenous communities.57 
1.57 It would be unrealistic to expect that all conflict has been resolved since the 
Native Title Act was enacted, particularly given the strong divisions when the 
legislation was introduced.
58
 Further, the objectives of stakeholders within the native 
title system are not necessarily congruent. 
1.58 The need for the Native Title Act to achieve certainty is emphasised by some 
stakeholders.
59
 The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australian suggested 
adoption of guiding principles which seek to ensure that the native title system 
maintains integrity, efficiency, timeliness, and certainty.
60
 In this light, the Minerals 
Council of Australia ‘supports the guiding principles but suggests that providing 
‘transparency and certainty’ for all stakeholders should be added to Principle 2.
61
 
Ed Wensing noted that certainty as a goal needs to be balanced against other outcomes 
to be achieved under the Act.
62
 
                                                        
53  See Ch 10 and Ch 11. 
54  Aden Ridgeway, ‘Addressing the Economic Exclusion of Indigenous Australians through Native Title’ 
(2005) 2. 
55  See, eg, the views expressed by pastoralists, ‘that more than any other respondents in the Federal Court, 
they have to live the longest with outcomes of native title determinations’: Pastoralists and Graziers 
Association, Submission 3. 
56  Western Australian Government, Submission 20. 
57  Minerals Council of Australia, Submission 8. 
58  Tim Rowse, ‘How We Got a Native Title Act’ (1993) 65 The Australian Quarterly 110, 131. 
59  AMEC notes that the Preamble to the Native Title Act recognises ‘the need of the broader Australian 
community require certainty’: Association of Mining and Exploration Companies, Submission 19. 
60  Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, Submission 21. 
61  Minerals Council of Australia, Submission 8. 
62  E Wensing, Submission 13. 
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1.59 As the Association of Mineral Exploration Companies stated, 
[t]he NTA is of course concerned with more than simply the recognition and 
protection of native title. It is in effect a compromise between the recognition and 
protection of native title rights and interests and the provision of certainty to the wider 
community, which holds or may seek to acquire or exercise non-native title rights.63 
1.60 The ALRC notes that acknowledging all interests within the native title system 
will require balance and proportionate responses. 
1.61 Commentators from a range of perspectives urged a move toward a settlement 
framework, rather than the current claims process under the Native Title Act.
64
 
1.62 The Native Title Act is to give precedence to conciliation and negotiation of 
native title determinations where possible.
65
 Chapter 3 outlines the shifts in practice 
toward achieving consent determinations,
66
 and a growing emphasis upon 
settlements.
67
 
1.63 A lack of certainty on legal points may inhibit effective negotiation and 
conciliation. As the South Australian Government explained: 
As the law on the recognition of native title became clearer, the State Government and 
other parties could more confidently proceed with negotiations to resolve claims by 
consent … While there is no doubt scope for improvement in the native title system, 
South Australia is concerned that significant changes to native title law will actually 
slow down and complicate the State's current program for resolving native title 
claims. 68 
Principle 3: Encouraging timely and just resolution of determinations 
Reform should promote timely and practical outcomes for parties to a native title 
determination through effective claims resolution, while seeking to ensure the 
integrity of the process. 
1.64 There was general support for this principle. However, AIATSIS qualified its  
support by indicating that timeliness in itself should not be the primary concern, 
arguing for a   
principled approach to reform that encourages savings in time and resources; though 
not at the cost of achieving just recognition of the rights of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples. The paramount ‘integrity’ of the system in this context lies in 
ensuring that measures to improve the timeliness of matters will at least do no harm. 
                                                        
63  Association of Mining and Exploration Companies, Submission 19. 
64  See, eg, National Native Title Council, Submission 16; John Catlin, ‘Recognition Is Easy’ in Toni 
Bauman and Lydia Glick (eds), The Limits of Change: Mabo and Native Title 20 Years On (AIATSIS, 
2012) 426.  
65  North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (1996) 185 CLR 595, [18]; Native Title Act 1993 
(Cth) Preamble. 
66  Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; Queensland Government Department of Natural 
Resources and Mines, Submission 28; Western Australian Government, Submission 20. 
67  For a recent example, see Noongar (Koorah, Nitja, Boordahwan) (Past, Present, Future) Recognition Bill 
2014 (WA) tabled as a draft bill in WA Parliament in February 2014. 
68  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
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An appropriate policy rationale applies considerations of efficiency, only in the 
context of a focus first on ‘just’ and then on ‘timely’.69 
1.65 A need for balance was stressed. AIATSIS further submitted that 
[p]romoting the timely and effective resolution of native title matters is an appropriate 
concern for any actor in the system. While avoidable delay can be a denial of justice, 
a lapse of time may be necessary for the just and efficient resolution of a matter. This 
is particularly the case in native title matters, which are unique in the Federal Courts’ 
jurisdiction, as they are lodged well before the parties are prepared for litigation.70 
1.66 The North Queensland Land Council directed attention to securing the integrity 
of the claims process and its role in building capacity for all parties to successfully 
engage.
71
 Adherence to international best practice built on human rights standards for 
negotiation and consultation was identified as another important factor.
72
 
1.67 Claims should not be unnecessarily prolonged. Long time frames have 
repercussions for the viability of current and future native title communities, and in 
terms of commercial certainty.
73
 Costs for the parties involved and, more generally, 
within the native title system, can escalate if there are long time frames. The Federal 
Court has instituted practice initiatives designed to ‘ensure where possible that 
resolution of native title cases is achieved more easily and delivered in a more timely, 
effective and efficient way’.
74
 
1.68 The balance between timely and practical outcomes, and procedural and 
substantive integrity, assumes particular significance as native title moves into the 
‘next phase’. Attention is shifting to governance of native title.
75
 The Australian 
Human Rights Commission explained: 
The Commission also considers it appropriate that any suggested amendments that 
relate to benefits obtained from either determinations of native title or Indigenous 
Land Use Agreements (ILUAs), also take into consideration the need to build good 
governance capacity within the native title system. This is particularly important to 
enable PBCs to manage native title benefits into the future.76 
Principle 4: Consistency with international law 
Reform should reflect Australia’s international obligations in respect of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and have regard to the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
                                                        
69  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
70  Ibid. 
71  North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17. 
72  S Bielefeld, Submission 6. 
73 ‘Principle 3 should also include the aim of providing certainty for future land use in the areas of 
determined native title’: South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
74  Federal Court of Australia, ‘Annual Report 2011–2012’ 13. 
75  Valerie Cooms, Governance, Community Control and Native Title (Paper presented at the AIATSIS 
Native Title Conference, Coffs Harbour, 1–3 June 2005). 
76  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
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1.69 Australia has international obligations in respect of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples under a range of binding international law instruments. The United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
77
 (‘UNDRIP’ or ‘the 
Declaration’) also reflects human rights standards that are relevant to the Native Title 
Act.
78
 The Terms of Reference direct the ALRC Inquiry to Australia’s statement of 
support for the Declaration.
79
 
1.70 The Minerals Council of Australia, while agreeing ‘it is important to have regard 
to international law’, noted also ‘it needs to be applied as ratified within the Australian 
context where the Crown has sovereign rights over minerals and with regard to the 
overall context and objects of the instruments in question, not just provisions read in 
isolation’.
80
 
1.71 The National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples supported the view that 
ALRC proposals should be consistent with Australia’s international obligations while 
stating: 
we are cognisant that despite repeated calls from UN treaty bodies for the Act to be 
amended to reduce the high evidentiary requirements that prevent many Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Peoples from regaining control of their traditional lands, 
successive Australian governments have failed to move beyond piecemeal 
amendments.81 
1.72 The Native Title Act was enacted in light of developments in international law.
82
 
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which 
Australia is a party, was of particular relevance.
83
 Under article 1(4) of the Convention 
an allowance is made for ‘special measures’.
84
 
1.73 Australia signed the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) on 18 December 1972 and ratified the Convention on 10 December 
1975, with no reservations. The UN ICESCR Committee noted the high cost, 
                                                        
77  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st Sess, 107th Plen Mtg, 
Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007). 
78   Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
79  The Hon Jenny Macklin, MP, ‘Statement on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (Speech Delivered at Parliament House, Canberra, 3 April 2009).  
80  Minerals Council of Australia, Submission 8. 
81  National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, Submission 32; see also National Native Title Council, 
Submission 16. 
82  See, eg, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) arts 2, 26; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 
195 (entered into force 4 January 1969) arts 1, 2, 5. See also Australian Human Rights Commission, 
Rights to Equality and Non-discrimination <www.humanrights.gov.au/rights-equality-and-non-
discrimination>.  
83  Bartlett, above n 30, 15. 
84  Art 14  relevantly states ‘taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or 
ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups 
or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms’. Section 8 of the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) reflects this Article of the Convention. 
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complexity and strict rules for native title claims, and the inadequate protection of 
Indigenous cultural and intellectual property and language, in accordance with art 15.
85
 
1.74 Since the enactment of the Native Title Act, specific human rights frameworks 
for Indigenous peoples have emerged internationally. UNDRIP is the most significant. 
In 2009 Australia issued a statement of support for the Declaration.
86
 The Declaration 
has provisions relating to the recognition and protection of Indigenous peoples’ lands 
and waters.
87
 
1.75 Professor Megan Davis suggests that 
[t]he Declaration represents an important framework from which the Australian state 
can re-engage Indigenous communities in relation to native title on the basis of 
internationally recognised and accepted standards pertaining to the rights of 
Indigenous peoples to land and the recognition of their culture.88 
1.76 The Declaration is a resolution of the General Assembly giving Indigenous 
Peoples ‘an evidentiary and persuasive role in stimulating the development of 
jurisprudence on the rights of indigenous people’.
89
 As the National Congress 
submission states, in regard to the Native Title Act, 
Congress draws distinction between the requirements of the Act, which merely extend 
to clarifying where land ownership of our Peoples might have survived the imposition 
of British and Australian law over our territories, combined with the additional 
requirement to provide evidence of continued customary practices; in contrast to the 
human rights standard, requiring independent and balanced adjudication of the rights 
of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples.90 
1.77 Article 38 of the Declaration provides that: 
States, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous Peoples, shall take 
appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of the 
Declaration. 
1.78 Within Australia, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice 
Commissioner has advocated a ‘principled approach’ to implementing the 
Declaration.
91
 The Australian Human Rights Commission stated: 
The Declaration is a remedial instrument, designed to rectify a history of failings 
when it comes to protecting Indigenous peoples’ human rights. The Declaration 
                                                        
85  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Australia, 42nd Sess, UN Doc E/C.12/AUS/CO/4 (12 June 2009) 
[32]–[33]. 
86  The Hon Jenny Macklin, MP, ‘Statement on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (Speech Delivered at Parliament House, Canberra, 3 April 2009).  
87  Arts 25–28. See S Bielefeld, Submission 6. 
88  Megan Davis, ‘Adding a New Dimension: Native Title and the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’ [2008] Australian Law Reform Commission Reform Journal 17, 17 as quoted in S 
Bielefeld, Submission 6. 
89  NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29. 
90  National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, Submission 32. 
91  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, ‘Social Justice and Native Title 
Report’ (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2013) 93. 
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contains the ‘minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the 
indigenous peoples of the world’. It elaborates the rights already set out in existing 
human rights instruments, including the treaties to which Australia is a party.92 
1.79 Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is a principle that has gained increasing 
acceptance as an international best practice standard to govern dealings between 
indigenous peoples and third parties.
93
 More informal concepts such as a ‘social licence 
to operate’ have gained increasing acceptance in industry and the community. 
1.80 These standards have important practical ramifications: 
[s]uccess on projects, or at least a smooth process from inception to conclusion, 
depends for a large part on how you build relationships with people along the way. It 
is critical that you engage Aboriginal people early in the piece. People are keen to be 
involved—they are very determined to protect their country and sacred sites, but they 
do not want to stifle development. People want to participate—it’s as simple as that. 
Sure you may have some challenges through the process, but they are never 
insurmountable and if you treat people with respect—that includes affording people 
the right to their free, prior and informed consent—and listen to what they are saying, 
you will get things done.94 
Principle 5: Supporting sustainable futures 
Reform should promote sustainable, long-term social, economic and cultural 
development for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
1.81 Many submissions supported this principle, but also raised some caveats about 
the capacity of the Native Title Act to deliver effective social, economic and cultural 
development.
95
 Other submissions emphasised the need for economic development to 
occur in a culturally appropriate way: 
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner encourages 
that outcomes sought be measurable, highlighting the critical importance of economic 
development occurring in a way that supports and respects Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples’ culture and identity.96 
1.82 The NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee endorsed the view of the 
UN Human Rights Committee to the effect 
that culture manifests itself in a variety of forms, including livelihood activities 
including fishing or hunting, in addition to the right to live on reserves protected by 
law. The right of indigenous peoples to participate in resource development on their 
traditional land has also been recognised by international law.97 
                                                        
92  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
93  S Bielefeld, Submission 6. 
94  Brian Wyatt, National Planning Congress, (Speech Delivered to the Planning Institute Australia, 
Canberra, 25 March 2013) as quoted in E Wensing, Submission 13.  
95  AIATSIS, Submission 36; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17. 
96  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
97  NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29. 
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1.83 The Preamble to the Native Title Act draws a link between Indigenous 
disadvantage and the dispossession of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
Since that time, many Commonwealth and state policies have been developed to 
redress Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander disadvantage. For example, on 1 July 
2014, the Australian Government’s Indigenous Advancement Strategy commenced.
98
  
1.84 Several submissions noted that few policies effectively link socio-economic 
opportunities for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples with native title 
outcomes.
99
 
1.85 The importance of simultaneously developing sustainable native title outcomes 
and policies designed to enhance Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ 
economic opportunities was highlighted by Professor Jon Altman. He questioned, ‘how 
can socioeconomic gaps be closed without economic development where people 
live?’
100
 
1.86 Other submissions emphasised that ‘[r]ecognition and protection of native title 
under the NTA is a starting point but not a complete answer to the social and economic 
issues which may face native title holders’.
101
 
1.87 Several submissions identified wide variation in native title outcomes.
102
 The 
Kimberley Land Council noted that the Native Title Act 
provides the best opportunity for economic, social and cultural development to those 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who are least impacted by colonisation 
… It is important to recognise that the NTA is not a panacea for all of the wrongs of 
dispossession and colonisation, but is one important device in addressing these 
wrongs. 103 
1.88 Other submissions identified the need for a longer term perspective. Frith and 
Tehan contended that 
more attention should be paid, in terms of sustainable futures, to achieving 
mechanisms by which native title groups can sustainably and effectively manage their 
determined native title rights and interests to achieve their long term land justice 
aspirations. Ultimately, a native title determination is not the only or even the main 
outcome of the native title process in the NTA.104 
                                                        
98  The objective of the Strategy is to improve the lives of Indigenous Australians. Its focus includes ‘getting 
Indigenous Australians into work, fostering Indigenous business and ensuring Indigenous people receive 
economic and social benefits from the effective management of their land and native title rights’: 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Indigenous Affairs—Indigenous Advancement Strategy 
<www.dpmc.gov.au/indigenous_affairs/ias/index.cfm>. 
99  See, eg, AIATSIS, Submission 36; Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30.  
100  Jon C Altman, ‘Reforming the Native Title Act’ (Topical Issue 10, Centre for Aboriginal Economic 
Policy Research ANU, 2011) 4. 
101  Northern Territory Government, Submission 31. 
102  Ibid; Western Australian Government, Submission 20; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17. 
103  Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30. 
104  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
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1.89 There are expectations that native title can achieve effective economic outcomes 
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in coming years.
105
 The identification 
of native title with sustainable future outcomes also suggests that critical components, 
such as the underpinning rights and governance structures, will be important for long-
term social, economic and cultural development for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples. 
1.90 A robust framework for reviewing the Native Title Act based on the principles 
identified in this chapter is important in that regard. 
 
                                                        
105  Deloitte Access Economics, ‘Review of the Roles and Functions of Native Title Organisations’ 
(Australian Government, March 2014) 3. 
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Framework for the proposals 
2.1 This chapter outlines the approach adopted for the ALRC proposals in light of 
the Guiding Principles identified in Chapter 1 and by reference to the Preamble and 
Objects of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). The analysis deals primarily with proposals 
related to ‘connection requirements’, and secondly with issues in relation to 
authorisation and joinder. 
2.2 The ALRC Inquiry, in formulating its proposals, has adopted the benchmark of 
‘the recognition and protection’ of native title rights and interests.
1
 This platform can 
provide an effective basis for native title to support ‘Indigenous economic development 
and generate sustainable long-term benefits for Indigenous Australians.
2
 
2.3 However, notwithstanding the growing number of native title determinations 
across Australia, and the achievement of benefits for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples, the law relating to connection requirements remains complex and 
variable in its outcomes. There is a need to reduce complexity and to focus on the core 
elements for proving native title. Timely—but just—resolution of claims is also an 
important objective. 
2.4 The ALRC was asked to examine potential improvements to the operation of the 
native title system—requiring analysis of the effectiveness of proposals against the 
systemic operation of native title laws and the many interests and areas affected. 
                                                        
1  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 3(a). 
2  Terms of Reference <www.alrc.gov.au>. 
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2.5 The statutory provisions relating to authorisation of an applicant, for example, 
have significant human and resource impacts. Joinder matters impinge on important 
questions around access to justice for all parties in the system. 
2.6 The improved operation of native title law and legal frameworks therefore has 
many potential benefits for participants in the claims process and for the Australian 
community. 
Rationale for reform 
2.7 The Native Title Act is sketched upon a large ethical canvas, but also serves 
the pragmatic requirements of an orderly interaction between the recognition of native 
title and the myriad laws and interests that have settled upon the land and waters of 
Australia since their progressive annexation by the British Crown.3 
2.8 This Inquiry seeks to balance requirements for certainty and orderly interaction 
in the native title system, with the principles of fairness and equality that are stated in 
the Act. Australia has obligations under international instruments that help shape its 
relationship with Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders. 
2.9 The ALRC’s proposals retain the basis of native title law adopted in the Native 
Title Act from Mabo v Queensland [No 2]
4
 (Mabo [No 2]). The Law Society of 
Western Australia submitted that the legislation as originally enacted was intended to 
reflect beneficial purposes consistent with the decision in Mabo [No 2].
5
 
2.10 Attention, however, is directed to clarifying and refining the highly complex law 
around connection requirements centred on s 223 of the Act to ensure that claim 
resolution is not impeded. 
2.11 In addition, the Inquiry seeks to streamline aspects of the authorisation process, 
while adopting decision-making processes appropriate to Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander communities—in line with facilitating access to the claims process. Access to 
justice considerations, balanced by the need for system integrity and efficiency, inform 
the suggested reforms to joinder provisions. 
2.12 These areas are important in governing the interactions between Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples, as well as between claimants and other parties in the 
native title claims process. The laws have significant ramifications for the effective 
operation of institutions within the native title system, such as courts, the National 
Native Title Tribunal, Native Title Representative Bodies and service providers. 
The question of change? 
2.13 The Australian legal system is characterised by change to ensure its continued 
relevance and coherence, through statutory reform and common law evolution. In 
examining improvements to native title law and legal frameworks, the ALRC, has 
                                                        
3  Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 (10 June 2005) [938]. 
4  Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
5  Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9. 
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necessarily, included an analysis of the interaction between the Native Title Act and 
case law. 
2.14 The proposals take into account the development of native title law since the 
enactment of the Native Title Act and the degree of legal certainty achieved as a result 
of major native title litigation.
6
 Parties in the native title system have ordered their 
practices and interactions with other parties and with native title institutions and 
organisations on this basis. Some submissions have stressed the importance of 
stability.
7
 
2.15 Nonetheless, there have been calls for reform of the Native Title Act, over time; 
including to the law governing the claims mechanism.
8
 Dr Paul Burke noted: 
there is a tendency in legal circles towards acceptance of the law as it is. The promise 
of bodies like the Australian Law Reform Commission is to step outside the usual 
orientation towards acceptance, at least within the terms of the enquiry.9 
2.16 However, some caution was advised in terms of potential disruption in some 
submissions.
10
 Others pointed to the achievements of the last two decades and noted 
that the native title claims process has accelerated and consent determinations are 
moving forward in many areas.
11
 
2.17 Other submissions advocated an incremental model of change within the Native 
Title Act.
12
 In addition, recent years have seen systemic changes to the claims process 
designed to deliver ‘practical, timely and flexible outcomes.’
13
 
2.18 Several ALRC proposals are oriented to the practical operation of the claims 
process in relation to authorisation and joinder procedures, although some issues 
generating conflict in the native title sphere are not easily resolved through the legal 
process. 
                                                        
6  See for example, Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1; Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 
CLR 1; Wilson v Anderson (2002) 213 CLR 401; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v 
Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422; Western Australia v Brown [2014] HCA 8 (12 March 2014); Akiba v 
Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209. 
7  National Farmers’ Federation, Submission 14; Pastoralists and Graziers Association, Submission 3. 
8  See for example, Justice A M North and Tim Goodwin, Disconnection–The Gap between Law and 
Justice in Native Title: A Proposal for Reform (Paper Delivered at the 10th Annual Native Title 
Conference, Melbourne, 4 June 2009).  
9  P Burke, Submission 33.  
10  Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; Association of Mining and Exploration Companies, 
Submission 19. 
11  A more complete analysis of those outcomes is contained in Ch 3. 
12  Western Australian Government, Submission 20. 
13  Terms of Reference, above n 2. 
34 Review of the Native Title Act 1993 
 
 
2.19 In turn, there were calls for a more fundamental revision of the Native Title Act, 
arguing that 
some of the problems underlying the specific questions of the inquiry stem back to 
fundamental choices in the judicial formulation of the legal doctrine of native title.14 
2.20 The ALRC does not propose that there should be comprehensive redefinition of 
native title under the Act as this may exacerbate the uncertainties experienced by all 
participants in the native title system. Nor does the ALRC suggest removal of the 
current claims-based process for native title determinations. Instead, the underpinning 
model of native title and the claims process is retained, while seeking to refocus on the 
core elements of native title law to facilitate an effective determination process. The 
elements in the definition of native title come from Mabo [No 2].
15
 
Australia’s legal history 
2.21 In Mabo [No 2], the High Court explored the legal relationship between 
Australia’s Indigenous peoples and the incoming settlers. One of the central questions 
was to consider whether, upon assertion of British sovereignty over Australia, the 
Crown’s title was ‘burdened’ by pre-existing rights. 
2.22 The Court declared that the pre-existing rights of Australia’s Indigenous peoples 
survived the acquisition of sovereignty.
16
 The majority decision was summarised as 
recognising ‘a form of native title which, in cases where it has not been extinguished, 
reflects the entitlement of the indigenous inhabitants, in accordance with their law and 
customs to their traditional lands’.
17
 
2.23 Mabo [No 2] navigated a path between extremes: 
On the one hand, the implications of sovereignty and the demand for a coherent 
skeleton of principle in the law prevented a wholesale reappraisal of Australian land 
law. On the other hand, the demands of justice prevented a simple confirmation of the 
extinguishment of all Indigenous rights to land.18 
2.24 As the Western Australian Government submitted 
the present concepts of native title derive from Mabo No 2, and, in turn, from 
Australia’s unique political and legal history, including its history of European 
settlement. Any proposed changes to the native title system, especially any changes to 
s 223(1) of the NTA, must take into account these historical foundations of native 
title.19 
                                                        
14  P Burke, Submission 33. 
15  Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 2. 
16  Ibid 116. 
17  Ibid 15. 
18  Ibid 68–69, 63–71, 112–113; Alex Reilly, ‘From a Jurisprudence of Regret to a Regrettable 
Jurisprudence: Shaping Native Title from Mabo to Ward’ (2002) 9 E Law Journal: Murdoch University 
[21]. 
19  Western Australian Government, Submission 20. 
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2.25 The overarching political relationship between the Australian nation and 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples that has evolved since Mabo [No 2] and 
its future development are beyond the scope of this Inquiry. However, the ALRC notes 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples Recognition Act 2013 (Cth).
20
 Native 
title can contribute to a platform for strengthening the place of Aboriginal peoples and 
Torres Strait Islanders within Australian society—including by supporting economic 
development in a culturally relevant manner, in line with the principles adopted for this 
Inquiry. 
The basis of native title law 
2.26 The source for native title in Mabo [No 2] was the recognition by the common 
law of the pre-existing rights and interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples.
21
 As Dr Paul Burke comments 
the most fundamental choice was to adopt a ‘laws and customs’ approach in which 
ideas of ‘laws and customs’ become universal, cross-cultural means of recognition.22 
2.27 This form of judicial ‘recognition’ is part of a long standing tradition in the 
common law system where courts give legal effect to ‘rights’.
23
 The common law, 
derived from Britain, constituted the law ‘received’ in Australia at settlement.
24
 
Common law courts have long asserted their power to protect people’s rights.
25
 
2.28 ‘Recognition’ also has a more specific genesis. It refers to the historical body of 
law that governed the British acquisition of colonies, and which included the doctrine 
of recognition, and the associated doctrine of continuity.
26
 
2.29 In the current Australian context, the concept of recognition links the common 
law and statute via the concepts of ‘recognition and protection’ for native title, 
expressed in the Objects of the Native Title Act.
27
 
                                                        
20  On 27 March 2014, the Minister for Indigenous Affairs appointed a Review Panel under the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Peoples Recognition Act 2013 (Cth) to assess Australia’s readiness to support a 
referendum to recognise Indigenous Australians in the Australian Constitution. See John Anderson, 
Tanya Hosch and Richard Eccles, ‘Final Report of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act of 
Recognition Review Panel’ (September 2014). The Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Recognition 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples is receiving submissions on steps to progress towards a 
successful referendum on Indigenous Constitutional Recognition by 30 October 2014. Co-chairs Patrick 
Dodson and Mark Leibler of the Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians 
completed their report, ‘Recognising Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in the Constitution: 
Report of the Expert Panel’ (Commonwealth of Australia, January 2012). 
21  Justice Robert French, ‘Western Australia v Ward: Devils and Angels in the Detail’ (Paper presented at 
the Native Title Conference 2002, Geraldton).  
22  P Burke, Submission 33.  
23  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
24  Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, 182 (Gummow J); Reilly, above n 18, [67].  
25  Ulla Secher, Aboriginal Customary Law: A Source of Common Law Title to Land (Hart Publishing, 
2014). 
26  Ibid. 
27  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 16 December 1993, 5097 (Christopher Evans). 
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2.30 Both courts and the legislature are part of the law-making system. Courts 
interpret and apply statutes and develop the body of case law rules and principles, 
subject to a concept of parliamentary sovereignty. This has proven central to the 
understanding of native title as it has developed in the law around the Native Title 
Act.
28
 
The Native Title Act 
2.31 Mabo [No 2] provided the source for the legal definition in s 223 of the Native 
Title Act.
29
 The wording there reflects the findings ‘that proof of native title requires 
proof that there is identifiable group, traditional connection with the land and the 
group’s laws and customs, and the maintenance of connection’.
30
 The High Court, in 
Ward, acknowledged the link, stating that ‘pars (a) and (b) of s 223(1) plainly are based 
on what was said by Brennan J in Mabo [No 2]’.
31
 
2.32 Secondly, Mabo [No 2] drew upon long-established common law principles 
arising from the British colonial experience and the jurisprudence from comparable 
countries, such as Canada.
32
 The majority in the High Court, in Mabo [No 2], was 
guided by international law and human rights principles.
33
 Submissions emphasised 
that Mabo [No 2] has been accepted as a principled platform for dealing with historical 
injustice.
34
 AIATSIS noted that the case has provided a model for the courts in several 
countries.
35
 
2.33 When the Act was being drafted, the assumption was that the law concerning 
connection requirements would develop in line with the initial common law.
36
 Once the 
Native Title Act was in place, some argued that the High Court gave ‘the concept of 
“recognition” a narrower scope than … Parliament intended’.
37
 According to another 
view, this process unnecessarily reduced the influence of the body of common law 
principles.
38
 
2.34 In Ward, however, the Court stated: ‘[b]ecause what is claimed in the present 
matters are claims made under the Native Title Act, for rights defined in the Native 
Title Act, it is that statute which governs’.
39
 In Yorta Yorta, the majority of the High 
                                                        
28  Michael Hudson McHugh, ‘The Law-Making Function of the Judicial Process–Part II’ (1998) 62 
Australian Law Journal 116, 124.  
29  ‘[T]he antecedent rights and interests in land possessed by the indigenous inhabitants of the territory 
survived the change in sovereignty. Those antecedent rights and interests thus constitute a burden on the 
radical title of the Crown’: Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, [62]. 
30  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
31  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [16]. Although, later found to be unconstitutional, s 12 of 
the Native Title Act provided that ‘the common law of Australia in respect of native title has … the force 
of a law of the Commonwealth’. 
32  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
33  Ibid. 
34  V Marshall, Submission 11; S Bielefeld, Submission 6. 
35  AIATSIS, Submission 36.  
36  Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373. 
37  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [134] (McHugh J). 
38  Justice Robert French, ‘A Moment of Change—Personal Reflections on the National Native Title 
Tribunal 1994–98’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 488, 521. 
39  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [468]. 
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Court held that the ‘common law of Australia cannot be understood as a form of 
drafting by incorporation’.
40
 
2.35 In 2013, the High Court noted the contribution of the common law to 
recognition of native title: 
It is a necessary condition of their inclusion in a determination that the rights and 
interests are recognised by the common law of Australia. That condition flows from 
s 223(1)(c). ‘Recognise’ in this context means that the common law ‘will, by the 
ordinary processes of law and equity, give remedies in support of the relevant rights 
and interests to those who hold them’.41 
2.36 Given the foundation of the Native Title Act in both statute and the common law, 
it is appropriate for the ALRC to consider both areas. Common law and statute have 
had an intertwined role in defining and interpreting native title.
42
 In particular, the 
proposed reforms seek to refocus on ‘core elements’ in the definition of native title. 
Construction of s 223 
2.37 In its Preamble, the Native Title Act stated: ‘The Parliament of Australia intends 
that the following law will take effect according to its terms and be a special law for 
the descendants of the original inhabitants of Australia’.
43
 The Terms of Reference 
expressly direct the ALRC to the Preamble and Objects of the Act when considering 
what, if any, changes could be made to improve the operation of Commonwealth native 
title law and legal frameworks. 
2.38 Further, where legislation is identified as being beneficial, the High Court has 
stated that such legislation should be given a ‘fair, large and liberal’ interpretation, 
rather than one which is ‘literal or technical’.
44
 
2.39 In view of these approaches to interpreting the Act, this section briefly 
summarises the approach to reforms to the definition of native title. The intention is to 
reduce the complexity and remain consistent with a ‘fair, large and liberal’ 
interpretation of the Native Title Act. A detailed overview of the law relevant to s 223 
of the Act appears in Chapters 4–8. 
2.40 It is accepted though that there is a complex approach to the interpretation of 
statutory definitions: 
The common law system of statutory interpretation is not just going by the words 
alone (literal interpretation) or applying rules of thumb … but something much more 
difficult and pluralistic.45 
                                                        
40  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [76]. 
41  Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209, [9]. 
42  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
43  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) Preamble. 
44  IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1, 12 (Brennan CJ, McHugh J); 39 (Gummow J). See also AB v 
Western Australia (2011) 244 CLR 390, [24]. 
45  Francis Bennion, ‘The Global Method: Statutory Interpretation in the Common Law World’ (2000) 82 
Commonwealth Legal Education Association Newsletter 30, 33. 
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2.41 Interpretation of s 223 of the Native Title Act has become ‘difficult and 
pluralistic’ as the courts have grappled with the difficulties of reconciling the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander laws and customs with the Australian legal 
system—as the necessary task for determining native title.
46
 
2.42 Yet the actual wording in s 223 of the Native Title Act contains relatively 
straightforward concepts—rights and interests in land and waters which are possessed 
under laws and customs; acknowledgment of those laws and observance of customs 
since the assertion of sovereignty, giving rise to the connection that Aboriginal peoples 
and Torres Strait Islanders have with land and waters. The rights and interests are 
recognised by the common law. The High Court in Ward, noted that these core 
elements have remained constant.
47
 
2.43 The Act is the starting point for determining native title rights and interests.
48
 
New requirements for s 223 
2.44 Over time, however, the courts have progressively articulated an expanded set of 
requirements for determining native title beyond the ‘core elements’ actually contained 
in the statutory definition of native title.
49
 Although sourced in Mabo [No 2], this 
framework has reoriented or expanded the meaning of certain terms in the actual 
wording, such as ‘traditional’. In turn, other concepts, such as ‘normative society’, 
have been implied into the definition. These additional requirements are now held to be 
integral to the s 223 definition of native title, although not found in the text of the 
statute. 
2.45 The expanded exposition of ‘connection requirements’ to prove native title 
culminated in the formulation adopted by the High Court in Yorta Yorta.
50
 This ‘test’ 
for determining native title was affirmed in later case law and has become central to 
framing the evidence that is brought to prove native title (see Chapters 4–7). 
2.46 Concepts introduced into the framework of the Native Title Act have produced 
extensive requirements for factual proof of native title under the Act. For example, 
‘continuity’ now effectively functions as an integrated, but yet an additional 
‘connection requirement’ (see Chapter 5). 
                                                        
46  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422. 
47  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [17]. 
48  As affirmed by the High Court in: Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1; Commonwealth v 
Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1; Wilson v Anderson (2002) 213 CLR 401. ‘However, as indicated, the 
immediately relevant elements in the definition in s 223(1) of “native title” and “native title rights and 
interests” have remained constant’: Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [17]. 
49  French J, in an extra-curial comment, noted that the turn to the statute also involved extensive re-
interpretation of the terms within s 223. Justice Robert French, ‘Western Australia v Ward: Devils and 
Angels in the Detail’ (Paper presented at the Native Title Conference 2002, Geraldton). 
50  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422. 
 2. Framework for Review of the Native Title Act 39 
2.47 Several submissions noted the difficulties for all parties that these additional 
requirements have imposed.
51
 By contrast, other submissions suggested that connection 
requirements no longer constituted a significant difficulty for claim resolution.
52
 
Summary of approach to connection requirements 
2.48 The ALRC proposes several amendments to s 223 of the Native Title Act by 
means of clarifying statements to focus construction on the core elements in the text of 
the section to ameliorate the effect of ‘additional’ requirements. 
2.49 The proposals give renewed attention to the actual wording of s 223(1) of the 
Native Title Act. In line, with accepted principles for statutory construction governing 
Commonwealth legislation, the statements support an interpretation of s 223, ‘that 
would best achieve the Act’s purpose’.
53
 
2.50 Proposals 5–1 to 5–4 suggest amendment of s 223 of the Native Title Act 
through clarifying statements directed to the interpretation of terms that exist in the 
statutory definition. 
2.51 Proposals 7–1 and 7–2 provide an alternative by proposing that the text of the 
definition itself be altered. ‘Traditional’ and ‘connection’ are to be found in the text of 
s 223.
54
 The ALRC proposes that the term ‘traditional’ be deleted from the text of 
s 223. The ALRC also proposes amendments to the term ‘connection’ in s 223(1)(b). 
2.52 Proposals 8–1 and 8–2 reflect the current law with respect to ‘commercial native 
title rights and interests’. 
2.53 The proposals around connection requirements are designed to: 
 accord with the object of the recognition and protection of native title rights and 
interests under the Native Title Act; 
 give greater attention to how Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders 
frame their relationship to country; 
 reduce the complexity of the law around connection requirements by 
emphasising the present day connection of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples with land and waters, while recognising the origins in the period before 
the assertion of sovereignty; 
 expedite the claims process by a refocus on core elements of the definition of 
native title in the framing and assessment of connection; 
                                                        
51  Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30; Queensland South Native Title Services, Submission 24; A 
Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; Cape York Land Council, Submission 7; Australian Human Rights 
Commission, Submission 1. 
52  Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; Central Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26; 
Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, Submission 21; Western Australian Government, 
Submission 20. 
53  Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA. 
54  See Ch 7. 
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 provide statutory reflection of the law on the scope of native title rights and 
interests; 
 give closer attention to the common law doctrines that were drawn upon in 
Mabo [No 2] to form the basis for interpretation of the text in s 223; and 
 review the anomalous position of Australian native title jurisprudence in terms 
of the evolution of international law and comparative law. 
The link between connection and the claim group 
2.54 The legal framework for the establishment of native title rights and interests is 
focused on ‘connection requirements’. In the Act, there is a nexus between the 
particular Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders bringing the claim and the 
rights and interests claimed. The native title claimants must be indicated at the 
registration of the claim.
55
 The case law on native title, while acknowledging the 
communal nature of native title has directed less attention to group composition unless 
the matter is put to issue through overlapping or disputed claims and claims 
boundaries.
56
 In those instances, claim group membership and composition and the 
interrelation with connection assume much significance.
57
 
2.55 The absence of substantive provisions in the Native Title Act to define the 
claimant group, avoids prescriptive processes of claim group composition and 
membership, in order to allow as much autonomy as possible for Aboriginal peoples 
and Torres Strait Islanders.
58
 
2.56 However, the pressures introduced by the native title claims process can lead to 
conflicts within communities that surface at points in the Act such as the authorisation 
and joinder provisions. Difficulties inherent to determining claim group composition 
have implications for third parties, governments, courts, native title organisations and 
many other organisations. These issues are dealt with in more detail in the proposals 
around authorisation and joinder; and in the general proposals promoting effective and 
sustainable claims resolution. 
The limitations of native title 
2.57 The Terms of Reference ask the ALRC to consider improvements in the existing 
native title system under the Native Title Act. Accordingly, the Review is not proposing 
the substitution of the native title claims process with a settlement framework model. 
The ALRC notes, however, that many claims are now resolved by consent 
determination (see Chapter 3). Settlement frameworks potentially offer advantages 
over the current native title system, although the outcomes that can be achieved will 
                                                        
55   The Social Justice Commissioner notes that ‘in the shadow of dispossession, the current arrangements 
including agreeing on the membership of the claim group; deciding on who will be the applicant; and 
determining the boundaries of the claim area can contribute to lateral violence  within Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander communities’. Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
56  Wyman on behalf of the Bidjara People v State of Queensland (No 4) [2014] FCA 93 (21 February 2014). 
57  Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2) (2013) 305 ALR 1. 
58  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
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clearly depend upon a range of circumstances. Nonetheless, there is strong merit in 
investigating whether elements of settlement frameworks may address the 
acknowledged limitations in the native title system. Such settlement frameworks might 
operate either in conjunction with the Native Title Act or in substitution. 
2.58 The Preamble to the Native Title Act identifies that several related initiatives to 
be adopted in conjunction with the Act. 
[T]he form of the NTA as agreed in 1993 was only part of a broader settlement, which 
also included the Indigenous land fund and the social justice package. The Indigenous 
land fund was implemented as the Indigenous Land Corporation, but the social justice 
package was never given effect. Accordingly, the other elements of the settlement, 
including the recognition of native title rights and interests, have acquired more 
significance for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples than might be obvious 
from the terms of the NTA. 59 
2.59 As Just Us Lawyers submitted, ‘the failure by successive Federal Governments 
to deliver Paul Keating’s “Social Justice Package” has meant that the void created by 
the inability of the NTA to deliver benefits to certain people has never been filled’.
60
 
Settlement frameworks 
2.60 Several submissions endorsed consideration of settlement frameworks.
61
 The 
National Native Title Council submitted 
the Council has been consistently advocating for the agreement of and implementation 
of a Broader Land Settlement framework, where native title is a means to an end, not 
an end in itself—that is native title should be a tool along with other legislative and 
administrative tools that assist with recognising Indigenous peoples and redressing 
Indigenous disadvantage. 
For some time a Comprehensive Land Claims Settlement policy and legislative 
package has been needed in Australia. In terms of the ALRC’s current reference this 
would allow Indigenous peoples ... to bypass complex legal proposals to address the 
inadequacies of the common law and native title jurisprudence to date and address the 
real issues from an Indigenous perspective. That is having traditional rights to country 
recognised, agreeing to a fair compensation package whilst being able to facilitate 
equitable outcomes in the modern economy.62 
2.61 Several state-based frameworks have emerged: 
These settlements occur largely under the framework of the NTA and therefore have 
the same issues in relation to connection and authorisation.63 
                                                        
59  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; See also, National Farmers’ Federation, Submission 14.  
60  Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. 
61  ‘So whilst a consent determination or a Court victory might provide formal recognition–for most it 
provides little else’: Queensland South Native Title Services, Submission 24. 
62  National Native Title Council, Submission 16. 
63  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
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2.62 Other models ‘opt out’ of the Native Title Act system.
64
 For example, the focus 
of the Traditional Owner Settlement Act 2010 (Vic) is on identifying the ‘right people 
for country’ rather than a laborious connection requirement.
65
 The adoption of 
agreement-based models may contribute to achieving long-term sustainable outcomes 
as identified by Guiding Principle 5. 
2.63 However, the negotiation of broader settlement frameworks has its own 
difficulties. Accordingly, it may promote certainty to consider retaining the existing 
native title framework under the Act but to implement changes within that model. 
Overview of proposals 
2.64 Chapter 4 sets out the legal requirements to establish native title rights and 
interests. It outlines the definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act and sets 
out major judicial statements on its interpretation. The chapter then discusses problems 
in relation to proof of native title and considers whether a presumption of continuity 
should be introduced. The ALRC does not propose that there be a presumption of 
continuity, as it considers that it is not necessary to introduce such a presumption in 
light of other proposed reforms to the definition of native title in the Native Title Act. 
2.65 Chapter 5 considers the definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act 
more detail, focusing on the approach taken to the meaning of acknowledgment and 
observance of traditional laws and customs. The ALRC makes proposals for reform of 
this aspect of the definition. The Inquiry considers that an interpretation of this 
provision consistent with the beneficial purpose of the Native Title Act, and in 
accordance with the Preamble and Objects of the Act, entails an approach that is ‘fair, 
large and liberal’. As a consequence, the ALRC considers that s 223(1) should not be 
construed in a way that renders native title rights and interests excessively fragile, or 
vulnerable, to a finding that there has been loss of their factual foundation. 
2.66 In Chapter 5, the ALRC proposes that there be explicit acknowledgment in the 
Native Title Act that traditional laws and customs under which native title rights and 
interests are possessed may adapt, evolve or otherwise develop. It also proposes that 
the definition of native title in s 223 of the Act clarify that rights and interests may be 
possessed under traditional laws and customs where they have been transmitted 
between groups in accordance with traditional laws and customs. Additionally, the 
ALRC makes proposals addressing the degree of continuity of acknowledgment and 
observance of traditional laws and customs that is required to establish native title. 
2.67 Chapter 6 considers whether there should be confirmation that ‘connection with 
the land or waters’ in s 223(1)(b) of the Native Title Act does not require physical 
occupation or continued or recent use. The ALRC has concluded that amendment of 
the Native Title Act on this issue is not necessary, as there is no lack of clarity in the 
Act or in the courts’ interpretation of the Act. The Native Title Act contains two 
references to ‘physical connection’, in sections of the Act concerning affidavits in 
                                                        
64  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
65  Ibid. 
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support of an application, and the registration of claims. The ALRC proposes that these 
references should be removed, to promote consistency with the courts’ interpretation of 
s 223(1)(b). 
2.68 Chapter 7 completes the chapters of the Discussion Paper that are concerned 
with the definition of native title in s 223(1) of the Native Title Act. The proposals 
outlined in Chapter 5 suggest amendment of the definition of native title in s 223 of the 
Native Title Act by clarifying statements directed to the interpretation of terms that 
exist in the statutory definition. Those proposals retain the existing text of s 223. 
2.69 Proposals in Chapter 7 offer an alternative approach by proposing changes to the 
text of the definition in s 223(1) of the Act. The changes relate to the terms ‘traditional’ 
and ‘connection’. These terms are found in the text of s 223 but each has been the 
source of much complexity. These two amendments are in accordance with the 
Guiding Principles for the Inquiry. 
2.70 Chapter 7 asks a number of questions. The ALRC invites comment about the 
utility of providing greater legal formality to native title claim group identification and 
composition prior to the final determination of native title. It seeks views on whether 
the law relating to connection should include revitalisation of the relationship with 
country. The ALRC also asks whether, in determining connection, there should be 
regard to the reasons for any displacement of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait 
Islanders and, if so, how the relevance of those reasons is to be taken into account. The 
ALRC seeks views on one possible model for reform that would permit the influence 
of European settlement to be considered. 
2.71 Chapter 8 considers whether there should be clarification that native title rights 
and interests can include rights and interests of a commercial nature. The chapter is in 
three parts. First, it considers the nature and content of native title rights and interests 
and whether statutory clarification of the commercial nature of native title is 
appropriate. Secondly, it considers whether there is a need to adopt a definition of 
commercial native title rights and interests. Finally, the chapter considers what other 
native title rights and interests fall within the scope of s 223(1). 
2.72 The ALRC proposes that the definition in s 223 reflect the law in Akiba v 
Commonwealth,
66
 that native title is a ‘right for any purpose’. The ALRC does not 
propose that the terms ‘commercial activities’ and ‘trade’ be defined in the Act. The 
ALRC also seeks views on whether the exercise of cultural knowledge should be 
included in the list of native title rights and interests in s 223(2). 
2.73 Chapter 9 considers various procedural aspects of the native title process, 
including: evidence in native title proceedings and consent determinations; the 
development of policies relating to the involvement of the Commonwealth in consent 
determinations; the development of principles guiding assessment of connection 
reports; and the potential for a training and accreditation scheme for native title 
                                                        
66   Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209. 
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practitioners. Several questions are also asked about possible reforms of the native title 
application inquiry process. 
2.74 Chapter 10 considers whether any barriers to access to justice are imposed by 
the authorisation provisions in the Native Title Act for claimants, potential claimants 
and respondents. In this chapter, the ALRC proposes changes to the authorisation 
provisions of the Native Title Act to: allow a claim group to choose its decision-making 
process; clarify that the claim group can define the scope of the authority of the 
applicant; simplify the procedure where a member of the applicant is unable or 
unwilling to act; and clarify that the applicant may act by majority unless the terms of 
the authorisation provide otherwise. 
2.75 These proposals are intended to confirm the ultimate authority of the claim 
group, and may support efforts to ensure that native title benefits are held for the 
benefit of the claim group. Chapter 10 also reports on other efforts that are being made 
to assist claim groups in managing benefits. Finally, this chapter considers how the 
identification of claim group members, and disputes about claim group composition, 
affect access to justice for claimants, potential claimants and respondents. 
2.76 Chapter 11 considers the party and joinder provisions in s 84 of the Native Title 
Act. These provisions specify who is a party to native title proceedings, who may join 
native title proceedings, in what circumstances they may join, and when they may be 
dismissed. In this chapter, the ALRC asks several questions and proposes several 
reforms designed to reduce burdens that may limit access to justice, while also 
ensuring that a wide range of interests are adequately represented in native title 
proceedings. The ALRC also makes proposals about allowing appeals from joinder and 
dismissal decisions, and about the Commonwealth’s participation in proceedings. 
Transitional arrangements 
2.77 It is important to consider how the reforms proposed above may take effect, and 
to recognise the need for transitional arrangements. The ALRC will direct further 
consideration to the areas of transitional arrangements and the commencement of any 
recommended reforms in its Final Report. 
2.78 Under the Native Title Act, a determination of native title may be varied or 
revoked on the ground that ‘events have taken place since the determination was made 
that have caused the determination no longer to be correct’ or ‘that the interests of 
justice require’.
67
 The ALRC invites comment on these matters. 
2.79 In respect of the commencement of reforms, the ALRC notes that there is a 
common law presumption that legislation does not have a retrospective operation.
68
 
This presumption informs past practice. The Native Title Amendment Act 1998, which 
included amendments to s 223
69
 and s 225,
70
 applied to all determinations made after 
                                                        
67  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 13(5). 
68  Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia, (at 15 April 2013) 25 Interpretation and Use of Legal Sources, 
‘25.1 Statutory Interpretation’ [25.1.2230]. 
69  Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) sch 1, item 42. 
70  Ibid sch 2 item 80. 
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the commencement of the amendment.
71
 The changes came into operation after 
evidence had been completed in the trial of Yorta Yorta, and were applied by the trial 
judge in making that determination.
72
 
2.80 At this point, the ALRC invites comments about the commencement of any 
proposed reforms to the claims process; including to the authorisation and joinder 
provisions. The Inquiry notes some concerns raised by stakeholders. Two submissions 
from representatives of the mining industry were concerned that there would be 
changes to the Native Title Act with retrospective operation or changes that would 
unsettle existing agreements.
73
 
Question 2–1 Should the proposed amendments to the Native Title Act 
have prospective operation only? 
2.81 It is anticipated, that if enacted, any reforms to s 223 of the Native Title Act 
should only apply to determinations made after the commencement of the amendments. 
Again, this expectation would be in accordance with past practice. 
Question 2–2 Should the proposed amendments to s 223 of the Native 
Title Act only apply to determinations made after the date of commencement of 
any amendment? 
2.82 The ALRC invites comment on these two questions and related matters. 
 
                                                        
71  Ibid sch 5 pt 5 item 24. The transitional provisions only refer specifically to the amendments to s 225. In 
the absence of any specification, the amendments to s 223 can be assumed to operate upon 
commencement.  
72  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [9]. 
73  Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, Submission 21; Minerals Council of Australia, 
Submission 8. 
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Summary 
3.1 This chapter sets out the context for this Inquiry and for the proposals for reform 
made in this Discussion Paper. 
3.2 The Native Title Act commenced on 1 January 1994. After a slow beginning, 
native title determinations are now being made at a steady pace with between 35 and 
45 determinations made each year from 2011 until 2013.
1
 As at 30 September 2014 
                                                        
1   Federal Court of Australia, Submission 40. 
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there have been 301 native title determinations made, and 242 of these have 
determined that native title exists in at least part of the determination area. More than 
two-thirds of determinations were by consent.
2
 Native title rights are held over 
approximately 18% of Australia. 
3.3 Despite the increased rate of determinations, concerns remain about the time and 
the cost of proceedings. This chapter reports on the views of participants and finds that 
there are multiple reasons for the drawn-out processes. Factors contributing to delay 
include the limited resources of representative bodies, the burden of collecting and 
assessing connection material and undertaking tenure analysis, the availability of 
experts and the difficulty of resolving overlapping claims. 
3.4 The introduction of intensive case management of native title matters appears to 
have contributed to the increased rate of determinations. However the ALRC has not 
been able to determine whether this rate can be sustained; more complex matters may 
be in the pipeline. Just outcomes may take time to achieve, and it is important that 
priority be given to recognising and protecting native title, rather than to timeliness. 
3.5 Finally, this chapter notes that the recognition of native title was not intended to 
be the sole answer to the question of Indigenous land justice. Land purchase, 
alternative settlement and social justice measures are also important policy tools. 
Progress to date 
3.6 The Native Title Act has been in force for 21 years. During that time there have 
been 301 native title determinations. Of these, 229 were by consent, 36 were litigated, 
and 36 were unopposed.
3
 There have been 96 determinations that native title exists in 
the entire determination area, 146 determinations that native title exists in part of the 
determination area, and 59 determinations that native title does not exist in the 
determination area.
4
 The 59 determinations of no native title include the 43 unopposed 
(non-claimant) determinations. There have been only 13 determinations of no native 
title made in response to a claimant application. 
3.7 The following map and Table 1 show the area of Australia subject to 
determinations of native title and registered claims for native title. Professor Jon 
Altman reports that a further 13% of Australia is land claimed under land rights 
legislation.
5
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2  National Native Title Tribunal, National Native Title Register <www.nntt.gov.au>. 
3  National Native Title Tribunal, Statistics <http://www.nntt.gov.au/Pages/Statistics.aspx>. All of the 
unopposed determinations were non-claimant applications, and most of them were made by Aboriginal 
land councils in NSW where a finding of no native title is necessary for an Aboriginal land council to sell 
land: Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) s 42. 
4  National Native Title Tribunal, Statistics, above n 3. 
5  J Altman, Submission 27. 
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Table 1. 
 
Jurisdiction 
Determinations Area subject to a registered claim 
Native title 
found to exist 
Native title found 
not to exist 
Land Sea 
ACT - - - - 
Cth 20,407.8 14,300.1 - 67,466.16 
NSW 1,790.2 868.8 373,121.82 494.84 
NT 183,150.9 964.1 205,924.32 3,145.18 
QLD 317,568.3 11,893.2 815,152.11 35,670.79 
SA 390,076.9 13,626.7 280,031.20 13,609.38 
Tas - - - - 
Vic 15,164.7 11,023.9 24,271.28 27.25 
WA 1,018,595.6 55,409.6 1,098,637.50 40,454.27 
TOTAL 1,946,754.3 108, 086.4 2,797,138.22 160,867.87 
Map and data in Table 1 provided by the National Native Title Tribunal and used with 
permission. 
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3.8 Only 46 determinations occurred during the first 11 years of the Act’s operation, 
and 12 of those were non-claimant applications.
6
 As the graph and Table 2 below 
indicate, from 2004 the number of determinations per year moved from single digits to 
double digits, and from 2011 the number rose significantly again. 
 
Table 2 
Year Native Title 
Determinations 
Year Native Title Determinations 
1997 2 2006 13 
1998 4 2007 16 
1999 2 2008 9 
2000 12 2009 14 
2001 14 2010 13 
2002 8 2011 35 
2003 4 2012 46 
2004 16 2013 44 
2005 17 2014 31* 
                                                        
6  National Native Title Tribunal, National Native Title Register, above n 2. 
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3.9 There are currently 419 native title applications lodged with the Federal Court: 
396 claimant applications, 18 non-claimant applications and five compensation 
applications. There are 285 registered applications. It is expected that many 
compensation applications will be filed in the future.
7
 
3.10 The native title process in each state and territory is affected by the history of 
the jurisdiction’s land rights arrangements. The next section of this chapter briefly 
outlines the way each jurisdiction has dealt with the question of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander rights to land. 
New South Wales 
3.11 Under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) (ALRA), vacant Crown land 
can be claimed by land councils on behalf of Aboriginal people. The ALRA also 
established the Statutory Investment Fund. For 15 years, from 1984 until 1998, an 
amount equivalent to 7.5% of NSW Land Tax (on non-residential land) was paid to 
NSW Aboriginal Land Council as compensation for land lost by the Aboriginal people 
of NSW. This fund is used for both administration and land purchase, and the 
Aboriginal Land Council and the land council network has been self supporting since 
1998.
8
 
3.12 If a land council wishes to sell land, it must get a determination under the Native 
Title Act that there is no native title in the land.
9
 There have been 39 non-claimant 
determinations that native title does not exist in NSW, and only five positive 
determinations, including the first determination of native title under the Native Title 
Act, Buck v New South Wales (Dunghutti People).
10
 There are 21 registered claims.
11
 
Queensland 
3.13 Under the Aboriginal Land Act 1991 (Qld) and the Torres Strait Islander Land 
Act 1991 (Qld), land that had been reserved for Aboriginal people could be transferred 
to Aboriginal people as trustees to hold the land for the benefit of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people. The Acts also made provision for claims to be heard by a 
Land Tribunal which could make recommendations to the Minister. According to the 
Queensland Government, 4.5 million hectares of land has been transferred under these 
Acts.
12
 
3.14 The Queensland Government considers that ‘native title is arguably at its most 
complex in Queensland’, because of the history of removals of traditional owners from 
their lands and the decentralised nature of development in that state.
13
 
                                                        
7  AIATSIS, Submission 36; Northern Territory Government, Submission 31. 
8  NSW Aboriginal Land Council, Our Organisation <http://www.alc.org.au>. 
9  Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) s 42. 
10  National Native Title Tribunal, National Native Title Register, above n 2. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Land Transfers <http://www.dnrm.qld.gov.au/ 
land/indigenous-land/land-transfers>. 
13  Queensland Government Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Submission 28. 
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3.15 Despite this complexity, there have been more than 100 successful 
determinations of native title in Queensland. There are a further 66 registered 
applications, with further applications under preparation.
14
 
South Australia 
3.16 In 1966, South Australia was the first state to transfer control of land reserved 
for Aboriginal people to a body controlled by Aboriginal people: the Aboriginal Lands 
Trust.
15
 Land rights were also acknowledged in the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 
(SA) and the Maralinga Tjarutja Land Rights Act 1984 (SA). 
3.17 There have only been two contested native title hearings in South Australia, and 
since 2004 the state has had a policy of ‘resolving claims by consent wherever 
possible’.
16
 There have been 20 consent determinations that native title exists and there 
are a further 16 registered claims.
17
 
3.18 As in most jurisdictions, overlapping claims have been a significant issue in 
South Australia. In around 2005 ‘a combined effort by South Australian Native Title 
Services and the National Native Title Tribunal managed to resolve almost all overlaps 
that then existed between claims, meaning attention could be focussed on 
settlements’.
18
 However, in recent years there have been more overlapping claims and 
more intra-Indigenous disputes.
19
 
Tasmania 
3.19 The Aboriginal Lands Act 1995 (Tas) did not establish a claims process, but 
vested 12 areas, listed in the schedule, in the Aboriginal Land Council of Tasmania to 
be held on trust for the benefit of Aboriginal people. 
3.20 There have been no determinations of native title in Tasmania and there are no 
registered claims.
20
 
Victoria 
3.21 There was no claims procedure for land rights in Victoria before the Native Title 
Act, but land was transferred on an ad hoc basis under six separate Acts.
21
 The 
Traditional Owner Settlement Act 2010 (Vic) (TOSA) provides for ‘a recognition and 
settlement agreement between the State and a traditional owner group entity for an area 
of public land’.
22
 TOSA is discussed further below. 
                                                        
14  See, eg, Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
15  Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia, (at 15 June 1997) 1. Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders ‘1.3 
Land Law’ [1.3.359]; Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966 (SA). 
16  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
17  National Native Title Tribunal, National Native Title Register, above n 2. 
18  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
19  Ibid. 
20  National Native Title Tribunal, National Native Title Register, above n 2. 
21  Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia, (at 1 April  1997) 1. Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders ‘1.3 
Land Law’ [1.3.412]. 
22  Explanatory Memorandum, Traditional Owner Settlement Bill 2010 (Vic). 
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3.22 The Victorian Department of Justice reports that ‘the claimable Crown land 
estate comprises roughly one third of the State’s land area’, and ‘native title has been 
settled over approximately 40% of that area, by way of a positive or negative native 
title determination and/or a Traditional Owner Settlement Act settlement’.
23
 There have 
been four determinations that native title exists in Victoria, and three that it does not 
exist. There are currently only two registered claims in Victoria.
24
 
Western Australia 
3.23 The Aborigines Act 1889 (WA) empowered the Governor to reserve Crown 
lands for Aboriginal people. By 1947, 15 million hectares had been set aside.
25
 The 
Aboriginal Lands Trust now holds 27 million hectares of reserved land, but title 
remains in the Crown. It is intended that ‘the control and management or ownership of 
all the land held by the Trust will be handed back to Aboriginal people’.
26
 There was 
no provision for land claims in Western Australia before the Native Title Act. 
3.24 The Western Australian Government reports that ‘the impact of the Native Title 
Act, including native title claims, determinations, future acts, and compensation 
liabilities is greater in Western Australia than any other jurisdiction in Australia’.
27
 
There have been 45 determinations that native title exists in at least part of the 
determination area, including 35 consent determinations.
28
 There is a continuing trend 
towards determinations by consent, with five consent determinations and one litigated 
determination so far in 2013–14. The Government expects a further 11 consent 
determinations in 2014–15. It has made a final offer in an effort to settle six claims in 
the south west of the state, via the Noongar Native Title Settlement.
29
 
3.25 There are 81 registered claims in Western Australia,
30
 and research is currently 
being undertaken with the purpose of lodging native title claims in the future.
31
 
Australian Capital Territory 
3.26 The Aboriginal Land Grant (Jervis Bay Territory) Act 1986 (Cth) vested land in 
the Jervis Bay area in the Wreck Bay Aboriginal Community Council. 
3.27 There have been no determinations of native title in the Australian Capital 
Territory, and there are no registered claims.
32
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Northern Territory 
3.28 Approximately 47% of land in the Northern Territory is Aboriginal freehold 
under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth). Pastoral leases 
cover 45% of the Territory, and a further five percent of the Territory is also available 
for claim under the Native Title Act.
33
 
3.29 There have been 242 determinations of native title in the Northern Territory, and 
there are a further 100 registered claims.
34
 
3.30 The Northern Territory Government has indicated that, ‘having litigated a 
number of test cases to clarify the operation of various provisions of the Native Title 
Act’, it now seeks to achieve negotiated resolutions of native title claims.
35
 The 
Territory has set out Minimum Connection Material Requirements for Consent 
Determinations which streamline the resolution of claims. 
Time frames and cost 
Concerns about timeliness 
3.31 Concerns about cost and timeliness have been prominent in discussion of the 
Native Title Act. In 2012, Brian Wyatt, CEO of the National Native Title Council, said 
that ‘we are tired and weary of our old people dying before decisions are made on the 
native title’.
36
 Also in 2012, John Catlin, Executive Director, Native Title Unit, West 
Australian Department of Premier and Cabinet, noted that ‘the failure of the Act to 
deliver timely and effective outcomes is undeniable’.
37
 
3.32 Despite the increase in the rate of determinations made by the Federal Court 
since 2011, stakeholders continue to report that they consider the native title system to 
be too slow and expensive.
38
 
3.33 Traditional Owner, Gumbaynggirr man and Garby Elder, Anthony Clarence 
Perkins, commented after the determination over his land at Red Rock Beach: 
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I never thought it would have an ending, I’ll be honest. It’s been going a long while. 
To me we may say it’s taking too long to be awarded native title to our property or 
country or whatever areas. But again we’ve got to look at the fact that there’s a lot to 
be done in the process. We’ve been sort of disconnected for lots of years, and we’ve 
got to pull all the information back before we can go forward, and that sometimes 
frustrates a lot of people. But to us it’s a step in the right direction.39 
3.34 The time frame in this case attracted judicial criticism. Jagot J was scathing 
about the 17 years that it took to reach a consent determination in this matter: 
the enormous resources and extraordinary length of time involved in this process 
could have been avoided, in large part, by the bringing to bear at an earlier time of a 
focus on the outcomes sought to be achieved and the application of common sense, 
practicality, proportionality, and flexible, constructive and creative thinking … 
Native title claims, in common with most litigation but perhaps also particularly given 
their character, run the risk of the consuming of resources and time well beyond what 
is reasonable … Recognition of this fact, and of the need for the kind of focus and 
approach which I have described, is essential to guard against the repetition of 
examples such as the present case, spanning not years but decades …40 
3.35 These very long time frames are not confined to NSW. In September 2014, the 
Kokatha claim in South Australia was finalised, by consent, after an 18-year 
proceeding.
41
 
3.36 Stakeholders representing the minerals sector also emphasised the importance of 
timely and expeditious resolution of native title claims, and certainty for the wider 
community.
42
 
Timeliness and just outcomes 
3.37 As noted in Chapter 1, just outcomes may take time to achieve. The Australian 
Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies has cautioned against an 
excessive focus on timeliness, suggesting that ‘sustainable and effective outcomes’ 
may require time to develop,
43
 and that ‘the integrity of the process requires justice to 
be prioritised ahead of timeliness’.
44
 Concerns were raised in 2008 by the then Social 
Justice Commissioner, Dr Tom Calma, regarding the priority given to efficiency, rather 
than the recognition and protection of native title.
45
 Again in 2012, the Social Justice 
Commissioner, Mick Gooda, commented on a ‘silent disregard for the fundamental 
inequalities in the native title system in favour of more efficient outcomes in the rush to 
finalise settlement of native title’.
46
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3.38 Graeme Neate, former National Native Title Tribunal President, notes that 
‘broader settlements’—settlements that include grants of land, joint management 
arrangements, or employment and economic opportunities—take longer to negotiate 
than a ‘bare determination’, but ‘might be much more satisfactory for all the parties’.
47
 
3.39 The ALRC has adopted as a guiding principle that any proposed reforms should 
encourage timely and just resolution of native title applications.
48
 The potential for 
changes to the Native Title Act to delay the resolution of native title claims has been 
taken seriously. However the value of timeliness must not be placed ahead of the 
fundamental requirement of justice.
49
 
Length of proceedings 
3.40 The National Native Title Tribunal reported that, between 1 January 1994 and 
31 December 2011, the average time taken to reach a consent determination was six 
years and three months. The average time for a determination after litigation was seven 
years. However, these figures do not take into account the common occurrence of 
claims being withdrawn, consolidated and relodged.
50
 
Reasons for lengthy processes 
3.41 The ALRC has considered whether the requirements of Native Title Act s 223 
(and associated case law) unnecessarily prolong proceedings. The Western Australian 
Government has suggested that connection requirements ‘are not a significant 
contributor to delays in the resolution of native title claims’,
51
 and the Chamber of 
Minerals and Energy of Western Australia has recommended that the ALRC should 
only make proposals for reform that are based on quantitative, clear and objective 
evidence.
52
 
3.42 The ALRC has identified multiple reasons for the slow pace of resolution of 
claims. It is well recognised that data on reasons for delay in court proceedings is 
difficult to obtain.
53
 While the length of proceedings can be accurately identified, the 
reasons for the time taken will not usually be evident from court files. Research on this 
topic is largely based on qualitative techniques, particularly interviews with 
participants.
54
 The ALRC has also relied on this approach. It is acknowledged that 
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there are limitations to this approach, particularly in light of the duty of confidentiality 
that legal representatives have to their clients. 
3.43 Importantly, as the Federal Court submitted, the causes of delay have changed 
over time.
55
 In the first 10 years of the Act, there were only 45 determinations of native 
title. There was uncertainty about the requirements of the Act, and a number of test 
cases occurred before parties could confidently negotiate consent agreements. The 
South Australian Government suggested that delays were ‘in large part reflective of the 
comparative newness of native title within the Australian legal system at the time the 
claims were lodged, the developing jurisprudence in this area, and the size and 
complexity of many of the claims’.
56
 
3.44 It was also necessary for representative bodies, claim groups, expert witnesses, 
government parties and third party respondents to acquire skills and expertise in the 
area. There have been 268 determinations in the second 10 years of the Act. There is 
now significantly more certainty around many aspects of the law,
57
 and significantly 
more of the participants in the system have highly developed skills and expertise—
although shortages remain in some areas.
58
 The following matters (in no particular 
order) have been identified by stakeholders as present-day factors contributing to the 
length of proceedings. 
Capacity constraints in representative bodies 
3.45 Stakeholders indicated that the limited resources of representative bodies is a 
cause of delays.
59
 Cape York Land Council said that ‘financial and capacity constraints 
definitely pose a barrier for native title outcomes’, causing delay and inadequate 
engagement with clients.
60
 The Law Society of Western Australia reported that a 
contributing factor to the long-running case of Banjima People v Western Australia 
(No 2)
61
 was the limited capacity of the representative body, and the claim was only 
able to be resolved when the claim group paid for private legal representation from the 
proceeds of agreements with iron ore companies.
62
 
Establishing native title 
3.46 Many stakeholders indicated that the collection, assessment and hearing of 
evidence in relation to connection is an important reason for the significant length and 
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cost of proceedings.
63
 The Northern Territory Government reported that ‘it had been 
agreed that the collection of this evidence is enormously resource intensive and has the 
potential to consume the scarce resources of all parties’.
64
 Justice Barker has also noted 
that hearings in relation to connection take ‘enormous’ time and costs are high.
65
 
3.47 The Attorney General of Western Australia, the Hon Michael Mischin indicated 
in 2013 that ‘there could be a hiatus in consent determinations if the rate of research is 
not increased and connection deadlines adhered to’,
66
 which suggests that the 
preparation of connection reports may be a bottleneck in the process in that state. The 
Queensland Government said that until at least 2008, connection reports did not 
address the issues the state considered relevant, causing delay. The Government noted, 
however, that after it clarified the principles it relied on in assessing connection reports, 
the quality of reports improved and the rate of resolution of claims increased.
67
 
3.48 Queensland South Native Title Services (QSNTS) reported that delays are being 
caused by the state’s recent (August 2013) policy shift on connection requirements, 
requiring lot by lot evidence of connection.
68
 Cape York Land Council said that, while 
there is strong evidence regarding connection in Cape York, locating and collating that 
evidence in a way that meets the state’s connection guidelines is a ‘significant 
impost’.
69
 
The availability of experts 
3.49 Several stakeholders indicated that the limited availability of appropriately 
qualified expert anthropologists contributed to the length and cost of proceedings.
70
 
Anthropologists collect and collate evidence of connection, assist in the preparation of 
connection reports, and provide expert evidence in hearings. The Federal Court 
described the scarcity of experts as ‘a constant factor in the causes of delay’.
71
 
Tenure analysis 
3.50 As part of native title proceedings, state respondent parties will analyse the 
tenure in the areas under claim, for the purpose of identifying areas where native title 
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has been extinguished. State governments have advised the ALRC that this analysis is 
expensive and time consuming and a significant contributor to the length of 
proceedings.
72
 
3.51 There is some debate as to whether an analysis of current tenure is sufficient for 
the purpose of a determination of native title
73
 or whether historical tenure analysis is 
necessary.
74
 There is also debate as to the timing of tenure analysis.
75
 Justice Barker 
has called for respondents to conduct this analysis soon after the lodgement of a 
claim.
76
 
Difficulties in negotiations 
3.52 Two representative bodies were concerned about delays caused by the state 
indicating that its connection requirements have not been met, but not specifying what 
aspects of a connection report are unsatisfactory.
77
 
3.53 One representative body submitted that delays are being caused by the state 
‘using the carrot of its consent as leverage to secure agreement on other matters’.
78
 It 
reported that the state insisted on an Indigenous land use agreement (ILUA) restricting 
the rights of the claimants, without offering anything of value in return, as a condition 
of consenting to a determination.
79
 
3.54 A similar concern was raised by the Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation in 
its submission to the Deloitte Review of Native Title Organisations.
80
 This submission 
reported that the state was seeking to negotiate a ‘complex, whole-of government State 
ILUA’ at a late stage of the claim process, with ‘little incentive for groups to enter into 
the agreement.
81
 
Overlapping claims and disputes 
3.55 Stakeholders from both claimant and respondent perspectives reported that 
overlapping claims and intra-Indigenous disputes are significant contributors to the 
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time taken to resolve claims.
82
 Disputes between Aboriginal people sometimes result in 
a late application for joinder.
83
 These applications can disrupt the progress of a claim 
towards a consent determination, causing upset, delay and considerable expense for all 
parties.
84
 
3.56 Some of the reasons for disputes and overlaps are discussed in Chapter 8. Toni 
Bauman has reported that there is an ‘urgent and unmet demand for skilled and 
experienced native title ADR [alternative dispute resolution] practitioners, including 
Indigenous practitioners’.
85
 
3.57 In some jurisdictions, the state respondent will not negotiate towards a consent 
determination over land subject to an overlapping claim.
86
 Cape York Land Council 
‘has expended considerable time, resources and funding in recent years attempting to 
mediate disputes’. Even where this mediation is successful, delay is inevitable, as is the 
diversion of resources towards the dispute and away from other claims.
87
 
Capacity constraints in government bodies 
3.58 Some non-government stakeholders indicated that state government resources 
are stretched by its obligations to conduct settlement negotiations,
88
 assess connection
89
 
and undertake tenure analysis.
90
 
Novel claims 
3.59 One stakeholder noted that delays may be caused by ‘claims for novel or 
unusual rights that are unsubstantiated’.
91
 
The right to negotiate 
3.60 Two stakeholders noted that because the Native Title Act gives significant 
procedural rights to groups with a registered claim, there may be a reduced incentive to 
speedily progress the claim,
92
 particularly if there is a risk the claim will fail. 
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3.61 Negotiating with proponents can absorb a great deal of the claim group’s time, 
energy and resources. A group and their representative body may not be able to 
simultaneously undertake the work involved with a claim, resulting in delay. 
Changing court practices 
Mediation and intensive court management 
3.62 The original Native Title Act provided that applications were to be filed in the 
National Native Title Tribunal (the Tribunal) and determinations of the Tribunal were 
to be given effect as if they were orders of the Federal Court. Such a scheme was held 
to be unconstitutional
93
 and from 1998 applications were filed in the Federal Court. 
However the Court would refer each application to the Tribunal for mediation.
94
 From 
2007 the Tribunal had sole responsibility for mediation, but in 2012, the mediation 
function was transferred from the Tribunal to the Federal Court.
95
 
3.63 The Federal Court has shifted away from the referral of entire matters to 
mediation, and prefers ‘intensive case management to identify the issues in dispute … 
and … referral of particular issues to mediation’.
96
 The Court suggests that this 
approach has contributed to the increased number of determinations in 2012 and 
2013.
97
 
3.64 In July 2010, the Federal Court established a priority list for case management. 
A range of strategies have been used to assist the parties to reach agreement on 
connection issues, including: 
 case management conferences where experts identify the issues likely to be 
contentious, prior to beginning fieldwork; 
 orders timetabling the provision of connection material and the respondent’s 
analysis of that connection material; 
 conferences of experts in the absence of lawyers, supervised by a registrar, 
aimed at narrowing connection issues; 
 court-appointed experts, frequently where there is a dispute between Indigenous 
people; 
 mediation on country, where state experts can question claimants; and 
 early evidence hearings.
98
 
3.65 These initiatives have been generally well received. The Cape York Land 
Council said the initiatives have increased the rate of determinations and are generally 
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beneficial.
99
 Central Desert Native Title Services commented that ‘native title claims 
are no longer stuck in a circle of never-ending negotiations with respondent parties’, 
and that 
Programming matters for trial has also meant that the State of Western Australia, who 
are the primary respondent to native title claims, has been required to become more 
articulate in its opposition to native title claims and more pro-active in progressing 
claims such as with the early provision of tenure information.100 
3.66 Similarly, the Queensland Government reported that 
Case management by the Federal Court provides a more disciplined framework within 
which the parties to claims are required to be more accountable for the prosecution of 
matters … [and] has ensured that all aspects of claims are dealt with in a professional 
and timely manner. 
3.67 On the other hand, the North Queensland Land Council said: 
It would be desirable for the court to recognise that its compressed time frames work 
against some native title groups particularly where the groups have been fractured and 
widely separated by removal policies as is the case in Queensland.101 
3.68 Prior to the introduction of intensive case management for native title matters, 
the Social Justice Commissioner raised concerns that the pressure of court deadlines 
can distract the parties from negotiating broader agreements and divert resources away 
from negotiations. The Commissioner suggested that there should be an option for 
parties to obtain a long-term adjournment of a matter if both parties consent.
102
 
Right to negotiate 
3.69 Case management of native title claims must be seen in the context of the right 
to negotiate, which contributes to two unusual features of this type of litigation. First, 
claims are frequently made not at a time of the claimant’s choosing, but in response to 
a future act notice.
103
 If the group does not already have a determination, the right to 
negotiate is only available to a person who, four months after the notification day, is a 
registered native title claimant.
104
 An Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group must 
lodge a claim in order to ‘speak for country’ and seek protection of their rights and 
interests. At this time, the group may not have confirmed its membership, the 
boundaries of the lands and waters held under Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander law, 
or the scope of the rights and interests held. The North Queensland Land Council said 
‘the idea that within three months a claim could be researched, hold an authorisation 
meeting, lodge a claim and then one month later pass the registration test is fanciful in 
the extreme’.
105
 It takes several years and significant resources for an expert to prepare 
a report on these matters, and the group may not have access to the resources or the 
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expert at the time of the claim. Susan Phillips has suggested that courts need to show 
patience in these circumstances, where native title applicants can be ‘properly 
understood as respondents to the proceedings of others’.
106
 
3.70 Secondly, as noted above, the right to negotiate can affect a claim group’s 
incentive to speedily progress the claim.
107
 
Can the increased rate of determinations be sustained? 
3.71 It is not clear that the faster rate of determinations can be sustained. Cape York 
Land Council pointed out that existing claims are more complex than past ones and 
there are more disputes.
108
 Others have agreed that current claims are more difficult 
than past claims
109
 and the National Farmers’ Federation noted that many unresolved 
claims involve disputes about the composition of the claim group and overlap with 
other claims.
110
 
3.72 Justice Barker has suggested that 
the overall success of this next phase is highly dependent upon a tripartite endeavour 
involving the Federal Court, claims groups and their representatives, and respondent 
parties, especially governments, and their representatives.111 
3.73 He calls on the parties to: 
 show flexibility, for example regarding non-native title outcomes; 
 undertake tenure analysis soon after the lodgement of a claim; 
 avoid full-blown hearings on connection by ‘better disclosure and exchange of 
information in the pre-hearing stage’; and 
 avoid formulaic requirements for proof of connection.
112
 
3.74 He also notes the importance of adequate resourcing.
113
 
The Land Fund and social justice package 
3.75 Stakeholders have pointed out that the Native Title Act was never intended to be 
the sole response to Mabo v Queensland [No 2] and to Indigenous demands for land 
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justice, or to the economic and social disadvantage that is a consequence of 
dispossession.
114
 It was to be accompanied by a land fund and social justice package, 
thus providing a comprehensive response.
115
 
3.76 In 2008, the then Social Justice Commissioner, Dr Tom Calma, commented that 
‘the other two limbs did not eventuate in the form intended, and this abyss is one of the 
underlying reasons why the native title system is under the strain it is under today’.
116
 
3.77 The Jumbunna Indigenous House of Learning submission to the Senate 
Committee on Law and Justice said: 
Jumbunna considers that native title should be conceived within a comprehensive land 
justice framework with restitution at its centre. Such a comprehensive settlement 
process would deal with traditional and historic land claims, reparation for 
dispossession, resource management, Indigenous jurisdiction over land and resources, 
economic development, would deal with the realities and consequences of 
dispossession and should promote and embody Indigenous peoples’ exercise of 
sovereignty.117 
The Land Fund 
3.78 The Preamble to the Native Title Act notes that ‘many Aboriginal peoples and 
Torres Strait Islanders, because they have been dispossessed of their traditional lands, 
will be unable to assert native title rights and interests and that a special fund needs to 
be established to assist them to acquire land’. That special fund is the Land Fund, 
administered by the Indigenous Land Corporation (ILC). The purpose of the ILC is to 
assist Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to acquire and manage land, so as to 
provide economic, environmental, social or cultural benefits for those people.
118
 
3.79 The Land Fund received appropriations from consolidated revenue for the first 
10 years of its operation, and at the end of 2004, the value of the fund was $1.42 
billion.
119
 The ILC has acquired 5.86 million hectares of land since establishment.
120
 
3.80 There are some concerns as to whether the ILC has fulfilled its purpose.
121
 Dr 
Calma said in 2008 that the ILC ‘does not always provide an effective and accessible 
alternative form of land justice when native title is not available’. In particular, he 
                                                        
114  See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Submission 35; Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30; Western 
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Report 2013’ (Australian Human Rights Commission) 82–3. 
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117  Jumbunna Indigenous House of Learning Research Unit, UTS, Submission No 17 to Senate Committee 
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AIATSIS) 19. 
120  Indigenous Land Corporation, ‘Annual Report 2012–13’ (2013) 3. 
121  Sullivan, above n 119; Catlin, above n 37, 428; ‘Native Title Report 2007’, above n 45, 47–49. 
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noted that Indigenous people are concerned about the ILC’s focus on economic gain 
rather than reparation for dispossession.
122
 
3.81 Similarly, in 2009, Patrick Sullivan reported that, while the Prime Minister’s 
second reading speech indicated that the purpose of establishing the ILC was ‘building 
and sustaining an adequate stock of land in the hands of indigenous owners currently 
dispossessed’, the Annual Reports of the ILC indicate a focus on ‘running its own 
commercial activities and emphasising employment and training’.
123
 
3.82 In 2014, Ernst & Young inquired into ‘the effectiveness of Indigenous Business 
Australia and the ILC … in driving economic development’.
124
 The report noted that 
the purpose of the ILC was compensatory, rather than to pursue commercial activity, 
and that some of its activities indicated ‘a lack of clarity around purpose’ that should be 
addressed.
125
 It also noted that ‘there is no interest on the part of the Government to 
change the purpose of the Land Account or the ILC’s functions towards commercial 
activity’.
126
 
3.83 In June 2013, the ILC adopted a policy setting out its commitment to ‘contribute 
to the constructive and flexible settlement of native title claims’.
127
 This policy 
indicates that the ILC 
will consider providing assistance where a proposed native title settlement will 
facilitate a full and final resolution of claims and improve the quality of native title 
outcomes for Indigenous parties.128 
3.84 The policy also indicates that the ILC will 
give preference to working with those States or Territories and NTRBs that have an 
effective, fair and realistic State or Territory or regional wide framework in place for 
the settlement of native title claims.129 
3.85 The ILC reported a number of native title-related activities in 2012–13, although 
only one of them involved acquiring and divesting property.
130
 
The social justice package 
3.86 In 1994, the then Prime Minister, the Hon Paul Keating MP sought the views of 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) on ‘further measures 
that the Government should consider to address the dispossession of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people as part of its response to the 1992 High Court decision on 
                                                        
122  ‘Native Title Report 2007’, above n 45, 47. 
123  Sullivan, above n 119. 
124  Ernst & Young, ‘Review of the Indigenous Land Corporation and Indigenous Business Australia’ (2014) 
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125  Ibid 11. 
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native title’.
131
 The Native Title Social Justice Advisory Committee of ATSIC reported 
that a social justice package should address, among other things, compensation for 
dispossession of land and dispersal of the Indigenous population.
132
 It suggested that 
the need for compensation and restitution goes beyond the scope of the National Land 
Fund, and such compensation should include ‘access to revenue derived from the use 
of land by non indigenous Australians’.
133
 
3.87 Without a social justice response, great pressure is placed on the native title 
system.
134
 There have been continuing calls for a social justice package to complement 
the native title system
135
 and to compensate traditional owners whose native title rights 
have been found to have been extinguished.
136
 
3.88 The ALRC’s proposals for reforms to the Native Title Act are intended to be 
consistent with the original understanding of its drafters—that native title could never 
be a sufficient response to the land justice question, and that land purchase and a social 
justice package are essential elements of a response. A fourth element is alternative 
settlements (discussed below). 
Alternative settlement 
3.89 The Hon Aden Ridgeway, Gumbayyngirr man and former Senator, has called 
for ‘a complete rethinking of the way native title issues are resolved and managed in 
this country. What we need is to establish comprehensive settlements’.
137
 The National 
Native Title Council has also endorsed such an approach.
138
 
3.90 In jurisdictions outside Australia, ‘settlement’ implies not only the resolution of 
native title claims, but the resolution of broader issues.
139
 Professor Mick Dodson has 
noted that property rights alone will not ‘allow Indigenous peoples to determine our 
economic and social development’ and suggested that Indigenous people should be 
involved in all decision-making forums which impact on the region. On this view, 
regional settlements could include settlement of native title claims, provision for 
Aboriginal control of land use and development on land they own, resource royalties, 
participation in planning, development and environmental management in the area, 
                                                        
131  Native Title Social Justice Advisory Committee, ‘Rights Reform and Recognition’ (Aboriginal and 
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135  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
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 3. Context for Reform Proposals 67 
joint management agreements, service delivery arrangements and measures to 
strengthen Aboriginal local government.
140
 
3.91 At the Native Title Minister’s Meeting in 2008, Ministers acknowledged that the 
potential of the native title system had been ‘constrained by technical and inflexible 
legal practices’. The Ministers agreed to work towards negotiated settlements and 
established a Joint Working Group on Indigenous Land Settlements (Joint Working 
Group) ‘to develop innovative policy options for progressing broader and regional land 
settlements’.
141
 
3.92 The Joint Working Group produced Guidelines for Best Practice, Flexible and 
Sustainable Agreement Making. The Guidelines do not define what the scope of a 
‘broader land settlement’ might be, except to note that they can include both native title 
and non-native title outcomes.
142
 
3.93 The Traditional Owner Settlement Act 2010 (Vic) (TOSA) provides for 
settlements between the Victorian Government and traditional owner groups in 
Victoria. Settlements are to be made on the basis that traditional owners must withdraw 
native title claims and agree not to make a claim in the future. Settlements may include 
recognition of the group and certain traditional owner rights over Crown land, grants of 
land either as freehold title or ‘Aboriginal title’, funding for traditional owner 
corporations, and the right to comment on or consent to certain activities and provide 
input into the management of land and natural resources.
143
 The Social Justice 
Commissioner described this agreement as setting ‘the benchmark for other states to 
meet when resolving native title claims’.
144
 
3.94 The first settlement under the TOSA was with the Gunaikurnai people, in 
2010.
145
 In 2013, a comprehensive settlement was made with the Dja Dja Wurrung, 
which included the transfer of two freehold properties; hunting, fishing and gathering 
rights; a Land Use Activity Agreement (a simplified ILUA); transfer of parks and 
reserves as ‘Aboriginal title’ and joint management of those lands.
146
 
3.95 The Western Australian Government and the South West Aboriginal Land and 
Sea Council, representing six native title groups—Yued, Gnaala Karla Boodja, South 
West Boojarah, Wagyl Kaip, Ballardong, and Whadjuk—have, since 2009, been 
negotiating a settlement in the South West of Western Australia. The matters under 
negotiation include recognition of the Noongar people as traditional owners, the 
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68 Review of the Native Title Act 1993 
transfer of land, funding, joint management of the conservation estate and processes for 
the protection of heritage.
147
 
3.96 The South Australian Government reports that it has had a policy of resolving 
claims by consent since 2004: 
Eleven claims have been resolved by consent determinations … and, of these, six 
have involved comprehensive settlement agreements that address broader issues 
including compensation, sustainability of the Prescribed Body Corporate, and future 
act issues.148 
3.97 Some efforts have been made to achieve regional agreements in Queensland, but 
they do not appear to have been successful.
149
 QSNTS has suggested that an alternative 
settlement framework, similar to the Victorian TOSA, should be discussed.
150
 
Compensation for extinguishment 
3.98 The ALRC has not been asked to inquire into compensation for the 
extinguishment of native title. However state governments have pointed out that 
compensation is relevant to the consideration of the connection requirements of the 
Native Title Act. Concerns arise on two related fronts. 
3.99 First, two state governments raised concerns that changes to the Native Title Act 
could increase the liability of state and territory governments for compensation.
151
 The 
South Australian Government reported that ‘virtually all determinations of native title 
are followed by negotiations or claims for significant compensation for historical 
extinguishment’.
152
 
3.100 The Native Title Act provides that where an act extinguishing native title is 
attributable to the Commonwealth, compensation is payable by the Commonwealth,
153
 
while the states and territories are liable for compensation when their acts extinguish 
native title.
154
 The South Australian Government noted that ‘the financial assistance 
package promised by the Commonwealth at the time of the Native Title Act and since is 
still yet to come to fruition, leaving the bulk of the cost of native title recognition with 
the states and territories’.
155
 The Commonwealth has entered into discussion with the 
states and territories regarding a Commonwealth contribution to state and territory 
compensation liabilities, but no final agreement has been reached.
156
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3.101 Secondly, one state government has expressed concerns about the absence of a 
commitment from the Commonwealth Government to contribute to funding for 
alternative settlements. In 2013, the Western Australian Attorney General said that, 
without such a contribution, there is ‘a disincentive for the states/territories to adopt 
more progressive native title policies’.
 157
 
3.102 At the 2008 Native Title Ministers’ Meeting, Ministers agreed to negotiate on 
‘Commonwealth financial assistance that could better facilitate state and territory 
settlement of native title issues’.
158
 The ALRC is not aware that such an agreement has 
been finalised. However in 2010, the Commonwealth entered into a written agreement 
with Victoria under Native Title Act s 200 for the provision of financial assistance to 
that state ‘to enable benefits to be provided to native title claim groups under 
settlement agreements’.
159
 The Commonwealth’s financial contribution will not exceed 
the state’s financial contribution.
160
 The agreement notes that ‘the Commonwealth will 
determine any contribution it makes to Settlement Agreements with States and 
Territories on a case-by-case basis and extend this Agreement accordingly’.
161
 
3.103 The Western Australian Government has sought a Commonwealth contribution 
to the proposed settlement with the Noongar community.
162
 
3.104 Alternative settlements, and the respective contributions of governments to their 
funding, are policy matters and the ALRC will not make recommendations in this 
regard. However it is important to note that both Indigenous leaders and government 
Ministers have indicated that alternative settlements are preferable to a continued 
reliance on litigation.
163
 Some progress is being made towards alternative settlements, 
and further progress will allow native title litigation to be just one of a range of means 
for achieving land justice for traditional owners and certainty for other parties. 
Consistency with other policy settings 
3.105 The National Indigenous Reform Agreement (Closing the Gap) is an agreement 
between the Commonwealth of Australia and all states and territories. It commits those 
governments to effort in seven areas, one of which is economic participation. The 
agreement notes that ‘access to land and native title assets, rights and interests can be 
leveraged to secure real and practical benefits for Indigenous people’.
164
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3.106 AIATSIS has argued that native title is significant for achieving the Closing the 
Gap targets: 
Establishing a regime of native title rights that are clear, strong and economically 
valuable can, in turn, provide a resource base for Indigenous social and economic 
development.165 
3.107 On the other hand, obtaining a determination of native title does not guarantee 
economic opportunity.
166
 Much depends on whether the area is rich in minerals,
167
 
whether the group has an effective body corporate and good governance,
168
 and the 
content of the rights themselves.
169
 
3.108 Aboriginal leaders have emphasised the importance of using native title for 
economic development. Warren Mundine, Chair of the Prime Minister’s Indigenous 
Advisory Council, said that native title rights, as well as compensation for loss of land, 
‘can and should be used to generate commercial and economic development for 
Indigenous people through a real economy, real jobs and real for-profit businesses 
owned and operated by Indigenous people’.
170
 Similarly, Wayne Bergman, CEO of 
Kred Enterprises, said: 
Aboriginal culture cannot survive without an economy to support it. And to build a 
viable indigenous economy, we must be allowed to control our land and sea country 
and to use the leverage it gives us to build an economic foundation for our future.171 
3.109 The ALRC has adopted as a guiding principle that ‘reform should promote 
sustainable, long-term social, economic and cultural development for Aboriginal 
peoples and Torres Strait Islanders’.
172
 
A holistic approach to reform 
3.110 A number of stakeholders pointed out that the ALRC’s Inquiry is just one of a 
number of inquiries into different aspects of the native title system, and suggested that 
this is both wearying for participants in the system, and not conducive to systematic 
reform. 
3.111 Nick Duff has identified 11 native title law reform activities since 2007.
173
 This 
places a significant burden on stakeholders, particularly native title representative 
bodies and service providers. Central Desert Native Title Services said 
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Participation by native title parties in multiple and sometimes overlapping reviews or 
consultations is time consuming and costly and often without any positive outcome. It 
creates a feeling of cynicism and pessimism within the native title sphere and a 
reluctance to participate in ‘another review’. 174 
3.112 The Association of Mining and Exploration Companies raised a broader concern 
about the lack of clear strategic direction by governments, and said there is a ‘need for 
Government to develop and articulate an overarching native title strategy including a 
coherent long term plan for legislative and regulatory reform in this area’.
175
 
3.113 The National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples noted that the ALRC Inquiry 
addresses ‘limited issues’. It supports ‘a comprehensive review of the Act by the 
Attorney-General’s Department, designed to achieve implementation of the rights set 
out in the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People’.
176
 
3.114 The Social Justice Commissioner has called for a comprehensive and 
independent review of the native title system, considering the burden of proof, 
extinguishment, the future act regime and other matters, in 2010 and 2011.
177
 
3.115 Goldfields Land and Sea Council said that there are ‘a range of issues 
demanding attention that have not been included in the terms of reference for the 
current review, including extinguishment and the right to negotiate’.
178
 
3.116 There are also significant post-determination challenges to be addressed, 
including the effectiveness and funding of prescribed body corporates (PBCs). The 
Deloitte Review of Native Title Organisations
179
 and the Taxation Working Group
180
 
addressed some of these issues, but again it is not clear that these activities formed part 
of a coherent long-term plan for reform. 
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Summary 
4.1 This chapter sets out the legal requirements to establish native title rights and 
interests. It outlines the definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act and sets 
out major judicial statements on its interpretation. The chapter then discusses problems 
in relation to proof of native title and considers whether a presumption of continuity 
should be introduced. The ALRC does not propose that there be a presumption of 
continuity. Instead, it proposes a number of amendments to the definition of native title 
to address the technicality and complexity of establishing native title rights and 
interests. These proposals are made in later chapters of this paper. 
Establishing native title rights and interests 
Recognition of native title in Mabo [No 2] 
4.2 In Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (‘Mabo [No 2]’), the High Court found that pre-
existing rights and interests in land held by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples—native title—survived the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown.
1
 
4.3 As noted in Chapter 2, native title has its source in the traditional laws and 
customs of the relevant Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. In Mabo [No 2], 
Brennan J stated that native title ‘has its origin in and is given its content by the 
                                                        
1  Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 57, 69 (Brennan J, Mason CJ, McHugh J agreeing); 100–
01 (Deane and Gaudron JJ); 184 (Toohey J). The history of the recognition of native title in Australia is 
discussed in more detail in Ch 2.  
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traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the 
indigenous inhabitants of a territory’.
2
 
4.4 Brennan J set out the conditions for the survival of native title after the assertion 
of sovereignty, stating that native title will survive or continue after sovereignty where: 
 a clan or group has continued to acknowledge and observe traditional laws and 
customs whereby their traditional connection with the land has been 
substantially maintained;
3
 and 
 it has not been extinguished by the valid exercise of sovereign power.
4
 
4.5 However, where ‘any real acknowledgment of traditional law and any real 
observance of traditional customs’ has ceased, ‘the foundation of native title has 
disappeared’.
5
 
Defining native title in the Native Title Act: s 223(1) 
4.6 Following Mabo [No 2], the Native Title Act was enacted to provide, among 
other things, a mechanism for determining native title.
6
 
4.7 To establish that they hold native title rights and interests, claimants must be 
able to satisfy the definition of native title in s 223(1), which is based on Brennan J’s 
judgment in Mabo [No 2].
7
 Section 223(1) provides that 
(1)  The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the 
communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where: 
  (a)  the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws 
acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the 
Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and 
  (b)  the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and 
customs, have a connection with the land or waters; and 
  (c)  the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of 
Australia. 
4.8 Briefly, the definition requires that the native title claimants show, as a matter of 
fact, that they possess communal, group or individual rights and interests in relation to 
land or waters under traditional laws acknowledged and customs observed by them, 
and that, by those laws and customs, they have a connection with the land or waters 
                                                        
2  Ibid 58. 
3  Ibid 59. 
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claimed.
8
 Additionally, the native title rights and interests must be able to be 
recognised by the common law.
9
 Whether they can be recognised is a question of law. 
4.9 This means that native title rights and interests can be determined not to exist 
because: 
 there is no factual foundation for them; or 
 they cannot be recognised as a matter of law. 
4.10 A determination of native title is made by the Court in accordance with s 225 of 
the Native Title Act: 
A determination of native title is a determination whether or not native title exists in 
relation to a particular area of land or waters and, if it does exist, a determination of 
(a)   who the persons, or each group of persons, holding the common or group rights 
comprising the native title are; and 
(b)   the nature and extent of the native title rights and interests in relation to the 
determination area; and 
(c)   the nature and extent of any other interests in relation to the determination area; 
and 
(d)   the relationship between the rights and interests in paragraphs (b) and (c) (taking 
into account the effect of this Act); and 
(e)   to the extent that the land or waters in the determination area are not covered by 
a non‑exclusive agricultural lease or a non‑exclusive pastoral lease—whether 
the native title rights and interests confer possession, occupation, use and 
enjoyment of that land or waters on the native title holders to the exclusion of 
all others. 
4.11 The High Court has emphasised repeatedly that the Native Title Act provides the 
starting point for considering a determination of native title.
10
 However, the 
interpretation of the Act has been guided by the basis upon which native title was first 
recognised in Mabo [No 2]. 
4.12 In Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (‘Yorta 
Yorta’), Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ began their discussion of s 223 by 
emphasising this. They noted that, upon the acquisition of sovereignty over a particular 
part of Australia, native title—rights and interests in relation to land or waters that 
owed their origin to the traditional laws and customs of the relevant Indigenous 
peoples—survived or continued.
11
 As they later noted, 
The native title rights and interests which are the subject of the Act are those which 
existed at sovereignty, survived that fundamental change in legal regime, and now, by 
                                                        
8  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 223(1)(a), (b). 
9  Ibid s 223(1)(c). 
10  Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, [7]; Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [16], 
[25]; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [32], [70], [75]. 
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resort to the processes of the new legal order, can be enforced and protected. It is 
those rights and interests which are ‘recognised’ in the common law.12 
4.13 This basis for the recognition of native title has consequences for the 
construction of the definition of native title in the Native Title Act.
13
 The following is a 
short overview of major judicial statements on the various elements of the definition of 
native title. 
Section 223(1)(a): Traditional laws and customs  
4.14 Section 223(1)(a) requires that rights and interests are possessed under the 
traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the relevant 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander peoples. Satisfaction of s 223(1)(a) is a question of 
fact.
14
 Yorta Yorta provides the High Court’s fullest elaboration of how s 223(1)(a) 
should be construed.
15
 
‘Traditional’ laws and customs 
4.15 In Yorta Yorta, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ found that the reference to 
‘traditional’ law and custom in the definition of native title must be understood in light 
of the proposition that 
the native title rights and interests to which the Native Title Act refers are rights and 
interests finding their origin in pre-sovereignty law and custom, not rights or interests 
which are a creature of that Act.16 
4.16 As a result, the meaning of ‘traditional’ has been held to include a number of 
aspects: 
 it refers to the means of transmission of a law or custom: a ‘traditional’ law or 
custom is one which has been passed from generation to generation of a 
society;
17
 
 it refers to the age of the laws and customs: the origins of the content of the law 
or custom concerned are to be found in the normative rules of the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander societies that existed before the assertion of 
sovereignty by the British Crown;
18
 
 the ‘normative system’—that is, the traditional laws and customs—under which 
rights and interests are possessed must have had a continuous existence and 
vitality since sovereignty.
19
 
                                                        
12  Ibid [77]. See also Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209, [9]. 
13  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [45]. 
14  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [18]; De Rose v South Australia (No 1) (2003) 133 FCR 
325, [161]. 
15  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422. 
16  Ibid [45] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
17  Ibid [46]. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Ibid [47]. See also Perry and Lloyd, above n 4, 22–23. 
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4.17 Section 223(1)(a) is in the present tense, directing attention to the present 
possession of rights and interests.
20
 However, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ in 
Yorta Yorta stated that, nonetheless, the 
 rights and interests presently possessed must be possessed under traditional laws 
and customs—that is, ‘the body of law and customs acknowledged and observed 
by the ancestors of the claimants at the time of sovereignty’;
21
 
 acknowledgment and observance of the traditional laws and customs must have 
continued ‘substantially uninterrupted’ since sovereignty. If this were not the 
case, the laws and customs presently acknowledged and observed could not 
properly be described as traditional. Instead, ‘they would be a body of laws and 
customs originating in the common acceptance by or agreement of a new society 
of indigenous peoples to acknowledge and observe laws and customs of content 
similar to, perhaps even identical with, those of an earlier and different society 
of the peoples concerned’.
22
 
Laws and customs 
4.18 The reference, in s 223(1)(a), to laws and customs means that there is no need to 
distinguish between matters of law and matters of custom. However, rights and 
interests must be possessed under a set of rules with normative content, for ‘without 
that quality, there may be observable patterns of behaviour but not rights or interests in 
relation to land or waters’.
23
 
Society 
4.19 In Yorta Yorta, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ interpreted the requirement 
that rights and interests are possessed under law and custom in the light of their 
assertion that there is an inextricable link between a society and its laws and customs. 
Laws and customs cannot exist in a vacuum, so if a society—understood as a body of 
persons united in and by its acknowledgment of a body of laws and customs—ceases to 
exist, the laws and customs (and rights and interests possessed under them) also 
cease.
24
 
4.20 Subsequent Federal Court judgments have considered the approach to society 
taken in Yorta Yorta. A number have emphasised that ‘society’ is not found in the 
words of the Act, and may be utilised as a ‘conceptual tool’ to illuminate the central 
question of acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs.
25
 The 
                                                        
20  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [85]. 
21  Ibid [86]. 
22  Ibid [87]. 
23  Ibid [42]. See also Akiba v Queensland (No 3) (2010) 204 FCR 1, [171]–[174]. 
24  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [51]–[53]. 
25  Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 
FCR 442, [78]. See also Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2) (2013) 305 ALR 1, [394]; Dempsey 
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following propositions can be identified in relation to the concept of society for native 
title purposes: 
 A society can be seen as the ‘repository’ of traditional laws and customs in 
existence since sovereignty.
26
 It functions to provide a link between pre-
sovereign and contemporary laws and customs.
27
 
 Proof of the continuity of a society is insufficient to establish that there has been 
continuity of a normative system of traditional laws and customs.
28
 
 The concept of society ‘does not introduce, into the judgments required by the 
NT Act, technical, jurisprudential or social scientific criteria for the 
classification of groups or aggregations of people as “societies”’.
29
 
 In determining whether a group of people constitute a society, the central 
consideration is whether the group acknowledge the same body of laws and 
customs relating to rights and interests in land and waters.
30
 This can be so, 
‘notwithstanding that the group was composed of people from different 
language groups or groups linked to specific areas within the larger territory 
which was the subject of the application’.
31
 
 Claimants need not establish that there exists a body of laws and customs that 
unite people as a society. Rather, the society is required to be united in and by its 
acknowledgment and observance of a body of law and customs.
32
 
 The boundaries of a society need not coincide with the native title claim group. 
A native title claim group may assert that it holds individual or group rights 
under the traditional laws and customs of a larger society or community of 
which they are a part.
33
 
                                                        
26  Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 
FCR 442, [78]. 
27  Nick Duff, ‘What’s Needed to Prove Native Title? Finding Flexibility Within the Law on Connection’ 
(Research Discussion Paper 35, AIATSIS, June 2014) 34. 
28  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [74], [123]. 
29  Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 
FCR 442, [78]. 
30  Sampi on behalf of the Bardi and Jawi People v Western Australia (2010) 266 ALR 537, [51]. 
31  Ibid [71]. See, eg, Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 (8 December 2003); Alyawarr, 
Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakay Native Title Claim Group v Northern Territory (2004) 207 ALR 539; 
Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 
FCR 442; Akiba v Queensland (No 3) (2010) 204 FCR 1. 
32  Akiba v Queensland (No 3) (2010) 204 FCR 1, [169]. 
33  Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 
FCR 442, [80]; Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [145]–[146]. This was the case in De Rose, in 
which the claim group did not assert that they constituted a discrete society or community. Instead, they 
asserted that they held rights and interests under the traditional laws and customs that they shared with a 
wider society of Aboriginal people of the Western Desert Bloc: De Rose v South Australia (No 1) (2003) 
133 FCR 325, [275].  
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Relationship between traditional laws and customs and rights and interests 
4.21 In Western Australia v Ward (‘Ward’), the High Court noted that s 223(1)(a) 
requires both: 
 the identification of laws and customs said to be traditional; and 
 the identification of rights and interests possessed under those laws and 
customs.
34
 
4.22 There is a relationship between rights and interests and traditional laws and 
customs. Native title rights and interests are those that find their origin in traditional 
(pre-sovereign) law and custom.
35
 This is because: 
What survived [after the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty] were rights and interests 
in relation to land or waters. Those rights and interests owed their origin to a 
normative system other than the legal system of the new sovereign power; they owed 
their origin to the traditional laws acknowledged and the traditional customs observed 
by the indigenous peoples concerned.36 
4.23 Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ also pointed out that the relevant inquiry is 
into the possession, not the exercise, of rights and interests: 
Evidence that at some time, since sovereignty, some of those who now assert that they 
have that native title have not exercised those rights, or evidence that some of those 
through whom those now claiming native title rights or interests contend to be entitled 
to them have not exercised those rights or interests, does not inevitably answer the 
relevant statutory questions.37 
4.24 The nature and content of native title rights and interests is considered further in 
Chapter 8. 
Section 223(1)(b): Connection with land or waters 
4.25 Section 223(1)(b) requires that the claimants, by ‘those laws and customs’—that 
is, the traditional laws and customs referred to in s 223(1)(a)
38
—have a connection 
with the land or waters. Satisfaction of s 223(1)(b), like s 223(1)(a), is a question of 
fact.
39
 
4.26 The drafting of s 223(1)(b) has been described as ‘opaque’.
40
 Its origins in the 
judgment of Brennan J in Mabo [No 2], but the Full Federal Court has noted that it 
‘appears to have been applied in the statute somewhat out of context’.
41
 
                                                        
34  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [18]. 
35  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [44]. 
36  Ibid [37]. 
37  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [84]. 
38  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [46], [86]; Western 
Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [18]; Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [165]. 
39  Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457, [146]–[147].  
40  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [163]; Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, 
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4.27 The High Court in Ward stated that a separate inquiry to that required by 
s 223(1)(a) is demanded by s 223(1)(b).
42
 This is so even though the inquiry may 
depend on the same evidence as is used to establish s 223(1)(a).
43
 
4.28 The connection inquiry under s 223(1)(b) requires, ‘first an identification of the 
content of traditional laws and customs and, secondly, the characterisation of the effect 
of those laws and customs as constituting a “connection” of the peoples with the land 
or waters in question’.
44
 The concept of connection is ‘multifaceted, with differing 
aspects of it being emphasised in differing factual contexts’.
45
 
4.29 The laws and customs connecting claimants to land or waters need not 
exclusively be the laws and customs giving them rights and interests in the land or 
waters.
46
 
Connection and continuity 
4.30 Like s 223(1)(a), s 223(1)(b) is expressed in the present tense, and requires 
inquiry into the present connection of claimants with land or waters. However, the 
connection must be shown to be ‘by’ the claimants’ traditional laws and customs.
47
 The 
Full Court of the Federal Court has observed that this means that connection involves 
an element of continuity, deriving from ‘the necessary character of the relevant laws 
and customs as “traditional”’.
48
 
4.31 Continuity of acknowledgment and observance of laws and customs can 
manifest connection—that is, connection can be maintained by continued 
acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs.
49
 
4.32 Bodney v Bennell noted that the acknowledgment and observance of traditional 
laws and customs providing the required connection must have continued substantially 
uninterrupted since sovereignty, and the connection itself must have been ‘substantially 
maintained’ since that time.
50
 In Sampi v Western Australia, French J expressed the 
continuity aspect to the connection inquiry as involving the ‘the continuing internal and 
                                                        
42  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [43]. 
43  Ibid [18]. 
44  Ibid [64]; Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [169].  
45  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [164]. 
46  Ibid [169]. 
47  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [86]. 
48  Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 
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FCA 777 (10 June 2005) [1079]; Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native 
Title Claim Group (2005) 145 FCR 442, [92].   
49  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [48]; Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, 
Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 FCR 442, [92]. 
50  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [168]. 
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external assertion by [a claimant community] of its traditional relationship to the 
country defined by its laws and customs’.
51
 
4.33 To establish connection ‘requires demonstration that, by their actions and 
acknowledgement, the claimants have asserted the reality of the connection to their 
land or waters so made by their laws and customs’.
52
 Lack of physical presence does 
not necessarily mean a loss of connection.
53
 
Connection to particular areas within a claim 
4.34 The connection inquiry can have a particular topographic focus within the claim 
area, but connection to an area may be inferred from activities in the surrounding 
areas.
54
 In Bodney v Bennell, the Full Federal Court stated that, where connection to a 
particular part of a claim area is in issue, there is a need to 
 examine the traditional laws and customs for s 223(1)(b) purposes as they relate 
to that area; and 
 demonstrate that connection to that area has, in reality, been substantially 
maintained since the time of sovereignty.
55
 
Section 223(1)(c): Recognised by the common law 
4.35 Sections 223(1)(a) and 223(1)(b) indicate that native title rights and interests 
derive from the traditional laws and customs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples—not the common law. In Ward, the High Court noted that the common law is 
accorded a role in the statutory definition of native title by virtue of s 223(1)(c), in that 
the rights and interests are ‘recognised’ by the common law.
56
 
4.36 In Yorta Yorta, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated that this requirement 
emphasises that native title is a product of an intersection between legal systems: the 
rights and interests ‘recognised’ by the common law are rights and interests that existed 
at sovereignty, survived that change in legal regime, and can now be enforced and 
protected under the new legal order.
57
 
4.37 The High Court has elsewhere noted that the requirement that the claimed rights 
and interests are recognised by the common law ‘requires examination of whether the 
common law is inconsistent with the continued existence of the rights and interests that 
owe their origin to Aboriginal law or custom’.
58
 If there is no inconsistency, the 
common law will ‘recognise’ the rights and interests by giving remedies in support of 
                                                        
51  Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 (10 June 2005) [1079]; Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 
84, [174]; Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group 
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the relevant rights and interests to those who hold them.
59
 If there is inconsistency, 
recognition by the common law will be ‘withdrawn’.
60
 
4.38 Inconsistency may arise, and recognition may be refused, because the claimed 
rights and interests are in some way ‘antithetical to fundamental tenets of the common 
law’,
61
 or ‘clash with the general objective of the common law of the preservation and 
protection of society as a whole’.
62
 
4.39  Recognition may also cease because native title rights and interests have been 
‘extinguished’.
63
 Rights and interests will be extinguished where there have been acts 
done by the executive pursuant to legislative authority, or grants of rights to third 
parties, that are inconsistent with the claimed native title rights and interests.
64
 
4.40 Extinguishment is, in this sense, the ‘obverse’ of recognition.
65
 However, native 
title rights and interests are not extinguished ‘for the purposes of the traditional laws 
acknowledged and customs observed by the native title holders’.
66
 That is, 
extinguishment of native title rights and interests must be understood as the cessation 
of the common law’s recognition of those rights and interests, not the cessation of 
those rights and interests under traditional laws and customs.67 
4.41 Questions of continuity of acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws 
and customs,
68
 or of a traditional community,
69
 pertain to s 223(1)(a), and not 
s 223(1)(c).
70
 
Problems of proof 
4.42 The Terms of Reference for this Inquiry require the ALRC to consider whether 
there should be a ‘presumption of continuity of acknowledgment and observance of 
traditional laws and customs and connection’. The ALRC considers that it is not 
necessary to introduce such a presumption in light of other proposed reforms. It 
considers that issues with proof of native title should be addressed by amendments to 
                                                        
59  Ibid [42]; Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209, [9]. 
60  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [82]. 
61  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [77]. 
62  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [21]. 
63  Ibid. For example, in Fejo, it was decided that native title is extinguished by a grant in fee simple, 
because ‘the rights that are given by a grant in fee simple are rights that are inconsistent with the native 
title holders continuing to hold any of the rights or interests which together make up native title’: Fejo v 
Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96, [43].   
64  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [26], [78]; Western Australia v Brown [2014] HCA 8 (12 
March 2014) [33]; Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209, [31]–[35] (French CJ and Crennan J); 
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65  Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209, [10]. 
66  Ibid. See also Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [21]. 
67  Congoo on behalf of the Bar-Barrum People No 4 v Queensland (2014) 218 FCR 358, [35] (North and 
Jagot JJ). 
68  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [92] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne JJ). 
69  Ibid [111] (Gaudron and Kirby JJ). 
70  Ibid [92] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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the definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act. These proposed 
amendments are detailed in subsequent chapters.
71
 
Proof in native title 
4.43 In a legal proceeding, a party may bear a ‘burden’ or ‘onus’ of proof of different 
kinds. A ‘legal’ or ‘persuasive’ burden of proof is ‘the obligation of a party to meet the 
requirement of a rule of law that a fact in issue be proved (or disproved)’.
72
 An 
evidential burden of proof is ‘the obligation to show, if called upon to do so, that there 
is sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in 
issue’.
73
 
Proof in native title determination applications 
4.44 Native claims are commenced and conducted as legal proceedings in the Federal 
Court—they are proceedings under the Native Title Act.
74
 In those proceedings, 
claimants bear the persuasive burden of proving all of the elements necessary to 
establish the existence of native title as defined in s 223.
75
 The standard of proof 
required is the civil standard—the balance of probabilities.
76
 
4.45 Native title matters may also be resolved by consent. If an agreement between 
parties to a determination is reached, the Federal Court may, if satisfied that an order 
consistent with the terms of the agreement would be within the power of the Court
77
 
and it appears to the Court to be appropriate,
78
 make a native title determination order 
over the whole or part of a determination area without a hearing. 
4.46 In Yorta Yorta, the High Court acknowledged that ‘difficult problems of proof’ 
face native title claimants when seeking to establish the existence of native title rights 
and interests—particularly in demonstrating the content of traditional laws and customs 
as required by s 223(1)(a).
79
 However, it also noted that ‘the difficulty of the forensic 
task does not alter the requirements of the statutory provision’.
80
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4.47 A number of the submissions to this Inquiry emphasised the complexity of 
establishing that native title exists. For example, Queensland South Native Title 
Services (QSNTS) argued that s 223 is ‘unnecessarily complicated, fragmented and 
inconsistently interpreted and applied in practice’.
81
 Goldfields Land and Sea Council 
commented upon the ‘unnecessary technicality and legalism in native title’.
82
 
4.48 However, other stakeholders said that the current legal test for the proof and 
recognition of native title was not unduly onerous and time-consuming.
83
 
A presumption in relation to proof? 
4.49 A presumption in relation to proof of native title is perceived as one response to 
the difficulty of establishing the existence of native title rights and interests. It was first 
proposed by Justice French (as he then was) in 2008.
84
 Justice French considered that a 
presumption may ‘lighten some of the burden of making a case for a determination’ by 
lifting some elements of the burden of proof from native title claimants.
85
 
4.50 A presumption has a specific meaning in a legal context, distinct from its 
ordinary meaning as an assumption of something as true, or a belief on reasonable 
grounds.
86
 
4.51 A presumption of law is a rule of evidence that affects how a fact in issue is 
proved. A presumption of law operates so that when a fact—the ‘basic fact’—is 
proved, it must, in the absence of further evidence, lead to a conclusion that another 
fact—the ‘presumed fact’—exists.
87
 In other words, a presumption that a fact exists 
will arise on proof of a basic fact. The presumption will operate unless rebutted by 
evidence to the contrary.
88
 The amount of evidence required in rebuttal differs between 
presumptions.
89
 Some may require ‘some’ evidence to be adduced. Others may be 
rebutted only by adducing evidence ‘sufficiently cogent to persuade the tribunal of fact 
of the non-existence of the presumed fact’.
90
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4.52 In Justice French’s model, the facts necessary to satisfy s 223(1) would be 
presumed to exist on the proof of certain basic facts, namely, that: 
 the native title claim group defined in the application applies for a determination 
of native title rights and interests where the rights and interests are found to be 
possessed under laws acknowledged and customs observed by the native title 
claim group; 
 members of the native title claim group reasonably believe the laws and customs 
so acknowledged to be traditional; 
 the members of the native title claim group, by their laws and customs, have a 
connection with the land or waters the subject of the application; 
 the members of the native title claim group reasonably believe that persons from 
whom one or more of them was descended, acknowledged and observed 
traditional laws and customs at sovereignty by which those persons had a 
connection with the land or waters the subject of the application.
91
 
4.53 Justice French considered that the presumption should operate subject to proof 
to the contrary.
92
 
4.54 Many stakeholders supported the introduction of a presumption,
93
 and many of 
these supported the model proposed by Justice French, in whole or in part.
94
 
4.55 A number of proponents of a presumption argued that it would reduce the 
resource burden on claimants to establish the elements necessary to prove the existence 
of native title,
95
 and would place some of that burden more appropriately on state and 
territory respondent parties.
96
 Related to this, a number of submissions argued that a 
presumption would reduce delay and speed resolution of claims.
97
 Other submissions 
argued that a presumption would be appropriate on the basis that it is unjust or 
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Submission 18; National Native Title Council, Submission 16; Law Society of Western Australia, 
Submission 9. 
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discriminatory to require native title claimants to prove their customary connection to 
their territories.
98
 
4.56 However, the ALRC considers that, rather than proposing a presumption—a 
reform affecting how facts in issue in native title matters are proved—it is preferable to 
propose amendments to the definition of native title itself. These are detailed in 
Chapters 5 and 7. The ALRC agrees with the observation of Mr Angus Frith and 
Associate Professor Maureen Tehan that the benefits of introducing a presumption 
must substantially outweigh potential disadvantages.
99
 The ALRC considers that such a 
substantial benefit has not been demonstrated, for a number of reasons. It is not clear 
what effect a presumption would have on a number of aspects of native title 
proceedings, including the resolution of claims by consent, the resources involved in 
native title matters, and claimants’ control of evidence. The ALRC also considers that 
the development of native title jurisprudence as well as case management in native title 
proceedings has rendered the case for a presumption less compelling. These matters are 
considered in more detail below. 
Effect on resolution of claims by consent 
4.57 Introduction of a presumption may affect parties’ practices in ways that are 
detrimental to claim resolution, particularly in relation to resolution of claims by 
consent. 
4.58 Most claims are now resolved by consent.
100
 For example, the South Australian 
Government’s submission noted that it has ‘only contested one native title matter since 
the resolution of De Rose, and that was set down for trial without going through its 
[consent determination] process. All other determinations have been by consent’.
101
 
Similarly, the Northern Territory Government submitted that there had been no 
substantive litigated claims in the Northern Territory since 2007.
102
 
4.59 Some submissions suggested that a presumption would strengthen the position 
of claimants in negotiations to resolve native title determination applications.
103
 
However, resolution of claims by consent currently occurs in the context of a state or 
territory respondent party being in a position to be satisfied of the existence of native 
title rights and interests on the basis of claimants’ provision of ‘connection material’—
factual material capable of demonstrating the existence of the claimed native title rights 
and interests. 
                                                        
98  National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, Submission 32; Native Title Services Victoria, Submission 
18.  
99  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
100  See Ch 3. 
101  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
102  Northern Territory Government, Submission 31. 
103  See, eg, NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29; National Native Title Council, 
Submission 16. 
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4.60 If more limited material sufficient to establish the basic facts of a presumption 
were to be provided by claimants, the willingness of state and territory respondents to 
agree to a determination is not clear.
104
 In this, the ALRC agrees with the observation 
of the National Native Title Tribunal that it is not possible to predict whether 
introducing a presumption would result in ‘more, or more timely, consent 
determinations recognising the existence of native title’.
105
 
Will a presumption ‘reduce the burden’ on claimants? 
4.61 It is also unclear that the introduction of a presumption will have the effect of 
reducing the evidentiary burden on claimants. Even some advocates of a presumption 
conceded that the projected savings of time and resources rely on respondent parties 
electing not to rebut it.
106
 AIATSIS, for example, cautions that 
There is a risk that little will be gained by a presumption that States actively seek to 
rebut, by adducing evidence that supports an argument of discontinuity and to which 
claimants would then be forced to mount proof of continuity in any event.107 
4.62 The Northern Territory Government submitted that a presumption ‘would not 
obviate the Northern Territory’s requirement to assess evidence of connection’.
108
 
Similarly, the Western Australian Government submitted that it 
would still be obliged to undertake a due diligence process in respect of claims if a 
presumption of continuity was introduced … It is unlikely the State would 
compromise due diligence by streamlining its connection assessment process, so in a 
consent determination context it is unlikely that there would be significant time 
savings … In a contested context, it is likely that the State or other parties (including 
competing Indigenous parties) would seek to test the various elements comprising the 
presumption.109 
4.63 Stakeholders who supported the presumption noted that claimants would still 
need to undertake research in the preparation of a claim, including research to establish 
that the claim group are the right people for the claim area.
110
 Time and resources will 
be needed to investigate these issues. Some stakeholders considered that this would 
                                                        
104  In particular, states and territories are likely to consider the compensation implications of a native title 
determination. The South Australian Government noted  that ‘virtually all determinations of native title 
are followed by negotiations or claims for significant compensation for historical extinguishment’: South 
Australian Government, Submission 34.   
105  National Native Title Tribunal, Submission No 15 to Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, August 2011. 
See also Queensland South Native Title Services, Submission 24. 
106  For example, NQLC state that the presumption  may constitute a change for the better and speed up the 
native title process if, in a significant number of cases, the States and Territories did not seek to rebut the 
presumption: North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17. 
107  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
108  Northern Territory Government, Submission 31. 
109  Western Australian Government, Submission 20. 
110  AIATSIS, Submission 36. See also Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation, Submission No 8 to Senate 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title 
Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, July 2011; Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30. 
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still involve a reduction in overall time and expense spent on claim preparation.
111
 
However, QSNTS considered that 
no decline in the requisite work to prove native title may occur, at least in the short to 
medium term upon the presumption’s introduction. … We suggest that it is sound 
legal strategy for the claim group to still nevertheless prepare its material in case it 
needs to evidence facts required to be shown pursuant to ss 223(1)(a)–(b) of the Act in 
those circumstances where the State is able to provide evidence to rebut that 
presumption.112 
Effect on quality of applications 
4.64 State and territory governments also expressed concern that a presumption may, 
variously, promote applications by those who do not hold traditional rights and 
interests in an area,
113
 or affect the quality of the evidence establishing the group and 
the rights and interests held.
114
 The South Australian Government submitted that, in 
contested matters, 
the Court would not be in receipt of anthropological and historical material explaining 
the basis of the rights sought and the structure of the native tile group asserting native 
title. Such a situation does not seem appropriate to deliver just decisions (for either the 
applicants or the respondents).115 
Claimants’ control of evidence of relationship to land and waters 
4.65 The ALRC considers that the introduction of a presumption may have an 
unfavourable effect on claimants’ control of the narrative of their connection to land 
and waters. AIATSIS raised concerns that, if state and territory respondent parties seek 
to rebut a presumption, ‘claimants will likely be asked to respond to anthropological 
research by State-commissioned researchers’. They considered that this could 
‘undermine cohesion within Indigenous communities’, and may involve an 
engagement with claimants, ‘without responsibility or capacity to resolve disputes or to 
understand their location within the broader dynamics of a claimant group or its 
neighbours’.
116
 
4.66 AIATSIS’s concerns echoed those raised by the Centre for Native Title 
Anthropology, which has warned that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
involved in native title claims may lose the ‘capacity to control the circumstances in 
which research about their history and culture occurs … and how it is to be managed in 
the future’.
117
 Such control may be particularly important in factual circumstances such 
as claims in relation to urban areas, or where there has been significant historical 
removal of groups from claimed areas. In such cases, it may be beneficial to claimants 
                                                        
111  North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
112  Queensland South Native Title Services, Submission 24. 
113  Northern Territory Government, Submission 31. 
114  Queensland Government Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Submission 28. 
115  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
116  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
117  Centre for Native Title Anthropology, ANU, Submission No 20 to Senate Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, 
August 2011. 
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to themselves contextualise and structure the evidence of their connection to land or 
waters.
118
 
4.67 The South Australian Government also expressed concerns about the role of a 
respondent party in gathering evidence to rebut a presumption, submitting that, in 
present negotiations to settle native title matters, 
Claimants are prepared to release their information knowing it will be handled 
sensitively and on the basis that it will not be disclosed further without their consent 
… On occasion, State representatives have gone on country with claimants and their 
representatives to fill gaps in the material.119 
4.68 However, it observed that ‘it is unlikely that this collaboration would be offered 
if it were for the State to disprove presumptions of continuity’.
120
 
Federal Court case management 
4.69 The Federal Court’s submission detailed case management strategies that have 
been adopted by the Court to assist parties to reach agreement on connection issues. 
For example, 
 In South Australia and Queensland the Court has, in particular claims, 
facilitated case management conferences at which the experts for the Applicant 
and State confer to identify the issues likely to be most contentious prior to the 
commencement of anthropological field work. … 
 In the Northern Territory, Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria and 
Queensland the Court has in various matters made orders that the experts confer 
under the supervision of a Registrar of the Court to identify those matters and 
issues about which their opinions are in agreement and those where they differ. 
These conferences have usually taken place in the absence of the parties’ 
lawyers and have been remarkably successful in narrowing connection issues, 
often resulting in agreement between the experts on all matters.121 
4.70 In light of this information, the ALRC considers that some of the assistance that 
a presumption would provide in narrowing the issues in contention in native title 
matters has been accomplished through other means. 
Inferences in relation to proof of native title 
4.71 The ALRC also notes the preparedness of the Court, where appropriate, to draw 
inferences as to the existence of facts satisfying s 223. Additionally, submissions to this 
Inquiry suggest that there is an increased preparedness on the part of state and territory 
respondent parties to draw inferences in the context of agreeing to consent 
                                                        
118  See generally Sally Babidge, ‘The Proof of Native Title Connection in Absentia’ in Toni Bauman and 
Gaynor MacDonald (eds), Unsettling Anthropology: The Demands of Native Title on Worn Concepts and 
Changing Lives (AIATSIS, 2011) 82; Paul Memmott, ‘Modelling the Continuity of Aboriginal Law in 
Urban Native Title Claims: A Practice Example’ in Toni Bauman and Gaynor MacDonald (eds), 
Unsettling Anthropology: The Demands of Native Title on Worn Concepts and Changing Lives 
(AIATSIS, 2011) 122.  
119  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
120  Ibid. 
121  Federal Court of Australia, Submission 40. 
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determinations. The ALRC considers that this approach to proof of native title rights 
and interests is appropriate, and that the increased willingness to draw inferences to 
satisfy the burden of proof makes the case for the introduction of a formal presumption 
in native title matters less compelling. 
4.72 An inference is distinct from a presumption of law. Presumptions have a formal 
role in the proof of a particular fact. By contrast, 
An inference is a tentative or final assent to the existence of a fact which the drawer of 
the inference bases on the existence of some other fact or facts. The drawing of an 
inference is an exercise of the ordinary powers of human reason in the light of human 
experience; it is not affected directly by any rule of law.122 
4.73 When an inference is drawn, it may satisfy a burden of proof, but the ‘trier of 
fact decides whether to draw an inference and what weight to give to it’.
123
 
4.74 Where a fact in issue may be inferred from the proof of another particular fact in 
a commonly recurring situation, such an inference is often referred to as a 
‘presumption of fact’.
124
 Unlike a presumption of law, a court is not obliged to draw 
this inference. However, ‘the party proving the basic fact is likely to win on the issue to 
which the presumed fact relates, in the absence of evidence to the contrary adduced by 
the other party’.
125
 
4.75 In Yorta Yorta, it was observed that, in many, perhaps most, native title cases, 
claimants will invite the Court to draw inferences about the content of traditional laws 
and customs at times earlier than those described in the claimants’ evidence.
126
 It is not 
possible, however, to offer any ‘single bright line test’ for deciding what inferences 
may be drawn or when they may be drawn.
127
 
4.76 Cases since Yorta Yorta have elaborated on the circumstances in which 
inferences may be drawn as to, for example, whether laws and customs are 
‘traditional’, or whether such laws and customs have been continuously acknowledged 
                                                        
122  Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia (at 1 September 2011) 16 Evidence, ‘16.2 Proof in Civil Cases’ 
[16.2.270]. 
123  Ibid. 
124  J D Heydon, LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, Vol 1 (at Service 164) [7215]. Heydon notes that 
presumptions of fact are ‘not true presumptions’, but that ‘nevertheless this misleading connotation of the 
term “presumption” used in connection with the ordinary processes of inferential reasoning has become 
so familiar that in most cases the word is hardly likely to be productive of great confusion’: Ibid [7255]. 
125  J D Heydon, LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, Vol 1 (at Service 164) [7215]. 
126  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [80] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ). The court has been prepared, in some native title cases, to draw an inference of 
continuity of generational transmission of law and custom, or of the claimant group’s descent from the 
original inhabitants of an area at sovereignty, and that the original inhabitants of an area were a society 
organised under traditional laws and customs: Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 
(8 December 2003) [336]; Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakay Native Title Claim Group v Northern 
Territory (2004) 207 ALR 539, [103]–[110]; Sampi on behalf of the Bardi and Jawi People v Western 
Australia (2010) 266 ALR 537, [64]–[66] (North and Mansfield JJ). 
127  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [82] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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and observed. In this, guidance has been taken from the approach to proof of 
customary rights at English common law.
128
 
4.77 To establish the existence of a custom enforceable at common law required, 
among other things, proof that the custom had existed since ‘time immemorial’.
129
 The 
difficulty of establishing the existence of a custom from time immemorial was eased by 
the courts’ willingness to infer from ‘proof of the existence of a current custom that 
that custom had continued from time immemorial’.
130
 
4.78 In Gumana v Northern Territory, Selway J noted the similarities between proof 
of the existence of traditional laws and customs for the purposes of establishing native 
title rights and interests, and proof of custom at common law.
131
 He observed that 
There is no obvious reason why the same evidentiary inference is not applicable for 
the purpose of proving the existence of Aboriginal custom and Aboriginal tradition at 
the date of settlement and, indeed, the existence of rights and interests arising under 
that tradition or custom.132 
4.79 Selway J considered that, where there is 
 a clear claim of the continuous existence of a custom or tradition that has existed 
at least since settlement; 
 supported by credible evidence from persons who have observed that custom or 
tradition; and 
 evidence of a general reputation that the custom or tradition had ‘always’ been 
observed; 
then, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is an inference that the tradition 
or custom has existed at least since the date of settlement.
133
 
4.80 The approach to the drawing of inferences set out in Gumana has been approved 
in a number of subsequent cases.
134
 For example, in AB (deceased) (on behalf of the 
Ngarla People) v Western Australia (No 4), Bennett J accepted the claimants’ 
submission that 
                                                        
128  Such customary rights may include, for instance, the use of an access path to a local church: Brocklebank 
v Thompson [1903] 2 Ch 344; or the playing of sports and other pastimes on a piece of land: New 
Windsor Corporation v Mellor [1975] Ch 380. See also LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 32 
(2012) Custom and Usage. 
129  LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 32 (2012) Custom and Usage. 
130  Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457, [198]. 
131  Ibid [197]–[202]. 
132  Ibid [201]. 
133  Ibid.   
134  Sampi on behalf of the Bardi and Jawi People v Western Australia (2010) 266 ALR 537, [63]–[65]; 
Griffiths v Northern Territory (2006) 165 FCR 300, [580]; Harrington-Smith on behalf of the 
Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 9) (2007) 238 ALR 1, [341]; Wyman on behalf of the Bidjara 
People v Queensland (No 2) [2013] FCA 1229 (6 December 2013) [479]; Dempsey on behalf of the 
Bularnu, Waluwarra and Wangkayujuru People v Queensland (No 2) [2014] FCA 528 (23 May 2014) 
[132]–[134]; AB (deceased) (on behalf of the Ngarla People) v Western Australia (No 4) [2012] FCA 
1268 (21 November 2012) [724]. 
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the Court is entitled to draw inferences about the content of the traditional laws and 
customs at sovereignty from contemporary evidence and that if the evidence 
establishes a contemporary normative rule, it may be reasonable to find that such a 
normative rule existed at sovereignty.135 
4.81 State and territory respondent parties, in some circumstances, are also willing to 
draw inferences in relation to proof of certain facts in native title matters. Indeed, Mr 
John Catlin has observed that ‘consent determinations invariably are a product of a 
combination of agreed facts and beneficial inferences about the available evidence’.
136
 
For example, the South Australian Government submitted that it is willing, where 
appropriate, to draw inferences relating to information that is 
 genealogical—many asserted relationships are accepted by the State without 
detailed analysis; 
 historical—the State often relies on historical assertions made by applicants 
where there is no other evidence; 
 anthropological—the State often accepts that contemporary differences from 
the historical description of a group’s traditional law and custom at 
sovereignty reflect an adaptation rather than a break in those traditions.137 
4.82 In reasons accompanying a determination of native title by consent in Lander v 
South Australia, Mansfield J agreed with South Australia’s assessment that the 
evidence supported 
the inference that the pre-sovereignty normative society has continued to exist 
throughout the period since sovereignty, and whilst there has been inevitable 
adaptation and evolution of the laws and customs of that society, there is nothing 
apparent in the Evidence to suggest the inference should not be made that the society 
today (as descendents of those placed in the area in the earliest records) acknowledges 
and observes a body of laws and customs which is substantially the same normative 
system as that which existed at sovereignty.138 
4.83 In relation to the western desert region of Western Australia, Central Desert 
Native Title Services (CDNTS) noted that Western Australia had generally accepted 
continuity of connection on the basis of evidence from ‘current senior claimants who 
have living memories of their grandparents and great grandparents’. In this regard, 
CDNTS submitted, ‘there effectively exists an unstated “presumption of continuity” for 
native title claims in the region’.
139
 
                                                        
135  AB (deceased) (on behalf of the Ngarla People) v Western Australia (No 4) [2012] FCA 1268 (21 
November 2012) [724]. 
136  John Catlin, ‘Recognition Is Easy’ in Toni Bauman and Lydia Glick (eds), The Limits of Change: Mabo 
and Native Title 20 Years On (AIATSIS, 2012). 
137  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
138  Lander v South Australia [2012] FCA 427 (1 May 2012) [48]. 
139  Central Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26. However, there was also some criticism that state 
respondent parties were not readily drawing inferences as to continuity of connection: see Queensland 
South Native Title Services, Submission 24.   
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4.84 The Northern Territory Government also submitted that ‘in practice, a rebuttable 
presumption operates in the context of resolution of pastoral estate claims’.
140
 
Additionally, the Northern Territory Government detailed the development of its 
streamlined process to resolve pastoral estate claims, which includes ‘not disputing the 
existence of native title holding group at sovereignty (subject to extinguishment)’.
141
 
4.85 The ALRC considers that it is appropriate for the Court and respondent parties 
to accept that a ‘presumption of fact’, or inference, arises on proof of the circumstances 
set out in Gumana. Such an approach to the drawing of inferences will increasingly be 
necessary if the beneficial purpose of the Act is to be sustained as the date of Crown 
assertion of sovereignty grows more distant.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
140  Northern Territory Government, Submission 31. 
141  Ibid. 
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Summary 
5.1 To establish that they hold native title rights and interests, native title claimants 
must satisfy the definition of native title in s 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). 
Section 223(1)(a) requires that the claimed rights and interests are possessed under the 
traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed by the relevant 
Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders. This chapter outlines how this 
requirement has been interpreted, focusing on the approach taken to the meaning of 
acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs. 
5.2 The ALRC makes proposals for reform of this aspect of the definition. It 
considers that an interpretation of this provision consistent with the beneficial purpose 
of the Native Title Act, and in accordance with the Preamble and Objects of the Act, 
entails an approach that is ‘fair, large and liberal’. As a consequence, the ALRC 
considers that s 223(1) should not be construed in a way that renders native title rights 
and interests excessively fragile, or vulnerable, to a finding that there has been loss of 
their factual foundation. 
5.3 The ALRC proposes that there be explicit acknowledgment in the Native Title 
Act that traditional laws and customs under which native title rights and interests are 
possessed may adapt, evolve or otherwise develop. It also proposes that the definition 
of native title clarify that rights and interests may be possessed under traditional laws 
and customs where they have been transmitted between groups in accordance with 
traditional laws and customs. 
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5.4 Additionally, the ALRC makes proposals addressing the degree of continuity of 
acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs that is required to 
establish native title. 
5.5 These proposals address the technicality and complexity of establishing the 
existence of native title rights and interests. In many respects, they endorse the 
movement in case law and in negotiations towards flexibility in the evidentiary 
requirements to establish native title. 
Approach to statutory construction of s 223 
5.6 Ordinary principles of statutory interpretation dictate the consideration of the 
purpose of the legislation.
1
 The language of the Preamble and Objects of the Native 
Title Act—referring to, among other things, an intention to rectify the consequences of 
past injustices and that the law be a special measure for the advancement of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples—suggests that its purpose is beneficial.
2
 
5.7 As noted in Chapter 2, where legislation is identified as being beneficial and 
remedial, the High Court has stated that such legislation should be given a ‘fair, large 
and liberal’ interpretation, rather than one which is ‘literal or technical’.
3
 
5.8 International law principles are also relevant to the approach taken to construing 
the Native Title Act. The High Court has accepted that ‘a statute is to be interpreted and 
applied, as far as its language permits, so that it is in conformity and not in conflict 
with the established rules of international law’.
4
 Rights to equality and non-
discrimination are central principles in human rights law, enunciated in a number of 
treaties to which Australia is a party.
5
 
5.9 Other principles of statutory interpretation are arguably relevant to the 
construction of the definition of native title rights and interests. For example, AIATSIS 
pointed to common law principles for interpreting legislation ‘root[ed] in the common 
                                                        
1  Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA. In 2014, the High Court commented that this provision 
reflected a ‘general systemic principle [of statutory construction]’: Thiess v Collector of Customs (2014) 
306 ALR 594, [23]. 
2  Sean Brennan, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Indigenous Property Rights’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 
239, 252. In Alyawarr, the Full Court of the Federal Court described the Preamble as the Act’s ‘moral 
foundation’: Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group 
(2005) 145 FCR 442, [63]. See also Justice Robert French, ‘Lifting the Burden of Native Title—Some 
Modest Proposals for Improvement’ (Speech Delivered at the Federal Court Native Title User Group, 
Adelaide, 9 July 2008) [7]. A number of submissions also referred to the beneficial purpose of the Native 
Title Act: see, eg, Queensland Government Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Submission 28; 
Central Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26; Native Title Services Victoria, Submission 18; North 
Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9. 
3  IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1, 12 (Brennan CJ, McHugh J); 39 (Gummow J). See also AB v 
Western Australia (2011) 244 CLR 390, [24]. 
4  Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 287 (Mason CJ and Deane J). 
5  See, eg, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) arts 2, 26; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 
195 (entered into force 4 January 1969) arts 1, 2, 5. See also Australian Human Rights Commission, 
Rights to Equality and Non-discrimination <www.humanrights.gov.au/rights-equality-and-non-
discrimination>. 
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law protection of the rights of citizens against arbitrary exercises of power by the state, 
especially in relation to property’.
6
 
5.10 As noted in Chapter 4, native title rights and interests can be determined not to 
exist when either: 
 they cannot be established as a matter of fact, because claimants cannot establish 
that they possess rights and interests under traditional laws and customs; and a 
connection, by those laws and customs, with the land or waters claimed;
7
 or 
 they cannot be established as a matter of law, because the rights and interests are 
not recognised by the common law of Australia, as they are inconsistent with 
them.
8
 
5.11 One of the guiding principles for this Inquiry is that reform should recognise the 
importance of recognition of native title to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples and the Australian community.
9
 It is consistent with this principle, and the 
Preamble and Objects of the Act, to approach the task of recognition of native title 
rights and interests in a way that does not render them excessively vulnerable to a 
finding of factual loss. Accordingly, the proposals in this chapter are intended to 
promote an interpretation of the definition of native title consistent with the purpose of 
the Native Title Act. 
5.12 However, the ALRC recognises that not all Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 
peoples will be able to establish that they hold native title under the Native Title Act. 
The Preamble to the Native Title Act acknowledges that ‘many Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders, because they have been dispossessed of their traditional lands, 
will be unable to assert native title rights and interests’.
10
  
Section 223(1)(a)  
5.13 Section 223(1)(a) of the Native Title Act requires that native title rights and 
interests are rights and interests possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged and 
traditional customs observed by the relevant Aboriginal peoples Torres Strait Islanders. 
As explained in Chapter 4, the High Court in Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal 
Community v Victoria (‘Yorta Yorta’) has stated that the laws and customs that can be 
properly described as ‘traditional’ are those that find their origin in the laws and 
customs acknowledged and observed at sovereignty.
11
 
                                                        
6  AIATSIS, Submission 36. See generally Dan Meagher, ‘The Common Law Principle of Legality in the 
Age of Rights’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 449. 
7  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 223(1)(a), (b). 
8  Ibid s 223(1)(c). 
9  Guiding Principle 1: see Ch 1.  
10  A number of submissions to this Inquiry highlighted this aspect of the Preamble: see, eg, Queensland 
Government Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Submission 28; Western Australian 
Government, Submission 20; National Farmers’ Federation, Submission 14. See Ch 3 for further 
discussion.  
11  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [46] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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5.14 As a result, the meaning of ‘traditional’ has been interpreted as having a number 
of aspects: 
 the means of transmission of a law or custom: a ‘traditional’ law or custom is 
one which has been passed from generation to generation of a society;
12
 
 the age of the laws and customs: the origins of the content of the law or custom 
concerned are to be found in the normative rules of the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander societies that existed before the assertion of sovereignty by the 
British Crown;
13
 
 continuity: the ‘normative system’—that is, the traditional laws and customs—
under which rights and interests are possessed must have had a continuous 
existence and vitality since sovereignty.
14
 
Accommodation of change to laws and customs 
Proposal 5–1 The definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act 
should be amended to make clear that traditional laws and customs may adapt, 
evolve or otherwise develop. 
5.15 The ALRC proposes that there be explicit acknowledgment in the Native Title 
Act that traditional laws and customs under which native title rights and interests are 
possessed may adapt, evolve or otherwise develop. 
5.16 As a number of submissions to this Inquiry have noted,
15
 the current 
interpretation of the requirement that rights and interests are possessed under 
traditional laws and customs already allows for some change in those laws and 
customs. Contemporary laws and customs do not have to be identical to those at 
sovereignty to be considered traditional. Instead, to be designated traditional, 
contemporary laws and customs need only have their ‘origins’ in pre-sovereign laws 
and customs.
16
 
5.17 The High Court in Yorta Yorta explicitly deals with the question of evolution 
and adaptation. There, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated that some change to, 
or adaptation of, traditional laws and customs will not necessarily be fatal to a native 
title claim.
17
 There is no bright line test that can be offered to judge the significance, in 
                                                        
12  Ibid [46]. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Ibid [47]. See also Melissa Perry and Stephen Lloyd, Australian Native Title Law (Lawbook Co, 2003) 
22–23. 
15  Law Council of Australia, Submission 35; South Australian Government, Submission 34; Northern 
Territory Government, Submission 31; Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30; Queensland South 
Native Title Services, Submission 24; Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9; Cape York Land 
Council, Submission 7. 
16  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [46]. 
17  Ibid [83]. 
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a particular case, of change and adaptation to law and custom.
18
 The key question 
remains ‘whether the law and custom can still be seen to be traditional law and 
traditional custom’.
19
 
5.18 Gaudron and Kirby JJ in Yorta Yorta also considered that laws and customs may 
adapt and still be considered traditional: 
What is necessary for laws and customs to be identified as traditional is that they 
should have their origins in the past and, to the extent that they differ from past 
practices, the differences should constitute adaptations, alterations, modifications or 
extensions made in accordance with the shared values or the customs and practices of 
the people who acknowledge and observe those laws and customs.20 
5.19 A number of submissions to this Inquiry argued that the existing approach to the 
meaning of ‘traditional’ sufficiently allows for evolution and adaptation of laws and 
customs.
21
 For example, the South Australian Government submitted that the 
‘evolution of traditional law and custom tends to be accepted in most circumstances but 
the evolved laws must be in some way referable to those in existence at sovereignty’.
22
 
5.20 In a number of determinations of native title, the Federal Court has recognised 
adapted laws and customs as retaining a ‘traditional’ character. For example, in 
Neowarra v Western Australia, Sundberg J found that the claimants’ laws and customs 
were traditional notwithstanding that they were ‘modified and to some extent diluted 
by the changed circumstances of the older applicants and their forebears’.
23
 Other 
examples of adapted laws and customs have included changes to: 
 descent rules: from patrilineal to cognatic;
24
 or a shift over time involving an 
increase in reliance on matrilineal descent;
25
 
 laws allowing images relating to country to be painted on canvas rather than on 
country, and the sale of these artworks;
26
 
 the location of initiation rituals,
27
 or a cessation of initiation ceremonies on the 
claimed area;
28
 
                                                        
18  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [83]. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Ibid [114]. 
21  South Australian Government, Submission 34; Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; 
Queensland Government Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Submission 28; Western 
Australian Government, Submission 20. 
22  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
23  Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 (8 December 2003) [346]. 
24  Griffiths v Northern Territory (2006) 165 FCR 300, [501]; Western Australia v Sebastian (2008) 173 
FCR 1, [121]–[122]; Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2) (2013) 305 ALR 1, [507]. 
25  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [116]. 
26  Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 (8 December 2003) [140]–[141]. 
27  Dempsey on behalf of the Bularnu, Waluwarra and Wangkayujuru People v Queensland (No 2) [2014] 
FCA 528 (23 May 2014) [693]–[694].  
28  Graham on behalf of the Ngadju People v Western Australia [2012] FCA 1455 (21 December 2012) 
[146]. 
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 social organisation associated with particular parts of the claimed area—with a 
number of smaller groups ‘coalescing’ into larger groupings.
29
 
5.21 However, while it is clear that some accommodation of change to laws and 
customs has been held to be possible, the ALRC considers that the definition of native 
title in the Native Title Act should explicitly acknowledge that traditional laws and 
customs may adapt, evolve or otherwise develop. 
5.22 Such legislative acknowledgment of change is arguably in keeping with the 
approach envisaged upon first recognition of native title in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] 
(‘Mabo [No 2]’). That native title rights will continue notwithstanding cultural change 
was repeatedly adverted to by the High Court in Mabo [No 2]. For example, Brennan J 
noted that, ‘of course in time the laws and customs of any people will change and the 
rights and interests of the members of the people among themselves will change too’.
30
 
Deane and Gaudron JJ stated that traditional laws and customs are not 
frozen as at the moment of establishment of a Colony. Provided any changes do not 
diminish or extinguish the relationship between a particular tribe or other group and 
particular land, subsequent developments or variations do not extinguish the title in 
relation to that land.31 
5.23 Toohey J was also of the view that ‘an indigenous society cannot … surrender 
its rights by modifying its way of life’.
32
 
5.24 As Kirby J noted in Commonwealth v Yarmirr, an adherence to the principle of 
non-discrimination 
must include a recognition that the culture and laws of indigenous peoples adapt to 
modern ways of life and evolve in the manner that the cultures and laws of all 
societies do. They do this lest, by being frozen and completely unchangeable, they are 
rendered irrelevant and consequently atrophy and disappear.33 
5.25 As the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples noted,
34
 the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples also recognises the right of 
Indigenous peoples to ‘practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs’. 
                                                        
29  Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2) (2013) 305 ALR 1, [400], [695]–[696]. See also AB 
(deceased) (on behalf of the Ngarla People) v Western Australia (No 4) [2012] FCA 1268 (21 November 
2012) [784]–[785]. In Bodney v Bennell, the Full Court found that the significant change from pre-
settlement land-holding systems—from a system of ‘home areas’ and ‘runs’, to an identification with 
larger areas known as ‘boodjas’, pointed against continuity with pre-sovereignty laws and customs, but 
did not make any conclusions on this issue: Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [79]–[83]. The Full 
Court noted that the primary judge did not make any finding as to whether this change was a ‘permissible 
adaptation’ of pre-sovereignty land holding systems: Ibid [83]. However, it did not suggest that this 
finding was not open to the primary judge. 
30  Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 61. 
31  Ibid 110. 
32  Ibid 192. Toohey J makes this statement in the context of his position that traditional rights exist ‘so long 
as occupation by a traditional society is established now and at the time of annexation’: 192. 
33  Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, [295]. 
34  National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, Submission 32. 
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This includes the ‘right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future 
manifestations of their cultures’.
35
 
5.26 A number of stakeholders were critical of the present interpretation of the 
meaning of ‘traditional’ laws and customs, or supported better recognition of evolution 
and adaptation to laws and customs.
36
 For example, Goldfields Land and Sea Council 
(GLSC) argued that focusing on tradition has the propensity ‘to ingrain and incentivise 
a cultural conservatism in Indigenous communities, effectively discouraging (even 
punishing) processes of cultural change and renewal that might otherwise occur’.
37
 
5.27 Queensland South Native Title Services (QSNTS) identified the tradition 
requirement as one of the ‘inherent deficiencies’ with the definition of native title, 
pointing to the limitations and injustice in 
the notion that upon settlement, all that the introduced law could and can ever 
recognise was a master copy of an indigenous legal system that existed at that point, 
from which successive generations of Aboriginal peoples across time have to be 
imprinted against.38 
5.28 Other stakeholders noted the injustice of requiring Aboriginal people to establish 
the existence of a system of traditional laws and customs ‘when former generations of 
European settlement have contrived to repress those laws and customs’.
39
 
5.29 Legislative acknowledgment in the Native Title Act of adaptation, evolution and 
development of laws and customs provides explicit recognition of the cultural vitality 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
5.30 An approach that explicitly acknowledges that laws and customs under which 
native title rights and interests are possessed can evolve, adapt and change is also in 
keeping with the aim of facilitating Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ 
ability to utilise their native title rights to promote future development.
40
 As Mr Angus 
Frith and Associate Professor Maureen Tehan noted, there is merit in promoting an 
approach to native title that allows native title holders to ‘achieve their economic, 
social and cultural aspirations’.
41
 
                                                        
35  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st Sess, 107th Plen Mtg, 
Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007) art 11.  
36  See, eg, National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, Submission 32; NSW Young Lawyers Human 
Rights Committee, Submission 29; Queensland South Native Title Services, Submission 24; Goldfields 
Land and Sea Council, Submission 22; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; National Native 
Title Council, Submission 16; A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; Cape York Land Council, 
Submission 7; Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2; Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. See 
also Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2014 cl 18, and the submissions to the  Senate Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) 
Bill 2011: Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011 (2011). 
37  Goldfields Land and Sea Council, Submission 22. 
38  Queensland South Native Title Services, Submission 24. 
39  North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17. See also Goldfields Land and Sea Council, Submission 
22. 
40  This accords with Guiding Principle 5: Supporting sustainable futures. See Ch 1.   
41  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. See also National Native Title Council, Submission 16. 
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5.31 The High Court in Ward has suggested that native title determinations have an 
indefinite character, reflecting 
the requirement for the continuing acknowledgment and observance of traditional 
laws and customs and continuing connection with land implicit in the definition of 
‘native title’ in s 223(1) of the NTA.42 
Explicit recognition that traditional laws and customs may evolve, adapt or develop is 
also appropriate to ensure that further adaptation or evolution of traditional laws and 
customs following a determination does not provide grounds for variation or revocation 
of a determination of native title.
43
 
How much change? 
5.32 The proposed amendment largely confirms and clarifies the current approach 
taken by courts to determining whether laws and customs are traditional. However, the 
ALRC acknowledges that ‘difficult questions of fact and degree’ will continue to arise 
in determining whether contemporary laws and customs can be characterised as having 
their origins prior to the assertion of sovereignty.
44
 These are essentially matters of 
evidence—and inference. 
5.33 Establishing that laws and customs have their origins in laws and customs 
acknowledged and observed prior to sovereignty will, in most cases, rely on the court 
(or a respondent in a consent determination) being willing to draw inferences from 
other evidence. As discussed in Chapter 4, in Gumana v Northern Territory, Selway J 
usefully identifies the evidence that may found such an inference, akin to the proof of 
custom at common law. Selway J considered that, where there is: 
 a clear claim of the continuous existence of a custom or tradition that has existed 
at least since settlement; 
 supported by credible evidence from persons who have observed that custom or 
tradition; and 
 evidence of a general reputation that the custom or tradition had ‘always’ been 
observed; 
then, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is an inference that the tradition 
or custom has existed at least since the date of settlement.
45
 
5.34 In a consent determination in favour of the Dieri people, Mansfield J remarked: 
The Determination can be made without the necessity of strict proof and direct 
evidence of each issue as long as inferences can legitimately be made. In consent 
determination negotiations, it is the State’s policy to focus on contemporary 
expressions of traditional laws and customs and pay less regard to laws and customs 
                                                        
42  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [32]. 
43  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 13(5). 
44  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [88]. 
45  Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457, [201]. 
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that may have ceased. The State can reasonably infer that such contemporary 
expressions are sourced in the earlier laws and customs. So can the Court.46 
5.35 The ALRC considers that, when assessing whether or not laws and customs are 
‘traditional’, adaptation, evolution and development of laws and customs should be 
treated as the norm rather than the exception. In this regard, the ALRC notes QSNTS’s 
submission that, implicit in ‘the recognition established at the time of acquisition of 
sovereignty is an acceptance that the indigenous normative system of law was and is 
inherently capable of dynamism’.
47
 As AIATSIS argued, Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people should not be deprived of ‘the right to interpret and re-interpret the 
meaning and content of their evolving laws and customs in line with changing 
conditions and environments’.
48
 Moreover, as the Law Society of Western Australia 
noted in its submission, ‘the requirement for adaptation from an original source does 
not require that adaptation to have occurred without the outside influence of European 
interaction’.
49
 
5.36 The ALRC also considers that recognition that traditional laws and customs may 
adapt, evolve or develop should not be limited by any requirement that such changes be 
of a kind contemplated by the laws and customs.
50
 
5.37 The ALRC further considers that significant weight should be accorded to 
claimants’ perspectives as to the traditional character of their contemporary laws and 
customs. For example, the NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee argued 
that, in assessing whether laws and customs are traditional, ‘the degree to which the 
claim group genuinely acknowledges and observes the laws and customs as a reflection 
of their traditions and customs’ should be taken into account.
51
 Such an approach 
would be in keeping with according the ‘highest importance’ to the testimony of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander witnesses.
52
 
                                                        
46  Lander v South Australia [2012] FCA 427 (1 May 2012) [42]. See also Bennett J’s acceptance of the 
submission that ‘the Court is entitled to draw inferences about the content of the traditional laws and 
customs at sovereignty from contemporary evidence and that if the evidence establishes a contemporary 
normative rule’: AB (deceased) (on behalf of the Ngarla People) v Western Australia (No 4) [2012] FCA 
1268 (21 November 2012) [724]. 
47  Queensland South Native Title Services, Submission 24. 
48  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
49  Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9. 
50  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [44]. See also Rubibi 
Community v Western Australia (No 5) [2005] FCA 1025 (29 July 2005) [266]. 
51  NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29. See also S Bielefeld, Submission 6; 
Jason Behrendt, ‘Changes to Native Title Law Since Mabo’ (2007) 6 Indigenous Law Bulletin 13. 
52  Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 (10 June 2005) [48]; Sampi on behalf of the Bardi and Jawi 
People v Western Australia (2010) 266 ALR 537, [57]. 
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Recognition of succession 
Proposal 5–2 The definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act 
should be amended to make clear that rights and interests may be possessed 
under traditional laws and customs where they have been transmitted between 
groups in accordance with traditional laws and customs. 
5.38 The ALRC proposes that the definition of native title be amended to make clear 
that native title rights and interests may be succeeded to by sub-groups within a native 
title claim group, as well as by a different group or society than that which possessed 
these rights and interests at sovereignty, where these rights and interests have been 
transmitted in accordance with traditional laws and customs. 
5.39 The ALRC views this proposal as consistent with treating native title rights and 
interests as durable, rather than excessively fragile, rights. Moreover, recognition of 
succession does not, in the ALRC’s view, disturb the basis of recognition of native 
title—that is, it does not involve a greater burden on the radical title of the Crown than 
existed at sovereignty.
53
 
5.40 Succession to native title rights and interests, where they have been transmitted 
in accordance with traditional laws and customs, was arguably envisaged in Mabo 
[No 2].
54
 There, discussing alienability of native title, Brennan J stated that 
a right or interest possessed as a native title cannot be acquired from an indigenous 
people by one who, not being a member of the indigenous people, does not 
acknowledge their laws and observe their customs; nor can such a right or interest be 
acquired by a clan, group or member of the indigenous people unless the acquisition is 
consistent with the laws and customs of that people.55 
5.41 Deane and Gaudron JJ stated that 
The enjoyment of the rights can be varied and dealt with under the traditional law or 
custom. The rights are not, however, assignable outside the overall native system.56 
5.42 There is a lack of clarity in the case law as to the possibility of succession to 
native title rights and interests under the Native Title Act. The judgment of Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ in Yorta Yorta may be considered to provide some support for 
the efficacy of transmission of native title rights and interests from one group to 
another. They state: 
The rights and interests in land which the new sovereign order recognised included 
the rules of traditional law and custom which dealt with the transmission of those 
interests.57 
                                                        
53  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [121]. 
54  Justice Robert French, ‘Mabo—Native Title in Australia’ (2004) 23 Federal Judicial Scholarship [27].  
55  Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 60.  
56  Ibid 110.  
57  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [44]. 
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5.43 The Full Federal Court has expressed views in obiter about the ability of native 
title rights and interests to be transmitted through succession. In Dale v Moses, Moore, 
North and Mansfield JJ considered the remarks made in Yorta Yorta about transmission 
did not encompass succession. The Full Federal Court considered that the statement in 
Yorta Yorta was 
probably directed to intergenerational transmission of rights and interests under 
traditional laws within the society possessing rights and interests in the land under 
traditional laws and customs at the time of sovereignty. The observations of the 
members of the High Court do not establish a principle of the type … that where the 
traditional laws and customs of one society provide for the transmission of rights and 
interests in land recognised by those laws and customs, then transmission to another 
society can be effected and the acquisition of the transferred rights in interest can 
ultimately be recognised as rights and interests of the transferee society for the 
purposes of the NTA.58 
5.44 The issue of succession was also considered in Western Australia v Sebastian.
59
 
In that case, the Full Federal Court was inclined to the view that succession could 
occur, in factual circumstances where succession occurred as the numbers of one group 
had reduced and in accordance with the traditional laws and customs of the two 
relevant Aboriginal clans.
60
 
5.45 There was some evidence from submissions that the question of succession is 
causing practical issues in native title. Cape York Land Council (CYLC) provided an 
example: 
A recent example involved two neighbouring groups which succeeded to country of 
an extinct group. Notwithstanding the existence of evidence of exclusive native title 
rights held by each group, including the right to exclude others, the State queried 
whether two groups could succeed to the country of another group.61 
5.46 The ALRC considers that rights and interests that have been succeeded to in 
accordance with traditional laws and customs should be recognised as native title rights 
and interests, and that this proposal will clarify the law in this regard. 
                                                        
58  Dale v Moses [2007] FCAFC 82 (7 June 2007) [120]. 
59  Western Australia v Sebastian (2008) 173 FCR 1. 
60  Ibid [104]. See also AB (deceased) (on behalf of the Ngarla People) v Western Australia (No 4) [2012] 
FCA 1268 (21 November 2012) [577]–[579]; Graham on behalf of the Ngadju People v Western 
Australia [2012] FCA 1455 (21 December 2012) [31]–[33]; Lardil Peoples v Queensland [2004] FCA 
298 (23 March 2004) [127]–[132]. 
61  Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. See also P Burke, Submission 33; Goldfields Land and Sea 
Council, Submission 22. 
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Continuity of acknowledgment and observance of laws and 
customs 
Proposal 5–3 The definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act 
should be amended to make clear that it is not necessary to establish that 
(a)  acknowledgment and observance of laws and customs has continued 
substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty; and 
(b)  laws and customs have been acknowledged and observed by each 
generation since sovereignty. 
5.47 The ALRC considers that the requirement that acknowledgment and observance 
of law and custom must have continued substantially uninterrupted by each generation 
since sovereignty renders native title claims excessively vulnerable to a finding that the 
factual basis for recognising rights and interests is no longer in existence.
62
 The ALRC 
considers that it is consistent with the promotion of the beneficial purpose of the Act to 
make clear that it is not necessary to establish this level of intensity of continuity of 
acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs.
63
 
The idea of continuity 
5.48 Continuity does not appear in the definition of native title in the Native Title Act. 
However, in Yorta Yorta, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ derive a requirement for 
continuity from its interpretation of the word ‘traditional’ in s 223(1)(a).
64
 They state 
that the requirement for rights and interests to be 
possessed under traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed by 
the peoples concerned, requires that the normative system under which the rights and 
interests are possessed (the traditional laws and customs) is a system that has had a 
continuous existence and vitality since sovereignty.65 
5.49 If this ‘normative system’ of laws and customs cannot be said to have had a 
‘continuous existence and vitality’ since sovereignty, the ‘rights and interests which 
owe their existence to that system will have ceased to exist’.
66
 Gleeson CJ, Gummow 
and Hayne JJ state that ‘continuity in acknowledgment and observance of the 
normative rules in which the claimed rights and interests are said to find their 
foundations before sovereignty is essential’.
67
 Where there is no such continuity, the 
laws and customs cannot be revived for the purposes of establishing native title.
68
 
                                                        
62  See also Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
63  See also Central Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26; Law Society of Western Australia, 
Submission 9.  
64  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [47], [87]. 
65  Ibid [47]. 
66  Ibid. 
67  Ibid [88]. 
68  Ibid [47]. 
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‘Substantially uninterrupted’ continuity 
5.50 In Yorta Yorta, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ elaborated on the degree of 
continuity required to establish native title, stating that acknowledgment and 
observance of laws and customs must have continued ‘substantially uninterrupted’ 
since sovereignty: ‘[w]ere that not so, the laws and customs acknowledged and 
observed now could not properly be described as the traditional laws and customs of 
the peoples concerned’.
69
 
5.51 As with evolution or adaptation of laws and customs, the High Court 
acknowledged that continuity in acknowledgment and observance of laws and customs 
from sovereignty to the present need not be absolute. To that end, the qualification 
‘substantially’ is important in ‘substantially uninterrupted’.
70
 The qualification was 
said to recognise the great difficulty of proving continuous acknowledgment and 
observance of oral traditions over the many years since sovereignty. It also recognises 
the ‘most profound effects’ of European settlement on Aboriginal societies. This means 
that it is ‘inevitable that the structures and practices of those societies, and their 
members, will have undergone great changes’.
71
 
5.52 In Yorta Yorta, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated that ‘the inquiry 
about continuity of acknowledgment and observance does not require consideration of 
why, if acknowledgment and observance stopped, that happened’.
72
 If the requirement 
is not met, then ‘examining why that is so is important only to the extent that the 
presence or absence of reasons might influence the fact-finder’s decision about whether 
there was such an interruption’.
73
 
Substantially uninterrupted ‘generation by generation’ 
5.53 In Yorta Yorta, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated that a ‘traditional law 
or custom is one which has been passed from generation to generation of a society, 
usually by word of mouth and common practice’.
74
 In Risk v Northern Territory, 
Mansfield J summarised the Yorta Yorta continuity requirement as the requirement to 
establish that ‘acknowledgment and observance of the laws and customs has continued 
substantially uninterrupted by each generation since sovereignty’.
75
 Such a 
requirement has significant implications in terms of the evidence to be produced by 
claimants. 
5.54 The ‘generation by generation’ test was also discussed in Bodney v Bennell. 
There, the Full Federal Court stated that the correct question as to continuity was 
                                                        
69  Ibid [87]. 
70   Ibid [89]. 
71  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [89].   
72  Ibid [90]. 
73  Ibid. See also Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [97].  
74  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [46]. 
75  Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 (29 August 2006) [97], emphasis added. On appeal the Full 
Court considered Mansfield J’s statement of the law to be accurate: Risk v Northern Territory (2007) 240 
ALR 75, [78]–[98]. 
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‘whether the laws and customs have continued to be acknowledged and observed 
substantially uninterrupted by each generation since sovereignty’.
76
 
Have issues with establishing continuity been overcome in practice? 
5.55 The Hon Justice Paul Finn has argued that the effect of the interpretation of 
s 223 in Yorta Yorta was to produce a ‘discernible hardening of the arteries of the 
Native Title Act … the onus cast on claimants by the Native Title Act as so interpreted 
is a severe one’.
77
 
5.56 Submissions by state and territory governments contended that substantially 
uninterrupted continuity of the acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and 
customs is an important aspect of native title law.
78
 The South Australian Government 
was of the view that ‘[i]t is only appropriate to recognise native title in circumstances 
where the rights and interests have been uninterrupted (to at least some degree) since 
sovereignty’. It continued: ‘[w]here there has been a substantial interruption of 
traditional law and custom, that should preclude a finding that native title exists’.
79
 
5.57 The Western Australian Government submitted that 
Any proposal to remove, or fundamentally alter, the requirement to demonstrate 
adherence to a continuing normative system based on pre-settlement laws and 
customs ignores a central tenet of the Mabo No 2 decision.80 
5.58 A number of the governments that made submissions expressed the view that the 
requirement already incorporates appropriate flexibility,
81
 noting that the qualification 
‘substantially’ essentially ‘makes allowances for the impacts of European settlement 
upon Aboriginal societies’.
82
 
5.59 Moreover, a number of governments submitted that discharging the onus in 
respect of continuity is not a problem in practice because of a willingness, by both the 
Court and respondent parties, to draw inferences.
83
 The South Australian Government 
submitted that, in its consent determination process, 
inferences tend to be drawn based on genealogical and anthropological information 
that link ‘snapshots’ in time periods. The question of interruption is rarely raised 
                                                        
76  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [73].  
77  Paul Finn, ‘Mabo into the Future: Native Title Jurisprudence’ (2012) 8 Indigenous Law Bulletin 5, 6. 
78  South Australian Government, Submission 34; Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; Western 
Australian Government, Submission 20. 
79  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
80  Western Australian Government, Submission 20. 
81  The South Australian Government submitted that it was a ‘flexible doctrine that in recent years has 
generally been interpreted by the Courts (and in the State’s consent determination process) in favour of 
claimant groups’: South Australian Government, Submission 34.  See also Western Australian 
Government, Submission 20.  
82  Western Australian Government, Submission 20. However, Frith and Tehan argued to the contrary that 
the exception for ‘substantially uninterrupted’ acknowledgment and observance of laws and customs 
‘does not go far enough’: A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
83  South Australian Government, Submission 34; Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; 
Queensland Government Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Submission 28; Western 
Australian Government, Submission 20. 
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without some other (usually historical) evidence suggesting that interruption may be 
relevant and it is then discussed with the applicant.84 
5.60 The Western Australian Government submitted: 
It is … the State’s experience from a broad range of consensual and contested matters 
that Aboriginal groups may compellingly and successfully establish that they hold 
native title rights and interests notwithstanding profound social and demographic 
changes since European settlement.85 
5.61 CYLC submitted that the requirement itself may not pose a problem in that 
region as the State in Queensland has ‘generally been willing to accept continuity in 
circumstances where there has been some interruption for reasons beyond the group’s 
control’. Nonetheless, 
it is extremely difficult and often distressing for Cape York Traditional Owners to 
participate in a process which in practical terms requires them to effectively deny the 
devastating effects of their dispossession and displacement.86 
5.62 CYLC also expressed concern that groups in different parts of Queensland and 
Australia may not be able to satisfy the requirement.
87
  
5.63 The ALRC acknowledges the practical developments that have occurred in the 
approach taken to evidence of continuity, particularly the use of inferential reasoning to 
fill gaps in continuity where appropriate. However, it is consistent with the promotion 
of the beneficial purpose of the Act, and a ‘fair, large and liberal’ approach to statutory 
construction, to explicitly provide that it is not necessary to establish that laws and 
customs have been acknowledged and observed substantially uninterrupted by each 
generation since sovereignty.
88
 
5.64 In this, the ALRC agrees with Black CJ’s view, in the Full Federal Court 
decision in Yorta Yorta, that to justify a finding that ‘there is a point in time at which 
acknowledgment and observance has ceased to the extent that the foundation for any 
native title rights or interests has disappeared’ requires consideration of a ‘very 
substantial time frame’.
89
 
5.65 The ALRC considers that the current degree of continuity of acknowledgment 
and observance of traditional laws requires claimants to surmount unnecessarily high 
evidential ‘hurdles’ to establish native title.
90
 
                                                        
84  South Australian Government, Submission 34. See also Lander v South Australia [2012] FCA 427 (1 May 
2012) [48]. 
85  Western Australian Government, Submission 20. 
86  Cape York Land Council, Submission 7.  The Australian Human Rights Commission argued that 
‘requiring “literal continuous connection” ignores ‘the reality of European interference in the lives of 
Indigenous peoples’: Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
87  Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
88  See also Central Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26; Law Society of Western Australia, 
Submission 9.  
89  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2001) 110 FCR [61]. 
90  Transcript of Proceedings, Risk v Northern Territory [2007] HCATrans 472 (31 August 2007) (Kirby J). 
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5.66 Such an intensive level of continuity of acknowledgment and observance of 
laws and customs was arguably not envisaged in Mabo [No 2]. There, Brennan J 
referred to a need for acknowledgment and observance of laws and customs, ‘so far as 
it is practicable to do so’.
91
 
5.67 Many stakeholders considered the continuity requirement to be problematic, 
with a number calling for the application of the continuity requirement to be limited.
92
 
GLSC submitted that it ‘does not consider that “substantially uninterrupted” 
acknowledgment and observance of traditional law and custom should be a legal 
requirement for the proof of native title’.
93
 While submissions expressed various views 
on how limitation of the requirement should be achieved,
94
 a number preferred a 
statutory amendment to limit the application of the requirement to other possible 
reform options such as a statutory definition of ‘substantial interruption’.
95
 
5.68 As a number of submissions pointed out, the requirement for generation by 
generation proof of continuity of the acknowledgment and observance of laws and 
customs is problematic because the evidence may be limited or have limitations.
96
 
5.69 Frith and Tehan expressed the view that, in many cases, ‘the gap in continuity 
observed by the Court is due to a lack of evidence rather than a lack of 
acknowledgment and observance of laws and customs.
97
 
5.70 The Law Society of Western Australia similarly argued that cases where 
acknowledgment and observance of laws and customs was not found to have continued 
substantially uninterrupted have reflected, ‘either a disproportionate focus on some 
evidence over other available evidence, or a gap in the evidence of observable 
acknowledgment and observance of laws and customs, rather than an abandonment of 
that acknowledgment and observance’.
98
 
5.71 AIATSIS argued that the need to meet the requirement in such circumstances 
constitutes ‘a form of evidentiary discrimination against those groups who had little or 
no interaction with non-Indigenous anthropologists and scientists throughout the 19th 
and 20th centuries’.
99
 
                                                        
91  Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 60. 
92  NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29; Goldfields Land and Sea Council, 
Submission 22; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
93  Goldfields Land and Sea Council, Submission 22.  
94  See, eg, NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29; North Queensland Land 
Council, Submission 17; A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; Cape York Land Council, Submission 7.  
95  See, eg, NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29; Cape York Land Council, 
Submission 7. 
96  See, eg, AIATSIS, Submission 36; A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; Law Society of Western 
Australia, Submission 9. Some respondent interests also acknowledged that the current requirement 
presents evidentiary problems. See, eg, National Farmers’ Federation, Submission 14. 
97  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12.  
98  Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9. 
99  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
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5.72 Other submissions argued that the requirement for substantially uninterrupted 
continuity of the acknowledgment of traditional laws and observance of traditional 
customs is inherently unconscionable or unjust given the history of colonisation.
100
 
Continuity of society 
Proposal 5–4 The definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act 
should be amended to make clear that it is not necessary to establish that a 
society united in and by its acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws 
and customs has continued in existence since prior to the assertion of 
sovereignty. 
5.73 The ALRC proposes that the definition of native title should be amended to 
make clear that continuity of a society is not an independent requirement to establish 
native title. Again, this proposal seeks to overcome an overly technical approach to 
statutory construction. 
5.74 As outlined in Chapter 4, the High Court in Yorta Yorta considered there to be 
an inextricable link between a society and its laws and customs. Laws and customs 
cannot exist in a vacuum, so if a society—understood as a body of persons united in 
and by its acknowledgment of a body of laws and customs—ceases to exist, the laws 
and customs (and rights and interests possessed under them) also cease.
101
 
5.75 The ALRC considers that its Proposal 5–4 is in keeping with Federal Court 
consideration of the relevance of society to establishing native title rights and interests. 
The Full Court in Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya 
Native Title Claim Group has emphasised that the term ‘society’ is not found in the 
words of the Act, and is to be used as a conceptual tool
102
 in the application of the 
words of the Native Title Act. The proposal is intended to further clarify that 
establishing a society is relevant only as a conceptual tool to assist in answering the 
central definitional question of whether there is acknowledgment and observance of 
traditional laws and customs under which rights and interests are possessed. 
                                                        
100  See, eg, North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. See Ch 7 
for further discussion.  
101  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [51]–[53]. 
102  Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 
FCR 442, [78]. 
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5.76 Justice Paul Finn has commented that the society requirement has created a 
‘problematic and quite time consuming distraction’ in native title litigation.
103
 He 
referred to his own judgment in a claim over the Torres Strait, Akiba v Queensland (No 
3), to illustrate this difficulty, noting that 
The Islanders’ primary case was that they were one society; the Commonwealth’s, 
that they were four societies, these representing the four island groups involved in the 
hearing; and the State of Queensland alleged there were thirteen societies, each being 
one of the thirteen inhabited islands.104 
5.77 In Akiba, Finn J found that the applicant had established its case that it 
comprised one society. However, he noted that: 
There is an irony in this … [T]he answers to the question of native title rights and 
interests—which is, after all, the concern of the NT Act—would in all probability be 
the same whether my conclusion had been one, or four, or thirteen societies.105 
5.78 Dr Paul Burke argued that society should not be seen as an independent element 
of proof for native title: 
If claimants prove that they, as a group, have been following a coherent body of 
traditional laws and customs relating to land that is substantially continuous with the 
pre-contact era, they would have, ipso facto, established that there had been and 
continues to be a relevant society out of which laws and customs arose. In other 
words, if the claimant group demonstrates the continuity of a body of traditional laws 
and customs, it will have demonstrated that it forms a ‘society’ or that it is part of a 
‘society’. On this view, ‘society’ is not conceptually distinct, but overlapping with 
other elements of native title legal doctrine, and there should not be a need to address 
it separately.106 
5.79 The South Australian Government argued that there was no need for reform in 
this area, noting also the development of the jurisprudence related to society: 
In practice, the apparently difficult test proposed by the High Court in Yorta-Yorta has 
not proved onerous. For example the cultural differences between native title holding 
groups in Akiba did not prevent the Court describing the group as a single normative 
society.107 
5.80 However, a number of submissions to this Inquiry were critical of the use of 
society in native title law. Frith and Tehan submitted that decisions related to society 
‘have generally tended to limit the prospect that native title applicants can establish 
native title’.
108
 GLSC submitted that the ‘society issue is a prime example of the 
                                                        
103  Finn, above n 77, 6. 
104  Ibid. 
105  Ibid 7, quoting Akiba v Queensland (No 3) (2010) 204 FCR 1. 
106 Paul Burke, ‘Overlapping Jural Publics: A Model for Dealing with the “Society” Question in Native 
Title’ in Toni Bauman (ed), Dilemmas in Applied Native Title Anthropology in Australia (AIATSIS, 
2010) 55, 65–66. See also P Burke, Submission 33; Goldfields Land and Sea Council, Submission 22.  
107  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
108  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
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unfortunate development of quite unnecessary technicality and legalism in native 
title’.
109
 
5.81 CYLC reported practical difficulties with the approach taken to society, 
submitting that 
The issue of identification of the relevant ‘society’ has caused considerable delays in 
some Cape York claims, although recent case law appears to have improved the 
situation somewhat. Anthropological evidence obtained for Cape York indicates that 
there may be a number of different ‘societies’ for a particular group of native title 
claimants, within which the group ‘acknowledges the same body of laws and customs 
relating to rights and interests in land and waters’. A number of early Cape York 
determinations were based on societies at the language-named group level. However, 
it is arguable that those groups may also be part of broader ‘regional’ groupings which 
still meet native title requirements.110 
5.82 Some submissions considered that the language of a society ‘united in and by its 
acknowledgment and observance of a body of law and customs’ is improperly 
suggestive of a need to prove the survival of an extensive social system, rather than of 
the relevant laws and customs relating to land and waters. The Law Council of 
Australia argued that reference to society 
constitutes a gloss on the statutory language of s 223(1) of the Act. Emphasis on these 
matters risks over-emphasising continuity of laws and customs of pre-sovereignty, 
such as rules about marriage, initiation and birthing practices, traditional language, 
which may have little relevance to whether particular customs in relation to land and 
waters have continued. The exercise of customary practices, such as hunting and 
fishing at particular times, are more relevant to establishing the existence of 
traditional customs than the requirement of a ‘normative’ system of laws and customs 
practiced by a ‘normative’ society.111 
5.83 GLSC pointed to the ‘unfairness of having to demonstrate the continuity of 
cultural practice and social cohesion in the face of a history of dispossession, cultural 
disruption, forced assimilation and geographical dispersal’.
112
 The Young Lawyers 
Human Rights Committee argued that 
allowing native title to be tested on a concept of society ultimately involves 
superficial value judgments about Indigenous ways of life, and inappropriately 
measures traditional, nomadic society against the legal ideas and institutions of a 
‘civilised’ society.113 
Implications for s 223(1)(b) 
5.84 Amendments affecting how s 223(1)(a) is interpreted will have a consequential 
effect on the construction of s 223(1)(b). Section 223(1)(b) requires that the relevant 
Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by ‘those laws and customs’—that is, the 
                                                        
109  Goldfields Land and Sea Council, Submission 22. 
110  Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
111  Law Council of Australia, Submission 35. 
112  Goldfields Land and Sea Council, Submission 22. 
113  NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29. 
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traditional laws and customs referred to in s 223(1)(a)
114
—have a connection with the 
land or waters. 
5.85 The Full Federal Court in Bodney v Bennell set out the relationship between the 
level of continuity of acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs 
required by s 223(1)(a) and the level of continuity of connection required by 
s 223(1)(b). It stated that 
the laws and customs which provide the required connection are ‘traditional’ laws and 
customs. For this reason, their acknowledgment and observance must have continued 
‘substantially uninterrupted’ from the time of sovereignty; and the connection itself 
must have been ‘substantially maintained’ since that time.115 
The ALRC considers that it follows from Proposal 5–3 that a commensurate approach 
should be taken to establishing connection for the purpose of satisfying s 223(1)(b).
116
  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
114  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [46], [86]; Western 
Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [18]; Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [165]. 
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Summary 
6.1 Section 223(1)(b) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) requires an Aboriginal or 
Torres Strait Islander claim group to show that, by their traditional laws and customs, 
they have a connection with the land and waters claimed. 
6.2 The ALRC has been directed to inquire into whether there should be 
confirmation that ‘connection with the land or waters’ in s 223(1)(b) does not require 
physical occupation or continued or recent use. The courts have consistently stated that 
connection is maintained by the continued acknowledgment of traditional laws, and by 
the observance of traditional customs.
1
 Evidence of acknowledgment and observance 
may include activities on the land, but the courts have been clear that physical presence 
is not necessary.
2
 The ALRC has concluded that amendment of the Native Title Act on 
this issue is not necessary, as there is no lack of clarity in the Act or in the courts’ 
interpretation of the Act. 
6.3 The Native Title Act contains two references to ‘physical connection’, in 
sections of the Act concerning affidavits in support of an application, and the 
registration of claims. The ALRC proposes that these references should be removed, to 
promote consistency with the courts’ interpretation of s 223(1)(b). 
Connection by laws and customs 
6.4 The definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act refers to interests in 
relation to land and waters possessed under traditional laws and customs where 
Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders ‘by those laws and customs, have a 
                                                        
1  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, 96; De Rose v South Australia (No 2) (2005) 145 FCR 290, 306; 
Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, 382. 
2  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 85-86. 
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connection with the land or waters’. These words are taken from the judgment of 
Brennan J in Mabo v Queensland [No 2]: ‘native title … [is] ascertained according to 
the laws and customs of the indigenous people who, by those laws and customs, have a 
connection with the land’.
3
 In Members of the Yorta Yorta Community v Victoria, the 
High Court held that the phrase ‘by those laws and customs’ indicates that the 
‘connection’ that must be shown is connection sourced in Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander laws and customs.
4
 The Full Federal Court in Northern Territory v Alyawarr, 
Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (‘Alyawarr’) said that 
‘connection’ is descriptive of the relationship to the land and waters which is, in 
effect, declared or asserted by the acknowledgment of laws and observance of 
customs which concern the land and waters in various ways. To observe laws and 
acknowledge customs which tell the stories of the land and define the rules for its 
protection and use in ways spiritual and material is to keep the relevant connection to 
the land.5 
6.5 When traditional laws and customs confer rights and responsibilities in relation 
to land, that creates connection as required by s 223(1)(b).
6
 The connection, or 
relationship, between people and country includes the obligation to care for country 
and the right to speak for country.
7
 
6.6 The courts have held that s 223(1)(b) requires the claim group to establish that 
they have had the connection with the land or waters from the time of sovereignty.
8
 
This is because the connection must be by their traditional laws and customs, and 
traditional laws and customs are those that have their origin in pre-sovereignty law and 
custom.
9
 
6.7 Again, in Alyawarr, the Full Federal Court said: 
The use of ‘connection’ as emphasising a requirement to show continuity of 
association with the land by observance and acknowledgment of traditional law and 
custom relating to it gives proper recognition to its origins in the Mabo judgment. It 
involves the continuing assertion by the group of its traditional relationship to the 
country defined by its laws and customs.10 
6.8 A substantial interruption in the observance of laws and customs in relation to 
country will result in a failure to establish connection as required by s 223(1)(b).
11
 
                                                        
3  Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 70. 
4  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, 456. 
5  Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 
FCR 442, 469. 
6  De Rose v South Australia (No 2) (2005) 145 FCR 290, 323. 
7  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 64. 
8  Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 (10 June 2005) [1079]; Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] 
FCA 1402 (8 December 2003) [353]; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria 
(2002) 214 CLR 422, 447; Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, 382. 
9  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, 444, 447. For a more 
detailed examination of what it means for a law to be ‘traditional’, see Ch 4. 
10  Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 
FCR 442, 469–470. 
11  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, 132.For a more detailed examination of ‘substantial interruption’, 
see Ch 5. 
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Establishing connection 
6.9 Evidence that connection with land is a ‘continuing reality’ to the claimants 
must be produced to establish connection: 
the connection inquiry requires … demonstration that, by their actions and 
acknowledgement, the claimants have asserted the reality of the connection to their 
land or waters so made by their laws and customs.12 
6.10 Evidence of presence on the land and the exercise of rights in relation to the land 
amounts to evidence of the maintenance of connection with land.
13
 
6.11 Other ways of demonstrating observance of law and custom in relation to land 
and waters, and thus connection, can be found in knowledge of ceremony, song, dance 
and body painting
14
 and knowledge of the land and the Dreamtime beings that created 
the land.
15
 For example, in Western Australia v Ward (‘Ward FFC’), the Court stated 
that 
Acknowledgment and observance may be established by evidence that traditional 
practices and ceremonies are maintained by the community, insofar as that is possible, 
off the land, and that ritual knowledge including knowledge of the Dreamings which 
underlie the traditional laws and customs, continue to be maintained and passed down 
from generation to generation. Evidence of present members of the community, which 
demonstrates knowledge of the boundaries to their traditional lands, in itself provides 
evidence of continuing connection through adherence to their traditional laws and 
customs.16 
6.12 The Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) make specific provision for the giving of 
evidence by way of singing, dancing and storytelling.
17
 
6.13 Using language is a way of observing law and custom, and may connect people 
with country.
18
 Language is sometimes said to have been ‘deposited in the landscape 
by Dreamtime figures’, and it becomes ‘possessed by the Aboriginal people connected 
with the land’.
19
 
                                                        
12  Ibid 129. 
13  Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, 382. 
14  Grace Koch, ‘We Have the Song, So We Have the Land: Song and Ceremony as Proof of Ownership in 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Claims’ (AIATSIS Research Discussion Paper 33, AIATSIS, 
July 2013) 8–10. 
15  Graeme Neate, ‘“Speaking for Country” and Speaking About Country: Some Issues in the Resolution of 
Indigenous Land Claims in Australia’ (Paper presented at Joint Study Institute, Sydney, 21 February 
2004) 65–68. 
16  Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, 382. 
17  Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 34.123. 
18  Grace Koch, ‘We Have the Song, So We Have the Land: Song and Ceremony as Proof of Ownership in 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Claims’ (AIATSIS Research Discussion Paper 33, AIATSIS, 
July 2013) 38; Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483. 
19  Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483, 525. 
118 Review of the Native Title Act 1993 
 
6.14 It is not necessary to adduce evidence of connection to every part of the claim 
area. A court may draw inferences from the evidence as a whole and from evidence of 
connection to surrounding or neighbouring areas.
20
 
Evidence of physical occupation, continued or recent use 
6.15 In Ward FFC, the Full Federal Court considered whether connection with land 
and waters could be maintained in the absence of physical presence.
21
 The Court 
concluded that, while actual physical presence provides evidence of connection, it is 
not essential for establishing native title under Native Title Act s 223(1). 
6.16 On appeal, the High Court noted that s 223 ‘is not directed to how Aboriginal 
peoples use or occupy land or waters’, although the way in which land and waters are 
used may be evidence of the kind of connection that exists.
22
 The Court confirmed that 
the absence of evidence of recent use, occupation or physical presence does not mean 
that there is no connection with the land or waters.
23
 
6.17 In De Rose v South Australia (No 2) (‘De Rose (No 2)’), the Full Federal Court 
held that 
It is possible for Aboriginal peoples to acknowledge and observe traditional laws and 
customs throughout periods during which, for one reason or another, they have not 
maintained a physical connection with the claim area. Of course, the length of time 
during which the Aboriginal peoples have not used or occupied the land may have an 
important bearing on whether traditional laws and customs have been acknowledged 
and observed. Everything will depend on the circumstances.24 
6.18 In Moses v Western Australia, the Full Federal Court confirmed that ‘physical 
presence is not a necessary requirement for connection’.
25
 
Physical occupation and the identification of native title 
rights and interests 
6.19 A determination of native title must include a determination of the nature and 
extent of the native title rights and interests in the area.
26
 Physical occupation and 
continued or recent use may be relevant to proving the particular rights and interests 
possessed under traditional laws and customs. The content of native title is a question 
of fact, to be determined on a case by case basis.
27
 Evidence of physical possession, 
occupation and use could be relevant to the question of whether the rights and interests 
                                                        
20  Moses v Western Australia (2007) 160 FCR 148, 224. 
21  Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316. 
22  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 86. 
23  Ibid. 
24  De Rose v South Australia (No 2) (2005) 145 FCR 290, 306; see also Dale v Moses [2007] FCAFC 82  
(7 June 2007) [306]. 
25  Moses v Western Australia (2007) 160 FCR 148, 222. 
26  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 225. 
27  Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 39; Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, 338; 
Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, 169; Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 58, 
61. 
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include a right to exclude others,
28
 or other rights. For example, in Banjima, the Court 
said: 
There is ample evidence to show that hunting and the taking of fauna in customary 
ways continues today. Similarly, the customary practice of gathering and taking flora 
is well established historically and presently. The right to take fish is the subject of 
less contemporary evidence, but the right to take fish in the claim area is still 
exercised and clearly established as a right possessed by the claimants both 
historically and presently. It is not a right or activity that the evidence suggests has 
been abandoned. Similarly the right to take stones, timber, ochre and water is another 
right possessed by the claimants even though the evidence of current exercise of those 
rights is relatively limited.29 
6.20 The courts have repeatedly emphasised that, while the exercise of native title 
rights and interests is ‘powerful evidence’ of the existence of those rights, the ultimate 
question concerns possession of rights, not their exercise.
30
 
6.21 In the Issues Paper, it was noted that in Akiba v Queensland (No 3), the claimant 
failed to establish connection at the extremities of the claim because there was ‘no 
evidence of use of, or connection to, those areas’.
31
 The claim over extremities did not 
fail because there was no evidence of use of the areas, but because there was no 
evidence at all regarding connection to those areas.
32
 The Court did not require 
evidence of use, but it did require evidence of connection. 
6.22 The Court did confirm that 
Islander knowledge of areas when coupled with the deep and transmitted sea 
knowledge that many of them possess, is itself a potent indicator of connection, and 
continuing connection at that, to their marine estates—the more so because under their 
laws and customs they have, and do exercise, traditional rights to use and forage there 
…33 
No clarification of s 223 
6.23 The ALRC considers that it is not necessary to clarify Native Title Act s 223. 
When codifying, confirming or clarifying an area of settled law, there is a risk of 
disturbing the settled law, causing uncertainty and unnecessary litigation. 
6.24 Several stakeholders suggested that the Native Title Act should be amended for 
consistency with De Rose (No 2).
34
 However, no lack of consistency with De Rose 
(No 2) has been identified, and the ALRC has not been directed to any areas of doubt 
                                                        
28  Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2) [2013] FCA 868 (28 August 2013) [686], [693]. 
29  Ibid [775]. 
30  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, 455; Neowarra v 
Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 (8 December 2003) [40]; Rubibi Community v Western Australia 
(No 5) [2005] FCA 1025 (29 July 2005) [21]; Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2) [2013] FCA 
868 (28 August 2013) [386]. 
31  Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Native Title Act 1993, Issues Paper No 45 (2013); 
referring to Akiba v Queensland (No 3) (2010) 204 FCR 1, 168, 172. 
32  Akiba v Queensland (No 3) (2010) 204 FCR 1, 168, 173. 
33  Ibid 164. 
34  Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2; Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
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or uncertainty in the construction of s 223 on this issue. Section 223 does not contain 
any reference to physical occupation or continued and recent use. The courts have been 
clear that, while such evidence is relevant, it is not necessary. A number of 
stakeholders agreed that clarification is not necessary.
35
 
6.25 One representative body indicated that claim groups ‘have experienced 
difficulties satisfying the State about continuing connection in circumstances where 
there is no recent evidence of physical presence on particular parts of a claim area’.
36
 
Just Us Lawyers also reported that ‘State governments generally expect physical 
occupation and ongoing use of at least parts of the claim area to be demonstrated for 
the purposes of a consent determination’.
37
 Because courts have confirmed that such 
evidence is ‘powerful’, respondents will continue to seek such evidence, and place 
weight on it, when it is available. However, to treat such evidence as a necessary 
element for a consent determination would be to impose a standard higher than that set 
by Parliament and the courts for a contested determination. 
6.26 Even without a requirement to demonstrate physical occupation, or continued or 
recent use, the requirement to demonstrate connection to land or waters is still a 
substantial one. Connection must be demonstrated to have been maintained under 
traditional laws and customs that have been observed, substantially uninterrupted, since 
pre-sovereignty times. Further discussion of these requirements and the ALRC’s 
proposals in this regard, are in Chapter 4. 
The affidavit supporting a claimant application 
Proposal 6–1 Section 62(1)(c) of the Native Title Act should be amended 
to remove references to ‘traditional physical connection’. 
6.27 The Native Title Act includes two references to physical connection that the 
ALRC considers may be inconsistent with the courts’ interpretation of s 223 on this 
issue. The ALRC proposes that these references should be removed. 
6.28 Claimants are required to provide an affidavit supporting their application. This 
affidavit must contain 
a general description of the factual basis on which it is asserted that the native title 
rights and interests claimed exist and in particular that … the native title claim group 
have continued to hold the native title in accordance with those traditional laws and 
customs.38 
                                                        
35  South Australian Government, Submission 34; Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; 
Goldfields Land and Sea Council, Submission 22; Western Australian Government, Submission 20; 
National Farmers’ Federation, Submission 14; Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9. 
36  Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
37  Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. 
38  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 62(2)(e)(iii). 
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6.29 Section 62(1)(c) provides that the affidavit may contain details of ‘any 
traditional physical connection’ with the land or waters had by a member of the native 
title claim group, or if any member of the native title claim group has been prevented 
from gaining access, the circumstances in which the access was prevented. 
6.30 This section does not require evidence of physical connection. It is consistent 
with statements of the courts that evidence of the exercise of rights can be adduced to 
support a claim for the existence of rights.
39
 However, the ALRC is concerned that the 
section specifically refers to physical connection and does not refer to other ways of 
demonstrating connection, such as observing traditional laws and customs,
40
 
maintaining traditional customs and ceremonies,
41
 maintaining stories and allocating 
responsibilities,
42
 faithfully performing obligations under traditional law
43
 and the 
continuing internal and external assertion by the group of its traditional relationship 
with country.
44
 The inclusion of physical connection in s 62 and the omission of 
spiritual, social and cultural evidence of connection gives an apparent priority to 
physical connection that does not reflect the case law or the requirements of s 223. 
The registration test 
Proposal 6–2 Section 190B(7) of the Native Title Act should be amended 
to remove the requirement that the Registrar must be satisfied that at least one 
member of the native title claim group has or previously had a traditional 
physical connection with any part of the land or waters, or would have had such 
a connection if not for things done by the Crown, a statutory authority of the 
Crown, or any holder of a lease. 
6.31 Section 190B(7) of the registration test includes a requirement that at least one 
member of the claim group demonstrate a ‘traditional physical connection’, except in 
certain circumstances. The ALRC considers that such a requirement is inconsistent 
with s 223 and the courts’ interpretation of that section and proposes that it should be 
removed. 
6.32 Part 7 of the Native Title Act establishes a Register of Native Title Claims and 
sets out conditions for registration. If a claim satisfies all of the conditions, it must be 
entered in the Register.
45
 The native title claim group is then entitled to certain rights, 
including the right to negotiate under Native Title Act s 31. 
                                                        
39  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
40  Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 59–60; Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, 
382. 
41  Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, 382. 
42  Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 
FCR 442, 469–470. 
43  De Rose v South Australia (No 2) (2005) 145 FCR 290, 306–307. 
44  Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 (10 June 2005) [1079]. 
45  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 190A(6). 
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6.33 The registration test requires the Registrar to be satisfied that the factual basis 
exists to support the assertion that the native title claim group has an association with 
the area.
46
 The native title claim group must show an association with the entire area 
claimed, but it has been held that the association can be physical or spiritual.
47
 
6.34 Section 190B(7) adds a requirement that the Registrar must be satisfied that at 
least one member of the native title claim group has, or previously had, a traditional 
physical connection with any part of the land or waters, or would have had such a 
connection if not for things done by the Crown, a statutory authority of the Crown, or 
any holder of a lease.
48
 ‘Traditional physical connection’, in this instance, means that 
the connection is in accordance with the laws and customs of the group.
49
 
6.35 Information about a claim group member’s presence on, or use of, the land or 
waters, is relevant to whether the factual basis exists for a claim. However, the 
requirement in s 190B(7) that an application include information about ‘traditional 
physical connection’ is inconsistent with the case law that has established that physical 
occupation or use is not required to establish connection. The requirement could result 
in a claim group with ample evidence of connection being denied registration and the 
procedural rights that are associated with registration. 
6.36 Further, the reference in s 190(7)(b) to ‘things done’ by the Crown, a statutory 
authority of the Crown, or a leaseholder suggests that those things are relevant to the 
question of whether connection has been maintained. However, the courts have 
indicated that the reasons for an absence of connection are not relevant.
50
 
6.37 This element of the registration test is also inconsistent with the reality of the 
lives of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who have moved away from their 
country in order to access employment, health services and education. 
6.38 Section 190B(7) is one of the few parts of the Act that acknowledges that acts of 
the Crown, and others, have interfered with the connection between Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples and their lands and waters. While this acknowledgment 
may have some value, the ALRC considers that it is important that the registration test 
is consistent with s 223 and the case law regarding physical occupation and continued 
and recent use. 
                                                        
46  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 190B(5). 
47  Martin v Native Title Registrar [2001] FCA 16 (19 January 2001) [26]; Corunna v Native Title Registrar 
[2013] FCA 372 (24 April 2013). 
48  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 190B(7). 
49  Gudjala People No 2 v Native Title Registrar [2007] FCA 1167 (7 August 2007) [89]. 
50  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, 104–105; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v 
Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, 456–457. 
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Summary 
7.1 This chapter completes the sections of the Discussion Paper that are concerned 
with the definition of native title in s 223(1) of the Native Title Act. The chapter is in 
two parts. The first considers a partial redefinition of s 223(1). The second part 
considers the framing of ‘connection’. In that context, it examines whether 
revitalisation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander laws and customs is to be 
distinguished from revival of native title. The second part also considers whether facts 
relating to European settlement may be considered when determining if Aboriginal 
peoples and Torres Strait Islanders have a connection with the land and waters claimed. 
7.2 The proposals outlined in Chapter 5 suggest amendment of s 223(1) of the 
Native Title Act by clarifying statements directed to the interpretation of terms that 
exist in the statutory definition.
1
 Those proposals retain the existing text of s 223. 
7.3 Proposals in this chapter offer an alternative approach by suggesting changes to 
the text of the definition in s 223(1).
2
 The changes relate to the terms ‘traditional’ and 
‘connection’. These terms are found in the text of s 223 but each has been the source of 
                                                        
1  See Proposals in Ch 5. 
2  See Proposals 7–1 and 7–2. 
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much confusion.
3
 Each has attracted elaborate jurisprudence in an attempt to 
comprehensively determine its meaning. The relevant law is outlined in Chapters 4, 5 
and 6. These proposed amendments are consistent with defining native title rights and 
interests in a manner that gives effect to the recognition and protection of native title. 
7.4 In the first part of this chapter, the ALRC invites comment about the utility of 
providing greater legal formality to native title claim group identification and 
composition prior to the final determination of native title. 
7.5 In the second part of this chapter, the ALRC seeks views on whether the law 
relating to connection should include revitalisation of the relationship with country. 
The ALRC also asks whether, in determining connection, there should be regard to the 
reasons for any displacement of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders and, if 
so, their relevance. The ALRC seeks views on one possible model for reform that 
would permit the influence of European settlement to be considered. 
Removing ‘traditional’ 
Proposal 7–1 The definition of native title in s 223(1)(a) of the Native 
Title Act should be amended to remove the word ‘traditional’. 
The proposed re-wording, removing traditional, would provide that: 
  The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the 
communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where: 
 (a)  the rights and interests are possessed under the laws acknowledged, 
and the customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait 
Islanders; and 
 (b)  the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and 
customs, have a connection with the land or waters; and 
 (c)  the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of 
Australia. 
7.6 In the Issues Paper the ALRC asked whether there should be a definition of 
traditional or traditional laws and customs in s 223 of the Native Title Act, and if so, 
what this definition should contain.
4
 Chapter 5 proposes that the Act clarify that 
traditional laws and customs may adapt, evolve or otherwise develop.
5
 Many 
submissions attested to the difficulties of interpretation of the term. 
                                                        
3   See, eg, Lisa Strelein, ‘From Mabo to Yorta Yorta: Native Title Law in Australia’ (2005) 19 Washington 
University Journal of Law and Policy 225. 
4  Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Native Title Act 1993, Issues Paper No 45 (2013)  
Q 11. 
5  Proposal 5–1. 
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7.7 The ALRC proposes that the term ‘traditional’ be removed from the text of 
s 223(1)(a). The term has been assigned multiple functions in the jurisprudence. It is a 
characterisation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander law and custom, but also the 
means to locate law, custom and connection in a pre-sovereignty timeframe. In 
Chapter 5, the proposal regarding ‘traditional’ centres on how traditional law and 
custom, and native title rights and interests in land and waters, can evolve and adapt 
over time.
6
 ‘Traditional’ also plays a role in the identification of the ‘right people for 
country’. 
7.8 Proposal 7–1 removes the word ‘traditional’ from s 223 of the Native Title Act. 
First, deletion of the term is suggested in view of the complexity of its interpretation in 
case law. Secondly, the term is often associated with rigid concepts, such as rights 
‘frozen in time’.
7
 Thirdly, the term ‘traditional’ may not reflect contemporary views of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander law and custom.
8
 Finally, the proposal has regard 
to Australia’s statement of support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).
9
 
7.9 If the term is removed, it could be replaced by a phrase that locates the origins 
of law and custom in the period prior to the assertion of sovereignty.
10
 The amended 
definition focuses on current law and custom in line with the present tense of the 
wording in s 223(1)(a), while operating in conjunction with an amended definition of 
connection in s 223(1)(b). 
7.10 The term ‘traditional’ is not simply a description of law and custom. Case law 
establishes several requirements emanating from s 223(1)(a). Evidence must establish 
the existence of the claim group’s laws and customs which have normative content.
11
 
Typically, some evidence is required of the detail of law and custom to identify the 
‘nature and content’ of native title,
12
 and for proving connection with land and 
waters.
13
 
7.11 In addition to proving that the claimants currently acknowledge law and observe 
custom, those laws and customs must be ‘traditional’.
14
 ‘Traditional’ has been a 
general basis for legal recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
15
 
                                                        
6  See discussion in Chapters 4 and 5.   
7   National Native Title Council, Submission 16. 
8    ‘A definition of traditional that does not acknowledge the natural evolution of culture and change under 
British and Australian governments, is discriminatory to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Peoples as 
it persecutes our Peoples for matters outside of our control.’ National Congress of Australia’s First 
Peoples, Submission 32. 
9  The Hon Jenny Macklin, MP, ‘Statement on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (Speech Delivered at Parliament House, Canberra, 3 April 2009). 
10  The suggested phrase is ‘in the period prior to the assertion of sovereignty’. 
11  Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457, [147]. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Ibid [148]. 
14   Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [43]–[45]. See the 
more complete discussion in Chapters 4 and 5. 
15  Australian Law Reform Commission, Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, Report No 31 (1986). 
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7.12 The movement to integrate aspects of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander law 
and custom within the Australian legal system has been a gradual process. The ALRC 
Report, Recognition of Customary Law, was an important milestone in this regard.
16
 
Writing in 1986, the ALRC noted: 
the fact remains that the recognition of Aboriginal customary laws by the general law 
has continued to be erratic, uncoordinated and incomplete.17 
7.13 The ALRC concluded that ‘the arguments in favour of recognition establish a 
case for the appropriate recognition of Aboriginal customary laws by the general legal 
system’.
18
 The ALRC, however, ‘treated the question of customary rights to land as 
outside the scope of its inquiry’.
19
 Since then native title has been recognised, and the 
concept finds expression in the Native Title Act. 
7.14 The concept of ‘traditional’ marks the threshold of entitlement with respect to 
native title, as the Full Federal Court in Bodney v Bennell stated: 
If this were not the case, a great many Aboriginal societies would be entitled to claim 
native title rights even though their current laws and customs are in no meaningful 
way traditional.20 
7.15 Currently, therefore, the process of recognition of native title is strongly aligned 
to the requirement that the laws and customs be ‘traditional’.
21
 Chapter 5 indicates that, 
in Yorta Yorta, ‘traditional’ has been held to comprise three components: 
Means of transmission: the laws and customs are passed from generation to 
generation, usually by word of mouth and common practice. 
History: the origins are to be found in the normative rules of the societies that existed 
before the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty; and 
Continuity: i.e. a normative system that has had a continuous existence and vitality 
since sovereignty.22 
7.16 The alignment of traditional with a particular means of transmission of laws and 
customs, on an intergenerational basis, has ramifications for proof of native title.
23
 It 
has particular relevance for evidence in relation to the adaptation, revitalisation and 
potential loss or abandonment of law and custom.
24
 The law relating to adaptation and 
continuity are addressed in Chapter 5. 
                                                        
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid 54. 
18  Ibid 116. 
19  Ibid 132. 
20   Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [97]. 
21  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [87].  
22   Nick Duff, ‘What’s Needed to Prove Native Title? Finding Flexibility Within the Law on Connection’ 
(Research Discussion Paper 35, AIATSIS, June 2014) 24–5. 
23   David Trigger, ‘Anthropology and the Resolution of Native Title Claims: Presentation to the Federal 
Court Judicial Education Forum, Sydney 2011’ in Toni Bauman and Gaynor Macdonald (eds), Unsettling 
Anthropology: The Demands of Native Title on Worn Concepts and Changing Lives (AIATSIS, 2011) 
142. 
24  Adaptation and revitalisation are considered in Ch 5. 
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Removal of traditional? 
7.17 The Law Council of Western Australia cautioned against statutory amendment 
of this kind: 
The Society is of the view that it would not assist the process of developing the 
meanings of ‘traditional’ and ‘society’, for the legislature to attempt to intervene and 
add words to the NTA, which in turn would need to be interpreted by the courts in 
future cases.25 
7.18 However, difficulties occur at a practical level as the ‘traditional’ character of 
law and custom must be ascertained afresh with each claim.
26
 Just Us Lawyers noted 
problems in complying with ‘traditional’: 
Given that Indigenous Australians were not credited with even possessing laws or 
systems of land tenure giving rise to ownership for most, if not all, of the 19th 
century, it is often very difficult to find a useful account of their laws and customs 
from the pre-sovereignty era. This is coupled with the impossibility of obtaining direct 
(ie. affidavit evidence) about observance by the relevant pre-sovereignty society of 
such laws and customs.27 
7.19 Such practical difficulties may contribute to lengthy time frames for resolution 
of claims and consequent resource, capacity and financial burdens on claimants and on 
parties with responsibilities for assessing connection. 
7.20 Further, concerns were raised that adherence to ‘traditional’ in s 223 does not 
reflect the reality of the distribution of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders 
that has resulted from European settlement.
28
 Underpinning definitions of native title 
may be skewed toward remote Indigenous communities.
29
 As Toni Bauman and 
Gaynor Macdonald stated: 
Native title jurisprudence has been slow in reflecting the complexities of Aboriginal 
lives in both settled and remote areas and anthropologists working across Australia 
are faced with the difficult task of explaining how cultural change is commensurate 
with continuing tradition. Although other important post-Yorta Yorta decisions have 
applied, clarified and refined the High Court’s reasoning in Yorta Yorta in both the 
Federal Court and the full court of the Federal Court on appeal, the High Court 
decision continues to provide the definitive benchmark for many of those involved in 
preparing and assessing the connection of claimants.30 
                                                        
25  Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9. 
26  Duff, above n 22. 
27  Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. 
28  ‘[L]egal doctrine envisages a grand continent –wide rationalisation of those who have maintained 
traditional connection and those who have not (and those in between who might be able to negotiate a non 
native title outcome.’: P Burke, Submission 33.  
29  Ibid; Central Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26. 
30  Toni Bauman and Gaynor Macdonald (eds), Unsettling Anthropology: The Demands of Native Title on 
Worn Concepts and Changing Lives (AIATSIS, 2011) 2. 
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7.21 Other commentators raised concerns about the removal of traditional from s 223 
of the Native Title Act. As David Martin noted, ‘it is tradition which grounds and 
legitimates claims to country from the perspective of Indigenous people, not mere 
connection’.
31
 
[R]emoving the concept of ‘tradition’/‘traditional’ from s 223, while well intentioned, 
would actually cause more conflict and confusion within claimant groups. [To do so] 
ignores the deep significance accorded to traditional connections within Indigenous 
societies’. The legal construction of tradition is, in my view, a translation (if in rather 
impoverished form) of a set of deeply embedded and highly significant values within 
much of Indigenous Australia. To remove the requirement for laws and customs to be 
traditional denies this important value.32 
7.22 Similarly, some submissions indicated that deletion of ‘traditional’ from s 223 
would remove an extremely important differentiator between different kinds of 
assertions of Indigenous rights—for example, those based on historical occupation in 
contrast to native title.
33
 Some submissions raised the possibility that any amendment 
to ‘traditional’ could increase conflicts within Indigenous communities, with 
consequent ramifications for community cohesion and for third parties who must deal 
with native title claimants.
34
 
7.23 The ALRC notes that matters of identifying native title group membership and 
composition must be informed by culturally sensitive ways of group identification. The 
availability of other models for identifying the ‘right people for country’ in non-native 
title frameworks suggests that alternative approaches may be beneficial. Better 
resourcing of the existing processes for identifying the claim group also may contribute 
to the robustness of both the ‘right people for country’ and connection processes. 
7.24 The ALRC invites comment about the utility of providing greater legal formality 
to the group structure prior to the final determination of native title. 
7.25 Section 224 of the Act defines a native title holder to mean: 
(a) if a prescribed body corporate is registered on the National Native Title Register 
as holding the native title rights and interests on trust—the prescribed body 
corporate; or 
(b) in any other case—the person or persons who hold the native title. 
Question 7–1 Should a definition related to native title claim group 
identification and composition be included in the Native Title Act? 
                                                        
31  David Martin, Correspondence, 15 August 2014. 
32  Ibid. 
33  South Australian Government, Submission 34; Northern Territory Government, Submission 31. 
34  Western Australian Government, Submission 20; Minerals Council of Australia, Submission 8.  
 7. The Transmission of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Culture 129 
7.26 The ALRC also asks whether it would be appropriate to develop a set of 
guidelines for identifying the right people for country for inclusion within the Native 
Title Act. 
7.27 If ‘traditional’ were removed from s 223 of the Native Title Act, then the section 
might operate in conjunction with ‘threshold guidelines’ similar to the Traditional 
Owner Settlement Act 2010 (Vic) (TOSA). The Victorian Department of Justice has 
developed ‘Threshold Guidelines’ for traditional owner groups seeking a settlement 
under the TOSA. These Guidelines set out the process for assessing threshold 
requirements, which includes lodgement by the claim group of a two-part threshold 
statement, evaluation by the Victorian Government Native Title Unit and thereafter 
notifying the broader traditional owner community and seeking feedback on its 
adequacy.
35
 
7.28 The ALRC seeks comment on the feasibility of this approach. 
Substitution of another term for traditional? 
7.29 Of the three components of ‘traditional’ in Yorta Yorta, the requirements related 
to the age of law and custom have particular significance for the native title rights and 
interests that can be recognised. As the court stated in Yorta Yorta: 
it also follows that the only rights or interests in relation to land or waters, originating 
otherwise than in the new sovereign order, which will be recognised after the 
assertion of that new sovereignty are those that find their origin in pre-sovereignty law 
and custom.36 
7.30 In light of the requirement that the native title rights and interests claimed 
cannot constitute a greater burden on the Crown title than at the assertion of 
sovereignty,
37
 the ALRC asks, if traditional is removed from s 223, whether it is 
appropriate to substitute a term that fulfils the ‘history’ function that has been 
attributed to ‘traditional’. 
7.31 The ALRC asks stakeholders to consider whether the phrase, ‘since prior to the 
assertion of sovereignty’, should be inserted in s 223(1)(a) to indicate that the rights 
and interests have origins in the pre-sovereignty period. If adopted, any such phrase 
would be regarded as consistent with proposals in Chapter 5 to allow for law and 
custom to adapt, evolve and develop. 
                                                        
35  Victorian Department of Justice, Threshold Guidelines for Victorian Traditional Owner Groups Seeking 
a Settlement Under the Traditional Owner Settlement Act 2010 (2013) 11–12. 
36  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [44]. 
37  Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, [223]. 
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Redefining ‘connection’ 
Proposal 7–2 The definition of native title in s 223 of the Native Title Act 
should be further amended to provide that: 
 The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the 
communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where: 
 (a)  the rights and interests are possessed under the laws acknowledged, 
and the customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait 
Islanders; and 
 (b)  the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and 
customs, have a relationship with country that is expressed by their 
present connection with the land or waters; and 
 (c)  the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of 
Australia. 
7.32 In addition to removal of ‘traditional’ in s 223(1)(a), the ALRC proposes 
amendment to the term ‘connection’ in s 223(1)(b). The meaning of this term has 
become opaque
38
 and its meaning open to various interpretations.
39
 Accordingly, it 
presents significant practical difficulties for parties in bringing evidence in support of 
the claim, and in ascertaining proof of connection. 
7.33 Section 223(1)(b) of the Native Title Act states ‘the Aboriginal peoples or Torres 
Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land or waters’. 
The case law on connection is covered in Chapter 6. That chapter considered whether 
there should be confirmation that ‘connection with the land or waters’ in s 223(1)(b) 
does not require physical occupation or continued or recent use. The ALRC has 
concluded that amendment of the Act on this issue is not necessary, as there is no lack 
of clarity in the Act or in the courts’ interpretation of the Act. 
7.34 The proposal here examines a broader question about the meaning of connection 
in s 223(1)(b) of the Native Title Act and its interpretation. The ALRC suggests that the 
definition of ‘connection’ in s 223(1)(b) of the Native Title Act should be amended to 
state that connection is the relationship with land and waters claimed. That relationship 
is expressed in the present form of acknowledgment of laws and observance of 
customs. 
7.35 The proposal could be read against further possible amending statements that, 
‘connection with land and waters means the holistic relationship that Aboriginal people 
and Torres Strait Islanders have with land and waters claimed’ and ‘the relationship 
                                                        
38  Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 
FCR 442, [87]. 
39  Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 (10 June 2005) [1077] (French J). 
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may be expressed in various ways including but not limited to physical presence on the 
land’.
40
 
7.36 The proposal could operate in conjunction with either an amended definition of 
traditional, or with the removal of traditional from s 223 of the Native Title Act and its 
substitution. 
What is connection? 
7.37 ‘Connection’ reflects the view that ‘native title … [is] ascertained according to 
the laws and customs of the indigenous people who, by those laws and customs, have a 
connection with the land’.
41
 
7.38 In Members of the Yorta Yorta Community v Victoria, the High Court noted: 
[I]t would be wrong to confine the inquiry for connection between claimants and the 
land or waters concerned to an inquiry about the connection said to be demonstrated 
by the laws and customs which are shown now to be acknowledged and observed by 
the peoples concerned. Rather, it will be necessary to inquire about the relationship 
between the laws and customs now acknowledged and observed, and those that were 
acknowledged and observed before sovereignty. 42 
7.39 The focus for the amended definition would be to emphasise that the starting 
point in determining connection is the ‘present relationship with country’ that the 
claimant group has with the relevant land and waters. 
7.40 Secondly, the amended definition is intended to give ‘connection’ some 
meaningful content in the definition of native title. In De Rose v South Australia 
(No 1), the Full Federal Court stated 
At first glance, it may not be evident what par (b) of s 223(1) adds to par (a). If 
Aboriginal people possess rights and interests in relation to land under the traditional 
laws acknowledged and the traditional customs observed by them, it would seem to be 
a small step to conclude that the people, by those laws and customs, have a connection 
with the land.43 
7.41 The courts typically have aligned connection with continuity of 
acknowledgment of law and observance of law and custom.
44
 Alternatively, the 
independence of s 223(1)(a) and 223(1)(b) has been emphasised.
45
 At other points, the 
concept of ‘recognition’ under s 223(1)(c) has been aligned with ‘connection’.
46
 
                                                        
40  See Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 
FCR 442, [111]. 
41  Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 70. 
42  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [56]. 
43  De Rose v South Australia (No 1) (2003) 133 FCR 325, [305]. 
44  Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 
FCR 442, [92]. 
45  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [18]–[19]. 
46  Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351, [37]. 
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7.42 Courts have dealt with the concept of connection in a variety of ways; reflecting 
some uncertainty in its interpretation.
47
 In Neowarra v Western Australia, the court 
considered matters pertaining to land and waters referable to law and custom, as well 
as factual inquires about links to specific places in the claim area.
48
 
7.43 Therefore, precisely which elements of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait 
Islanders’ law and custom can give effect to ‘connection’ can be relatively 
indeterminate.
49
 At one level, this reflects the need for native title to be determined in 
accordance with the unique factual circumstances for each claim. At another level, it 
renders the test for connection ‘unbounded’, thereby generating difficulties for what is 
to be deemed as ‘sufficient’ factual evidence of law and custom constituting 
connection. 
7.44 The proposed amendment seeks to re-emphasise the relationship to land and 
waters as the primary focus when connection is interpreted—reflecting the actual text 
of s 223(1)(b). 
7.45 The reference to a ‘holistic relationship’ in regard to connection (expressed in 
Ward as an integrated view of the ordering of affairs),
50
 is intended to overcome 
uncertainties in the interpretation of the Act. There have been uncertainties over 
whether the relationship comprises ‘physical’, ‘spiritual’, ‘economic’ and ‘cultural’ 
elements in favour of a more broadly-conceived concept. In this sense, the 
interpretation of connection might align to the view in Bodney v Bennell that claimants 
must assert ‘the reality of their connection’ to their land and waters.
51
 
7.46 It is likely that no statutory construction can entirely reflect Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander understanding of connection: 
No English words are good enough to give a sense of the links between an Aboriginal 
group and its homeland ... A different tradition leaves us tongueless and earless 
towards this other world of meaning and significance.52 
7.47 By contrast, general legal scholarship has been used to provide insights into how 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander law and custom constitutes a normative society.
53
 
7.48 The Law Council of Australia explained the inadequacy of the current legal 
model in terms of capturing Indigenous relationships with country.
54
 
                                                        
47  Duff, above n 22, 50. 
48  Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 (8 December 2003) [352]–[353]. 
49  Sean Brennan, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Indigenous Property Rights’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 
239. 
50  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [14]. 
51  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [171]. 
52     WEH Stanner quoted in A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
53  For example, the Court drew on US Constitutional law theory propounded by HLA Hart as to why people 
acknowledge law: Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, 
[41]. 
54  Law Council of Australia, Submission 35. 
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7.49 At one level, it may be appropriate to provide a broad frame for connection 
requirements. At another, the task may be unrealistic, compressing a richly-textured 
world into legal forms. 
The difficulty of expressing a relationship between a community or group of 
Aboriginal people and the land in terms of rights and interests is evident. Yet that is 
required by the NTA. The spiritual or religious is translated into the legal. This 
requires the fragmentation of an integrated view of the ordering of affairs into rights 
and interests, which are considered apart from the duties and obligations which go 
with them.55 
7.50 The view that the ‘translation’ of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ 
connection necessarily requires fragmentation has been questioned: 
Is there really, in the words of s 223, the compulsion apparently felt by the plurality 
[in Ward] to further fragment what is holistic by translating it into Western legal 
terms in a diffuse rather than organically cohesive way... It is suggested that the 
disaggregating impact of the words in the statute at s 223 has been overstated and the 
task of translation, difficult though it is, could be approached in a less atomising 
way.56 
Proof of connection 
7.51 The complexity involved in bringing evidence to establish ‘connection’ derives 
in part from the particular model for proof adopted under the Native Title Act. In 
Mabo [No 2], several bases for proving Indigenous peoples’ connection with land and 
waters were canvassed. Deane and Gaudron JJ, and Toohey J discussed a possessory 
title drawing on Canadian jurisprudence.
57
 A title founded on the basis of possession or 
occupation places less emphasis on the legal inquiry into the traditional laws and 
customs of Indigenous peoples. Deane and Gaudron JJ in Mabo [No 2] accepted that 
occupation of land and waters may constitute adequate evidence of the continued 
maintenance of traditional law and custom.
58
 
7.52 The Northern Territory land rights claims process is another potential model.
59
 
Case law interpreting the Native Title Act has not examined alternative bases for 
structuring evidence to establish native title. Some submissions noted that there may be 
advantages in considering possessory or occupation models.
60
 Scholarship has 
identified other potential models, for example, common law Aboriginal title to land.
61
 
7.53 The ALRC Inquiry under its Terms of Reference is to focus on the current 
Native Title Act and therefore makes no proposal in relation to alternative models.
62
 
                                                        
55  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [14] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummon and Hayne JJ) 
quoted in National Native Title Council, Submission 16. 
56  Brennan, above n 49, 259. 
57  Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
58  Ibid 110. 
59  Australian Law Reform Commission, Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, Report No 31 (1986) 
[663]. 
60  See AIATSIS, Submission 36 for a discussion of the Canadian approach. 
61  Kent McNeil, ‘The Onus of Proof of Aboriginal Title’ (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 775. 
62  See Ch 3.  
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7.54 Further the difficulties of translating Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples’ connection into Australian law find resonance in the past. In Banjima 
People v Western Australia (No 2) (‘Banjima’) the Federal Court noted the 
incommensurability of two different cultures: 
It may readily be inferred from the evidence in this proceeding that upon their arrival 
in the Swan River Colony the agents of the British Sovereign and the first British 
settlers had no detailed knowledge of the circumstances and social organisation, laws 
and customs of the indigenous people. It may also be inferred from that same 
evidence that the indigenous people were oblivious to the social organisation, laws 
and customs of the new settlers when they first encountered them.63 
7.55 This underscores the difficulties of accurately ‘reaching back’ to establish past 
‘connection’: 
At most, a right in the past might be juxtaposed against current rights in order to better 
understand how they came to be shaped and asserted in the present. But to interpose 
rights from the past into the present and expect their nature and extent to be 
unchanged requires a similitude between conditions in the past and the present that 
gives a false notion of history.64 
7.56 Other submissions noted that the historical record is often incomplete or ad hoc 
in terms of the evidence of connection or genealogy that has survived.
65
 In Banjima, 
the court noted that 
The evidence of early seafarers, explorers, pastoralists, ethnographers and 
anthropologists, which falls into an historical category, may also be relevant in any 
proceeding and have evidentiary value in relation to matters in issue, although 
depending on the circumstances and context in which it was gathered, and by whom it 
was gathered, it may need to be treated with care.66 
7.57 Given the practical difficulties in bringing evidence, the vagaries of the 
historical record and constraints in relation to expert evidence, the ALRC seeks 
stakeholder comment on the proposed amendments to the existing requirements for 
establishing connection. 
Revitalisation of connection? 
Question 7–2 Should the Native Title Act be amended to provide that 
revitalisation of law and custom may be considered in establishing whether 
‘Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have 
a connection with land and waters’ under s 223(1)(b)? 
7.58 This section of the chapter considers whether the law relating to connection to 
land and waters could include revitalisation of the relationship with country. The case 
                                                        
63  Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2) (2013) 305 ALR 1, [23]. 
64  Alex Reilly and Ann Genovese, ‘Claiming the Past: Historical Understanding in Australian Native Title 
Jurisprudence’ (2004) 3 Indigenous Law Journal 19, 38. See Ch 5. 
65  AIATSIS, Submission 36; A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
66  Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2) (2013) 305 ALR 1, [26]–[29]. 
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law is clear that revival of native title is not possible.
67
 However, the ALRC asks 
whether it is appropriate to distinguish between revival and revitalisation (meaning 
renewed vigour as opposed to reinvention) of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders 
peoples’ connection, based upon acknowledging the various forms in which 
transmission of culture can take place.
68
 
7.59 The ALRC is interested in views on whether the Native Title Act should be 
amended to provide that revitalisation of law and custom may be a factor that may be 
considered in establishing the requirement in s 223(1)(b) that ‘Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a connection with land or 
waters’. 
7.60 In Mabo [No 2], Brennan J stated: 
when the tide of history has washed away any real acknowledgment of traditional law 
and real observance of traditional customs, the foundation of native title has 
disappeared. A native title which has ceased with the abandoning of laws and customs 
based on tradition cannot be revived for contemporary recognition.69 
7.61 By contrast, Deane and Gaudron JJ felt it unnecessary to decide whether native 
title rights ‘will be lost by the abandonment of traditional customs and ways’.
70
 
7.62 The majority of the High Court in Fejo v Northern Territory noted, in the 
context of explaining the effects of extinguishment, that ‘[t]he argument that native 
title may revive fails because the rights are extinguished by the grant of freehold title; 
they are not merely suspended’.
71
 The Native Title Act now allows for suspension of 
native title in respect of certain future acts.
72
 
7.63 As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, native title applicants must demonstrate that, 
since the assertion of sovereignty, acknowledgment of their traditional laws and 
observance of their traditional customs have continued ‘substantially uninterrupted’.
73
 
For example, in Risk v Northern Territory, concerning the Larrakia
74
 people’s claim, 
the court at first instance found that 
A combination of circumstances has, in various ways, interrupted or disturbed the 
presence of the Larrakia people in the Darwin area during several decades of the 20th 
Century in a way that has affected their continued observance of, and enjoyment of, 
the traditional laws and customs of the Larrakia people that existed at sovereignty.75 
                                                        
67  Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96, [56]–[58] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, 
Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
68  See, eg, AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
69  Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 60.   
70  Ibid 110. 
71  Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96, [57]. 
72  See, eg, Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 24AA(6).   
73  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422.  
74  Both the judgments at trial and on appeal referred to ‘Larrakia’ as encompassing all the relevant 
applicants. 
75  Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 (29 August 2006) [812]. See Ch 5.   
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7.64 The Court specifically referred to a lack of evidence about the passing on of 
knowledge of the traditional laws and customs.
76
 There was a finding that there had 
been a substantial interruption in the ‘practice’ of the traditional laws and customs.
77
 
This was despite a finding by the trial judge that 
The Larrakia community of today is a vibrant, dynamic society, which embraces its 
history and traditions. This group of people has shown its strength as a community, 
able to re-animate its traditions and customs.78 
7.65 The factual questions around revitalisation of law and custom, and thereby 
connection, raise matters about how the impact of European settlement on the 
transmission of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples might be considered. 
Concerns have been raised that a comparatively short break in continuity was sufficient 
to find that native title did not exist.
79
 
7.66 Some view the current interpretation of the definition of native title, specifically 
with respect to substantially uninterrupted continuity, as creating ‘insurmountable 
barriers to cultural resurgence’.
80
 A view has been expressed that ‘a comparatively 
minimal interruption’ to the sharing of culture across the claimant group should not 
prevent recognition of native title.
81
 However, the Western Australian Fishing Industry 
Council submitted that ‘[i]t is not for the Courts to revive customs that have fallen 
away’.
82
 Similarly, the South Australian Government submitted that ‘[r]ecognising 
revived or other rights is better left to other policy devices on a local jurisdictional 
basis’.
83
 
7.67 Commentators have noted that the forms for transmission of culture necessarily 
respond to the circumstances in which Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
found themselves.
84
 Further, there is growing knowledge about how culture is 
transmitted in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander societies that has emerged since 
early cases were litigated—driven in part by the claims process under the Native Title 
Act. Proposal 5–1, that traditional laws and customs may evolve, adapt or otherwise 
develop, is consistent with a view that the transmission of laws and customs may also 
change, and such change may be a result of making use of available technologies. 
Thus, revitalisation of culture, through, for example, transmission of knowledge of law 
                                                        
76  Ibid [823].   
77  Ibid [835], [839].    
78  Ibid [530].  
79  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, ‘Native Title Report 2009’ (Australian 
Human Rights Commission, 2009) 86.   
80  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 21 March 2011, 1303 (Rachel Siewert). 
81  Ibid.  
82  Western Australian Fishing Industry Council, Submission 23. 
83  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
84  S Bielefeld, Submission 6; Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1; Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, ‘Social Justice and Native Title Report 2013’ (Australian 
Human Rights Commission) 108–10. 
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and custom through ethnographic, anthropological and biographical texts, may be ‘an 
unavoidable and acceptable cultural adaptation’.
85
 Dr Paul Memmott has argued that 
contemporary Aboriginal cultures must be recognised as including textual and digital 
media, which constitute part of the process of negotiating meaning out of the current 
socio-economic and cultural circumstances.86 
7.68 The Inquiry is an opportunity to consider whether there may be merit in 
investigating a distinction between: 
 abandonment of law and custom and substantial interruption of connection; and 
 where force of circumstances requires Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander law 
and custom to adapt and take different forms over time. 
7.69 The ALRC invites comment as to whether a distinction between revival and 
revitalisation may be useful in this respect. 
Disregarding substantial interruption or change in 
continuity? 
7.70 The Terms of Reference ask the ALRC to inquire into and report on connection 
requirements for the recognition and scope of native title rights and interests. In its 
Inquiry, the ALRC is directed to a number of options for reform but can examine 
connection more broadly. In the context of a general examination of connection 
requirements, this section considers whether the Native Title Act and legal frameworks 
should be amended, to allow the empowerment of courts to disregard substantial 
interruption or change in continuity of acknowledgment and observance of traditional 
laws and customs, where it is in the interests of justice to do so. 
7.71 The requirement that acknowledgment and observance of law and custom must 
have occurred substantially uninterrupted by each generation since sovereignty is 
discussed in earlier chapters.
87
 The requirement has arisen from the statutory 
construction of s 223(1)(a) of the Native Title Act. Proposal 5–3 provides that the Act 
should be amended to make clear that it is not necessary to establish that: 
 acknowledgment and observance of law and custom has continued substantially 
uninterrupted since sovereignty; and 
 laws and customs have been acknowledged and observed by each generation 
since sovereignty. 
7.72 That is, Proposal 5–3 addresses the degree or frequency of continuity of 
acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs that is required to 
                                                        
85  Paul Memmott, ‘Modelling the Continuity of Aboriginal Law in Urban Native Title Claims: A Practice 
Example’ in Toni Bauman and Gaynor MacDonald (eds), Unsettling Anthropology: The Demands of 
Native Title on Worn Concepts and Changing Lives (AIATSIS, 2011) 122, 130. 
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meet s 223(1)(a). The terms ‘continuity’ and ‘substantially uninterrupted’ do not 
appear in the text of s 223 of the Act. 
7.73 In this section of the chapter, the ALRC examines other questions about whether 
the Act should be amended in relation to ‘substantial interruption or change in 
continuity of acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs’. These 
questions are directed primarily, but not entirely, to the function that ‘connection’ 
performs in s 223(1)(b) of the Act.
88
 That section states: ‘the Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land or 
waters’. 
7.74 The ALRC asks whether in determining connection under s 223(1)(b), there can 
be regard to historical factors around the displacement of Aboriginal peoples and 
Torres Strait Islanders that may affect the manner of the connection with land or 
waters. The ALRC considers that such an approach is consistent with the recognition 
and protection of native title and gives effect to the beneficial purposes of the Act. 
Relevant law 
7.75 The extent to which the effects of European settlement can be taken into account 
in determining whether s 223 is established is reflected in two areas. First, in 
considering the degree to which there can be change or evolution in law and custom. 
Secondly, it is relevant in respect of whether acknowledgment of law and custom has 
been interrupted or ceased. 
7.76 The Full Court of the Federal Court in Bodney v Bennell set out the relationship 
between:  
 the level of continuity of acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws 
and customs required by s 223(1)(a); and  
 the level of continuity of connection required by s 223(1)(b). 
7.77 The court in that respect stated  
the laws and customs which provide the required connection are ‘traditional’ laws and 
customs. For this reason, their acknowledgment and observance must have continued 
‘substantially uninterrupted’ from the time of sovereignty; and the connection itself 
must have been ‘substantially maintained’ since that time.89 
7.78 The qualification of ‘substantially’ reflects the impacts of European settlement, 
as the High Court explained in Yorta Yorta: 
It is a qualification that must be made to recognise that European settlement has had 
the most profound effects on Aboriginal societies and that it is, therefore, inevitable 
that the structures and practices of those societies, and their members, will have 
undergone great change since European settlement.90 
                                                        
88   Connection is discussed in Ch 6.  
89  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [168]. 
90  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [89] (Gleeson CJ, 
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7.79 Further, the High Court held that, to describe ‘the consequences of interruption 
in acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs as “abandonment” 
or “expiry” of native title was apt to mislead’ because it involved imputing an intention 
to abandon law and custom on the part of Indigenous peoples.
91
 
7.80 Nonetheless, the High Court emphasised that 
the inquiry about continuity of acknowledgment and observance does not require 
consideration of why, if acknowledgment and observance stopped, that happened ... If 
it is not demonstrated that that condition was met, examining why that is so is 
important only to the extent that the presence or absence of reasons might influence 
the fact-finder’s decision about whether there was such an interruption.92 
7.81 Accordingly, the High Court left open the permissibility of examining why 
acknowledgment and observance may have ‘stopped’ in confined circumstances. 
Subsequently, the Full Federal Court in Bodney v Bennell, when discussing continuity, 
stated: 
if... there has been a substantial interruption, it is not to be mitigated by reference to 
white settlement. The continuity enquiry does not involve consideration of why 
acknowledgment and observance stopped.93 
7.82 After this Full Federal Court decision, it could be said that the law is unclear as 
to whether consideration of the reasons why acknowledgment and observance may 
have ‘stopped’ is permitted at all. 
7.83 A further complexity is that some commentators draw a distinction between the 
effects of European settlement in respect of adaptation, and thereby change, in law and 
custom, as compared with a substantial interruption. According to this view, Bodney v 
Bennell ‘should be treated with caution insofar as it suggests that evidence of European 
influence is irrelevant to the question of change, as opposed to interruption’.
94
 
Should consideration of the reasons for interruption be permissible? 
Question 7–3 Should the reasons for any displacement of Aboriginal 
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders be considered in the assessment of whether 
‘Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have 
a connection with the land or waters’ under s 223(1)(b)? 
7.84 The ALRC’s Issues Paper did not ask specifically about consideration of the 
reasons why acknowledgment and observance may have changed or ‘stopped’. 
Nevertheless, submissions expressed a range of views about whether factual matters 
relating to European settlement, such as dispossession from lands, missionary activity, 
removal of Indigenous peoples to reserves, should be raised. 
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7.85 As the North Queensland Land Council put it, ‘European settlement which 
occurred pursuant to British and Australian law inhibited the observance of traditional 
laws and customs in areas of closer settlement’.
95
 Similarly, Frith and Tehan submitted 
that state or settler acts—such as being forced to move off country to missions or 
reserves—often denied groups ‘the right or ability to acknowledge and observe their 
laws and customs’.
96
 In its submission to a Senate Committee Inquiry, the Kimberley 
Land Council said: 
The movements of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander persons from their traditional 
lands was, in many cases, either directly or indirectly forced upon them—either 
through government activities such as the removal of children or, as was common in 
the Kimberley region, the movement of traditional owners off their lands into the 
relative safety of the missions to escape violence perpetrated by pastoralists.97 
7.86 Yet, as the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 
has observed, ‘there is little room to raise past injustice as a counter to the loss of, or 
change in, the nature of acknowledgment of laws or the observance of customs’.
98
 
7.87 Several submissions commented on the ‘apparent unconscionability of the State 
or Territory effectively relying on its own actions to the detriment of native title 
groups’ assertion of native title’.
99
 Just Us Lawyers submitted that the strict application 
of ‘substantial interruption’ effectively downplays the practical impacts of colonisation 
and dispossession.
100
 Some submissions stated that the current position does not accord 
with the beneficial objects of the Native Title Act.
101
 
7.88 A number of submissions supported reform so that courts could consider the 
reasons for interruptions in continuity.
102
 Frith and Tehan submitted that 
the Court should be given the discretion to consider the reasons for any such 
interruption in considering its relevance to its determination of whether traditional 
laws and customs have been acknowledged and observed.103 
7.89 Governments did not directly mention this issue but rather made general 
submissions that the system was working well and that there was no need for 
significant statutory amendments, particularly given that courts interpreted the 
                                                        
95  North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17.  
96  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12.  
97  Kimberley Land Council, Submission No 2 to Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, June 2011.  
98  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, ‘Native Title Report 2009’, above n 
79, 87.  See also Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
99  See, eg, Native Title Services Victoria, Submission 18; A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; Australian 
Human Rights Commission, Submission 1.   
100  Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. 
101  Central Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26; Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9: 
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NTA to require consideration of why the interruption has occurred and the broader interests of justice in 
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102  See, eg, A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
103  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
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requirements for connection and continuity flexibly.
104
 The South Australian 
Government submitted: 
The Federal Court takes into account that extensive loss or modification of traditional 
law and custom was almost inevitable in the face of colonisation and has, on occasion, 
found in favour of groups that have long been absent from their lands or whose 
culturally active membership has, at various times in history, numbered very few 
individuals.105 
7.90 The ALRC is interested in stakeholder views on the issue of whether the reasons 
for any displacement of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders should be 
considered in the assessment of whether ‘the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait 
Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land or waters’. 
Reform options 
7.91 A number of reform proposals have been advanced as to how the influence of 
European settlement could be considered in the determination of native title. The 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, in Native Title 
Report 2008, argued that ‘the law about continuity of traditional connection needs to be 
brought back into line with the overall logic of Mabo’.
106
 The Commissioner proposed 
a legislative amendment so that the courts would have capacity to take into account the 
reasons for interruption to the acknowledgment of the traditional laws and the 
observance of the traditional customs.
107
 
7.92 In Native Title Report 2009, the Commissioner suggested that, 
[s]uch an amendment could empower Courts to disregard any interruption or change 
in the acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs where it is in 
the interests of justice to do so.108 
7.93 Further, the Commissioner suggested that ‘a definition or a non-exhaustive list 
of historical events’ could be provided in the Native Title Act in order ‘to guide courts 
as to what should be disregarded’.
109
 The Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011 
proposed amendments that were broadly consistent with these recommendations.
110
 
                                                        
104  South Australian Government, Submission 34; Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; 
Queensland Government Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Submission 28; Western 
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105  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
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79, 87.   
109  Ibid. 
110  The Bill approached the issue of substantial interruption within a presumption of continuity—that is, by 
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7.94 The Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2014 differed in some key respects 
to the 2011 Bill.
111
 The reform proposed in the 2014 Bill is for courts to be conferred 
with discretion—not mandated to ‘treat as relevant’ particular reasons for the 
substantial interruption. New s 61AB, as proposed in the 2014 Bill, would provide 
A court may determine that subsection 223(1) has been satisfied, despite finding that 
there has been: 
(a)   a substantial interruption in the acknowledgment of traditional laws or the 
observance of traditional customs; or 
... 
if the primary reason for the substantial interruption or the significant change is the 
action of a State or a Territory or a person or other party who is not an Aboriginal 
person or a Torres Strait Islander. 
How could the influence of European settlement be considered? 
7.95 Two reform options were raised for consideration in the Issues Paper: 
 whether courts should be empowered to disregard substantial interruption or 
change in the continuity of acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws 
and customs where it is in the interests of justice to do so;
112
 and 
 whether substantial interruption should be defined in the Act.
113
 
7.96 Neither of these options for reform are proposed in this Discussion Paper for the 
reasons set out below. Rather, the ALRC asks for views about how the influence of 
European settlement should be considered in the determination of native title. 
The empowerment of courts 
7.97 The ‘empowerment’ of courts indicates the statutory conferral of discretion.
114
 
This can be contrasted with an earlier model.
115
 
7.98 A number of submissions expressed support for the empowerment of courts to 
disregard substantial interruption or change in continuity of acknowledgment of 
                                                        
111  For example, the provisions for presumptions and with respect to continuing connection are not linked 
Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2014 cl 14. See also Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill (No 
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(Rachel Siewert). 
112  Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Native Title Act 1993, Issues Paper No 45 (2013) Q 
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114  See Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2014 cl 14. See also Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 
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115  Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011 cl 12. Proposed new s 61AB(2)(a) provided that the courts 
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Territory or a person who is not an Aboriginal person or a Torres Strait Islander.  
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traditional laws and observance of traditional customs, where it is in the interests of 
justice to do so.
116
 The Law Society of Western Australia submitted that such a reform 
would be ‘consistent with the beneficial purposes for which the NTA was enacted, 
particularly where the interruption is caused by circumstances outside the control or 
intent of the relevant members of the relevant society’.
117
 Similarly, the Australian 
Human Rights Commission submitted that such a reform would be ‘[i]n furtherance of 
the purposes of the Act’, and referred to the Preamble to the Act.
118
 
7.99 However, a number of stakeholders were opposed to this reform option.
119
 Even 
stakeholders who were critical of the current law concerning substantially 
uninterrupted continuity raised some concerns about this approach, preferring other 
options instead.
120
 
7.100 Concerns that such reform: 
 ‘would likely place greater emphasis than there is presently on the fact and 
nature of any substantial interruption’;
121
 
 would be of uncertain effect;
122
 
 may not be in claimants’ interests as it may lead to increased debate about issues 
as well as increased costs and delay;
123
 and 
 is problematic because of uncertainty about the meaning of ‘in the interests of 
justice’.
124
 
7.101 Judicial discretion is, by its very nature, one to be exercised in relation to the 
circumstances of an individual case. Therefore, the circumstances enlivening the 
discretion will be variable. A general empowerment of courts may therefore be quite 
uncertain in its effect and operation.
125
 Questions may arise whether any such 
‘empowerment’ would operate as a procedural matter or would form part of the 
substantive area of law interpreting s 223 of the Native Title Act. 
                                                        
116  National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, Submission 32; Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30; 
NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29; Goldfields Land and Sea Council, 
Submission 22; Native Title Services Victoria, Submission 18; North Queensland Land Council, 
Submission 17; A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9; 
Cape York Land Council, Submission 7; Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
117  Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9. 
118  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
119  South Australian Government, Submission 34; Western Australian Fishing Industry Council, Submission 
23; Western Australian Government, Submission 20; National Farmers’ Federation, Submission 14; Just 
Us Lawyers, Submission 2. 
120  NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29; Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. 
121  Western Australian Government, Submission 20. 
122  Some stakeholders also raised this concern in relation to the earlier proposal for a presumption of 
continuity and substantial interruption. See, eg, Western Australian Government, Submission No 18 to 
Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title 
Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, August 2011: ‘significant uncertainty would be generated with the 
introduction of the presumption and the requirements for establishing “substantial interruption”’. 
123  NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29; Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. 
124  See, eg, NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29. 
125  S Bielefeld, Submission 6. Note that this submission did not express a view on the desirability of the 
reform option.  
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7.102 Other submissions focused on ‘in the interests of justice’. The term typically 
indicates that courts retain discretion. In a more general sense, it could be implemented 
in varying ways.
126
 A number of concerns were expressed about defining it in the 
Act.
127
 NSW Young Lawyers submitted that 
The phrase [‘in the interests of justice’] could import considerations of the overall 
circumstances of the case, including the present circumstances of the Claimants or the 
Respondents, or difficulties being experienced between multiple claim groups. There 
is a possibility that a decision may be taken to not disregard ‘substantial interruption’ 
in order to assist a poor or disadvantaged respondent due to the ‘interests of 
justice’.128 
7.103 In their view, the ‘appropriate’ focus for ‘the interests of justice’ should be the 
actual causes of substantial interruption.
129
 
7.104 Notwithstanding the breadth of the phrase ‘in the interests of justice’, there was 
little support for a definition of it in the Act. However, some submissions expressed the 
view that some guidance may be useful
130
 or necessary.
131
 The South Australian 
Government submitted that the phrase 
is usually utilised to provide a court or a decision maker with a discretion to act if the 
particular facts of the matter justify it. It provides flexibility but is to be applied in a 
judicial manner. However, were it to be included in the NTA as suggested here, there 
would need to be clear guidance on appropriate use.132 
7.105 Stakeholders who were opposed to a statutory definition of ‘in the interests of 
justice’ considered that it was ‘better left to the Court in each case’.
133
 North 
Queensland Land Council submitted that a statutory definition of the phrase may 
attract ‘many years’ of judicial interpretation. It was of the view that ‘[b]y not 
including a definition of this term, the courts would have a greater range for finding 
that it is in the interests of justice to disregard substantial interruption’.
134
 
7.106 The ALRC is not proposing the ‘empowerment of courts to disregard substantial 
interruption or change in continuity of acknowledgment and observance of traditional 
laws and customs where it is in the interests of justice to do so’ as identified in the 
Terms of Reference. This is due to the concerns expressed above. Rather, the ALRC 
asks a question about how the influence of European settlement should be considered 
in the determination of native title.
135
 
                                                        
126  Ibid. 
127  The ALRC had asked a question in the Issues Paper. See Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of 
the Native Title Act 1993, Issues Paper No 45 (2013) Q 21(b). 
128  NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29. 
129  Ibid. See also S Bielefeld, Submission 6. 
130  NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29 (suggesting the option put forward by 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, namely ‘a non-exhaustive list of 
particular circumstances where it is “in the interests of justice” to disregard “substantial interruption”’). 
131  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
132  Ibid. 
133  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
134  North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17.  
135  See Q 7–4 below. 
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Statutory definition of ‘substantial interruption’ 
7.107 While originally a statutory definition of ‘substantial interruption’ was 
conceived as linked to the empowerment of courts to disregard substantial 
interruption,
136
 some submissions to this Inquiry conceived of a statutory definition as 
a separate option in itself.
137
 As outlined earlier, the two issues could be conceived as 
different reform options for how the influence of European settlement could be 
considered. 
7.108 A number of submissions expressed support for a statutory definition of the 
factual matters that could be related to ‘substantial interruption’.
138
 
7.109 A variety of stakeholders considered the non-exhaustive nature of the list to be 
important.
139
 Stakeholders who supported a statutory definition of substantial 
interruption considered a non-exhaustive list necessary because what constitutes a 
substantial interruption is unsettled.
140
 
7.110 However, a number of stakeholders opposed a statutory definition of ‘substantial 
interruption’.
141
 Governments were opposed,
142
 viewing such a reform option as: 
 unnecessary;
143
 
                                                        
136  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, ‘Native Title Report 2009’, above n 
79, 87.  
137  See, eg, A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12.  
138  National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, Submission 32; Native Title Services Victoria, Submission 
18; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 
1. Some of these stakeholders supported express inclusion of the forced removal of children and the 
relocation of communities onto missions, which were examples that the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Social Justice Commissioner had suggested previously: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Social Justice Commissioner, ‘Native Title Report 2009’, above n 79, 87. 
139  South Australian Government, Submission 34 (who was opposed to such a definition because ‘[s]uch 
concepts are ill suited to exhaustive definition’); National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, 
Submission 32; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; Cape York Land Council, Submission 7; 
Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. Some suggested that the list could simply comprise a list of examples to 
guide judicial consideration, or alternatively the list could be added to over time—either by gazette or by 
regulation. Just Us Lawyers emphasised that while any such definition should be non-exhaustive, it 
should ‘be capable of objective assessment’. 
140  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. See also North Queensland Land Council, 
Submission 17 (‘there could be a variety of circumstances not yet known, 20 years after the 
commencement of the NTA’). 
141  South Australian Government, Submission 34; NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, 
Submission 29; Western Australian Government, Submission 20; National Farmers’ Federation, 
Submission 14; A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; Cape York Land Council, Submission 7.  
142  South Australian Government, Submission 34; Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; Western 
Australian Government, Submission 20. 
143  South Australian Government, Submission 34 (‘[c]ommon law courts are regularly applying the law to the 
circumstances without a definition and lawyers and negotiators do so when negotiating settlements’); 
Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; see also Queensland Government Department of Natural 
Resources and Mines, Submission 28 (referring broadly to Australian Law Reform Commission, Review 
of the Native Title Act 1993, Issues Paper No 45 (2013) Questions 10–22, ‘Given the current rate of 
resolution of native title claims and the associated outcomes being presently achieved, there is little basis 
for significant amendments to the NTA’). 
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 ‘impractical’, given that it is ‘a question of fact and degree’;
144
 
 making the test for recognising native title ‘unduly complicated’;
145
 and 
 tending to ‘shift the focus of native title inquiries onto historical matters, without 
necessarily achieving any time savings’.
146
 
7.111 A statutory definition of ‘substantial interruption’ was also opposed by some 
stakeholders who were in favour of law reform.
147
 AIATIS, for example, 
acknowledged that 
A strong argument exists for including a non-exhaustive list of historical events upon 
which the courts could be guided with respect to disregarding the requirement for 
continuing connection without substantial interruption.148 
7.112 However, AIATSIS reiterated its comment to the Senate Inquiry concerning the 
provisions of the 2011 Bill, that 
It may not always be possible to prove a direct correlation between a demonstrated 
interruption or change and the effect of government policies and individual behaviour 
on the movements of individuals or families. Indigenous agency in responding to such 
forces is not always easily articulated and reasons for certain actions may form part of 
the implicit rather than explicit knowledge of claimants. In these circumstances, 
respondent rebuttal might argue that a particular move was voluntary as the subtleties 
and long terms effects of policies remain invisible. There are also many other factors, 
such as cataclysmic events, drought, flood, war and the like, which could, prima facie, 
indicate a substantial period of dislocation, but which might fall outside the protection 
of s 61AB(2).149 
7.113 Some stakeholders favoured other reform options instead.
150
 
7.114 The ALRC considers that amendment of the Act to provide a statutory definition 
of ‘substantial interruption’ has limitations due to the difficulty of defining substantial 
interruption in a conclusive manner. Rather, the ALRC has suggested consideration of 
other ways of addressing these issues. Proposal 5–3 provides that the Act be amended 
to make clear that it is not necessary to establish acknowledgment and observance of 
laws and customs has continued substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty. In the 
discussion below the ALRC raises the issues around acknowledgment of the influence 
of European settlement and suggests a potential option for reform.  
                                                        
144  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
145  Western Australian Government, Submission 20. 
146  Ibid. 
147  See, eg, NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29; A Frith and M Tehan, 
Submission 12.  
148  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
149  Ibid. 
150  NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29; A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; 
Cape York Land Council, Submission 7; Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. 
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Other models for reform 
7.115 The ALRC invites comment on what other options for reform may be 
appropriate. The sequence of questions below is a guide. Question 7–4 asks for 
possible models and Question 7–5 outlines a suggested model. 
Question 7–4 If the reasons for any displacement of Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders are to be considered in the assessment of whether 
‘Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have 
a connection with the land or waters’ under s 223(1)(b), what should be their 
relevance to a decision as to whether such connection has been maintained? 
Question 7–5 Should the Native Title Act be amended to include a 
statement in the following terms: 
 Unless it would not be in the interests of justice to do so, in determining 
whether ‘Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and 
customs, have a connection with the land or waters’ under s 223(1)(b): 
  (a)  regard may be given to any reasons related to European settlement 
that preceded any displacement of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait 
Islanders from the traditional land or waters of those people; and 
 (b)  undue weight should not be given to historical circumstances adverse 
to those Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders. 
7.116 The ALRC noted the limitations raised in respect of the models for reform that 
were outlined for consideration in the Issues Paper. Therefore, the ALRC is interested 
in views on how else reform could be appropriately implemented. The ALRC offers 
one possible model for consideration, as set out above. This model draws upon drafting 
precedents in the Native Title Act. For example, the construction of the provision is 
similar to that outlined in s 82(2) of the Act
151
 and the expression ‘European 
settlement’ reflects the language in the Preamble. The ALRC welcomes views on this 
model and associated issues. For example, should such a statement be a section or only 
a note to the Act? The ALRC also welcomes comment on other models that may be 
appropriate. 
 
                                                        
151  Section 82(2) concerns the Federal Court’s way of operating and provides, ‘[i]n conducting its 
proceedings, the Court may take account of the cultural and customary concerns of Aboriginal peoples 
and Torres Strait Islanders, but not so as to prejudice unduly any other party to the proceedings’. This 
provision replaces the provision that was originally enacted. When considering the current wording, 
Sackville J remarked, ‘that provision permits, but does not oblige, the Court to take account of the 
cultural and customary concerns of Aboriginal peoples’: Jango v Northern Territory [2003] FCA 1230 
(31 October 2003) [49].    
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Summary 
8.1 The Terms of Reference direct the ALRC to inquire into whether there should 
be ‘clarification that “native title rights and interests” can include rights and interests of 
a commercial nature’. The suggested reform option has particular relevance for issues 
related to determining the scope (nature and content) of native title.
1
 
8.2 Native title or native title rights and interests are defined in s 223(1) of the 
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). Section 223(2) provides a non-exhaustive listing of 
representative native title rights and interests. It does not refer to rights of a commercial 
nature. Recent case law has held that native title comprises a ‘right for any purpose’.
2
 
8.3 This chapter is in three parts. First, it considers the nature and content of native 
title rights and interests and whether statutory clarification of the commercial nature of 
native title is appropriate. Secondly, it considers whether there is a need to adopt a 
definition of commercial native title rights and interests. Finally, the chapter considers 
what other native title rights and interests fall within the scope of s 223(1). 
                                                        
1  See Terms of Reference. 
2  Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209. 
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Overview of the proposals and questions 
8.4 The ALRC proposes that the definition in s 223 reflect the law in Akiba on 
behalf of the Torres Strait Regional Seas Claim Group v Commonwealth (‘Akiba’),
3
 
that native title is a ‘right for any purpose’. 
8.5 The proposal is that s 223(2) of the Native Title Act should be repealed and 
substituted with a provision that provides ‘without limiting subsection (1) but to avoid 
doubt, native title rights and interests in s 223(1) comprise rights in relation to any 
purpose and may include, but are not limited to, hunting, gathering, fishing, 
commercial activities and trade’. 
8.6 The inclusion of the terms ‘commercial activities’ and ‘trade’ in s 223(2) is 
indicative and not intended to limit the operation of s 223(1). The precise native title 
rights and interests determined in each claim will turn on the particular factual 
circumstances and the evidence brought by the claimants. 
8.7 The ALRC is not proposing that the terms ‘commercial activities’ and ‘trade’ be 
defined in the Act. This is to allow flexibility—in acknowledgment that ‘[n]ative title 
has its origins in and is given its content by the traditional laws acknowledged by and 
the traditional customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory’.
4
 
8.8 The ALRC seeks views on whether the exercise of cultural knowledge should be 
included in s 223(2) and the utility of a specific s 223(2)(b) to that effect. The ALRC 
also invites comment on other activities that should be included in the proposed 
indicative listing in the revised s 223(2)(b). 
Relevant provisions in the Native Title Act 
8.9 Within the Native Title Act there are a number of provisions relevant to the 
nature and content of native title rights and interests in an application for a 
determination of native title.
5
 
8.10 Under s 62(2) a claimant application must be accompanied by an affidavit sworn 
by the applicant. It must include, inter alia: 
 ‘a description of the native title rights and interests claimed in relation to 
particular land or waters (including any activities in exercise of those rights and 
interests)’,
6
 and 
 ‘a general description of the factual basis on which it is asserted that the native 
title rights and interests claimed exist’.
7
 
                                                        
3  Ibid. 
4  Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 58 (Brennan J). 
5  Note that other provisions not discussed will be relevant. 
6  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 62(2)(d). 
7  Ibid s 62(2)(e). 
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8.11 Section 223 is the key provision. Section 223(1)—which is discussed in 
Chapter 4—defines ‘native title’ and ‘native title rights and interests’. Importantly, 
native title is variable: 
Native title is not treated by the common law as a unitary concept. The heterogeneous 
laws and customs of Australia's indigenous peoples, the Aboriginals and Torres Strait 
Islanders, provide its content. It is the relationship between a community of 
indigenous people and the land, defined by reference to that community's traditional 
laws and customs, which is the bridgehead to the common law.8 
8.12 Section 223(1) is the substantive provision, with s 223(2), providing a non-
exhaustive list of native title rights and interests. Section 223(2) currently states that, 
Without limiting subsection (1), rights and interests in that subsection includes 
hunting, gathering, or fishing, rights and interests. 
8.13 Section 223(2) was enacted to provide ‘an example of the type of rights and 
interests that might comprise native title’.
9
 Melissa Perry and Stephen Lloyd suggest: 
As a result of the express recognition of such rights in s 223(2), it is not open to 
contend that native title rights and interests cannot comprise fishing, hunting or 
gathering rights and interests.10 
8.14 On this view, s 223(2) confirms that the specified purposes are native title rights 
and interests. 
8.15 Section 225 defines a ‘determination of native title’ and requires the listing of 
the native title rights and interests found to exist. Relevantly, s 225(b) provides: 
A determination of native title is a determination whether or not native title exists in 
relation to a particular area (the determination area) of land and waters and, if it does 
exist, a determination of: 
… 
(b) the nature and extent of the native title rights and interests in relation to the 
determination area. 
8.16 As well as the substantive provisions for establishing native title, s 211 of the 
Act provides a ‘savings provision’ giving limited protection of native title rights to 
hunt, gather, fish and engage in cultural or spiritual activities.
11
 The ‘protection’ is in 
respect of licensing and similar government regulation, not in terms of the grant of 
third party interests or development activities.
12
 Section 211(2) provides: 
                                                        
8  Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351, [72] (Gummow J). 
9  Explanatory Memorandum, Native Title Bill 1993 (Cth), Part B, 77 (s 223 was originally numbered s 208 
in the Bill). 
10  Melissa Perry and Stephen Lloyd, Australian Native Title Law (Lawbook Co, 2003) 768. 
11  Section 211(3) defines ‘class of activity’—with hunting, fishing and gathering referred to as separate 
classes of activity, rather than as rights and interests. The other class of activity that is specified is ‘a 
cultural or spiritual activity’. There is also provision for any other kind of activity to be prescribed for the 
purpose of the sub-section.  
12  Richard H Bartlett, Native Title in Australia (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2004) 659. 
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the law does not prohibit or restrict the native title holders13 from carrying on the class 
of activity, or from gaining access to the land or waters for the purpose of carrying on 
the class of activity, where they do so: 
(a) for the purpose of satisfying their personal, domestic or non-commercial 
communal needs; and 
(b) in exercise or enjoyment of their native title rights and interests.14 
8.17 Section 211(1) sets out the conditions necessary to activate s 211(2).
15
 
8.18 In effect, s 211 has provided a defence to prosecution for charges involving: 
 the ‘taking’ of juvenile estuarine crocodiles—by way of hunting with a 
traditional form of harpoon—for food, where it was a traditional custom of the 
relevant native title holders to hunt such crocodiles for food;
16
 and 
 possessing a quantity of undersized abalone, where the abalone were taken in 
accordance with the traditional laws and customs of the relevant native title 
holders.
17
 
Commercial native title? 
8.19 The inquiry as to whether native title includes rights and interests of a 
commercial nature, including rights to trade, raises central issues about the scope of 
native title and ‘the capacity of native title to support Indigenous economic 
development and generate sustainable long-term benefits for Indigenous Australians’.
18
 
8.20 For Indigenous communities, there are expectations that native title can provide 
the platform for redressing disadvantage and a more secure economic future for native 
title holders. Principle 5 identifies that reform should promote sustainable long-term 
social, economic and cultural development for Aboriginal people and Torres Strait 
Islanders. 
8.21 These considerations form the context for the following discussion of the law in 
relation to the nature and content (scope) of native title rights and interests. There are 
three main points. First, there are questions about the ‘nature’ and ‘content’ of native 
title rights and interests. Secondly, with respect to the ‘nature’ of native title, case law 
has affirmed that a distinction should be made between the native title right and its 
exercise. Thirdly, questions are raised about the extent to which the exercise of a right 
(with its origins in the pre-sovereignty period) can develop—for example, by reference 
to adaptations such as modern technologies. 
                                                        
13  ‘Native title holder’ is defined in Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 224.  
14  A note to the provision states ‘Note: In carrying on the class of activity, or gaining access, the native title 
holders are subject to laws of general application’. 
15  The second-listed condition—s 211(1)(b)—provides that ‘a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a 
Territory prohibits or restricts a person from carrying on the class of activity other than in accordance 
with a licence, permit or other instrument granted or issued to them under the law’. 
16  Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351. 
17  Karpany v Dietman (2013) 88 ALJR 90. 
18  Terms of Reference, above n 1. 
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The nature and content of native title rights and interests 
8.22 The ‘nature’ of native title refers to the ‘legal nature’ of the rights and 
interests.
19
 As ‘[n]ative title has its origin in the traditional laws acknowledged and the 
customs observed by the indigenous people who possess the native title’,
20
 the rights 
and interests are ‘founded upon’
21
 the traditional laws and customs of the relevant 
Indigenous communities. 
8.23 The High Court has explained that ‘[t]he ambit of the native title right is a 
finding of law’.
22
 The High Court has emphasised that ‘[t]he identification of the 
relevant rights is an objective inquiry’.
23
 Thus identification of the native title rights 
and interests is a question of fact and the ‘content’ of the rights and interests will 
depend on the evidence in each case.
24
 
8.24 Two examples illustrate this point. In Akiba there was a ‘long and well 
chronicled history’ that ‘[t]he Islanders were, and are, trading fish’—that is, that 
‘marine products were historically, and are today, taken for the purpose of exchange 
and sale’.
25
 In Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2), the trial judge distinguished 
the evidence before him from that in Akiba: 
The situation is not akin to the circumstances in which the claimants in Akiba (No 3) 
were found traditionally to take whatever resources they found at sea and were apt to 
trade and use it however they could.26 
8.25 Rather, the Federal Court found that particular resources were taken for 
particular uses, with limited evidence of trade in resources.
27
 
The nature of native title 
8.26 Courts indicate that native title is not equivalent to common law property 
interests.
28
 In 2014, the High Court cautioned against confining the understanding of 
                                                        
19  Western Australia v Brown [2014] HCA 8 (12 March 2014) [34]; Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 
CLR 209, [61] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) citing Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [468] 
(Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
20  Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96, [46] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne 
and Callinan JJ citing Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 58 (Brennan J)). 
21  Congoo on behalf of the Bar-Barrum People No 4 v Queensland (2014) 218 FCR 358, [35] (North and 
Jagot JJ). 
22  Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351, [109] (Gummow J). 
23  Western Australia v Brown [2014] HCA 8 (12 March 2014) [34]. 
24  ‘The nature and incidents of native title must be ascertained as a matter of fact by reference to those laws 
and customs’: Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 58 (Brennan J). 
25  Akiba v Queensland (No 3) (2010) 204 FCR 1, [527].  
26  Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2) [2013] FCA 868 (28 August 2013) [783]. 
27  Ibid [783]–[784]. 
28  ‘Because native title has its origin in traditional laws and customs, and is neither an institution of the 
common law nor a form of common law tenure, it is necessary to curb the tendency (perhaps inevitable 
and natural) to conduct an inquiry about the existence of native title rights and interests in the language of 
the common law property lawyer’: Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, [11] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).  
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rights and interests ‘to the common lawyer’s one-dimensional view of property as 
control over access’.
29
 
8.27 In Western Australia v Ward (‘Ward’), the majority of the High Court 
considered native title as a ‘bundle of rights’,
30
 finding the metaphor to be ‘useful’ for 
two reasons. They explained: 
It draws attention first to the fact that there may be more than one right or interest and 
secondly to the fact that there may be several kinds of rights and interests in relation 
to land that exist under traditional law and custom.31 
8.28 The majority expressed the view that identification of the rights and interests is 
necessary in order to determine extinguishment.
32
 While the issue of extinguishment is 
outside the Terms of Reference for this Inquiry, whether a native title right is 
extinguished or merely regulated is relevant to the scope—or content—of native title.
33
 
8.29 Some stakeholders are critical of the ‘bundle of rights’ doctrine: 
The bundle of rights concept of property derives in mainstream Anglo-American legal 
philosophy and one may well question what place it has in native title, particularly 
because native title is viewed by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people as being 
holistic in nature.34 
8.30 Some commentators regard such an approach to native title as one of 
‘definitional over-specificity’.
35
 Sean Brennan has argued that the High Court’s 
prioritisation of fact-specific laws and customs has negated a more holistic conception 
of native title.
36
 
8.31 Some submissions reflected on how conceiving of the ‘nature’ of native title as a 
bundle of rights could influence the ‘content’ and exercise of native title. For the 
former Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, conceiving 
of the nature of native title as a bundle of rights inhibits economic development.
37
 
North Queensland Land Council submitted that the bundle of rights doctrine ‘should 
not be permitted to exclude the inclusion of commercial native title rights and interests 
in the NTA’.
38
 
                                                        
29  Western Australia v Brown [2014] HCA 8 (12 March 2014) [36], citing Western Australia v Ward (2002) 
213 CLR 1, [95]. 
30  Ibid [76] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
31  Ibid [95]. 
32  Ibid [94], [468]. 
33  See, eg, Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209.  
34  See, eg, North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17. 
35  Paul Finn, ‘Mabo into the Future: Native Title Jurisprudence’ (2012) 8 Indigenous Law Bulletin 5, 8 (‘the 
fragmentation of native title rights and interests … results, in my view, in the overdefinition, and 
subdivision of, individual rights and interests and in the dilution of a proprietary conception of native 
title’); Simon Young, Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, 2008) 
297, 361–2.  
36  Sean Brennan, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Indigenous Property Rights’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 
239, 259. 
37  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. 
38  North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17. 
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The content of native title rights and interests 
8.32 A broader specification of native title rights is evident in Akiba. The High Court 
held in Akiba that native title rights and interests could comprise a ‘right to access 
resources and to take for any purpose resources’ in the native title claim area.
39
 The 
right could be exercised for commercial or non-commercial purposes.
40
 
8.33 In the High Court, French CJ and Crennan J held that the native title right should 
be conceived as a widely-framed right.
41
 They observed that ‘[t]he native title right so 
framed could be exercised in a variety of ways, including by taking fish for commercial 
or trading purposes’.
42
 The ‘sectioning of the native title right into lesser rights or 
“incidents” defined by the various purposes which it might be exercised’ was 
unnecessary as ‘[t]he lesser rights would be as numerous as the purposes that could be 
imagined’.
43
 
8.34 Similarly, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ observed that 
The relevant native title right that was found to exist was a right to access and to take 
resources from the identified waters for any purpose. It was wrong to single out taking 
those resources for sale or trade as an ‘incident’ of the right that had been identified. 
The purpose which the holder of that right may have had for exercising the right on a 
particular occasion was not an incident of the right; it was simply a circumstance 
attending its exercise.44 
8.35 Their Honours continued: 
Focusing upon the activity described as ‘taking fish and other aquatic life for sale or 
trade’, rather than focusing upon the relevant native title right, was apt to, and in this 
case did, lead to error.45 
8.36 In Western Australia v Brown the High Court stated that ‘[t]he nature and 
content of a right is not ascertained by reference to the way it has been, or will be, 
exercised’.
46
 
8.37 In the reasons for judgment in respect of the Pilki People’s and the Birriliburu 
People’s native title claims, the Federal Court remarked that 
it is not necessary as a matter of logic to prove that activity in conformity with 
traditional laws and customs has taken place in order to establish that a right exists. In 
many cases, proof of activities undertaken pursuant to laws or customs will assist in 
proving the existence of the right. But evidence of the activity is not necessary. Thus, 
if the applicants had not shown that they traditionally accessed and took resources for 
commercial purposes, they could still show that they had the right to do so if there 
were traditional laws or customs which gave them such a right. In the same way, the 
                                                        
39  Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209.  
40  Ibid, [21] (French CJ and Crennan J); [67] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (‘the relevant native title right that 
was found in this case was a right to take resources for any purpose’). 
41  Ibid [21]. 
42  Ibid [1].  
43  Ibid [21]. 
44  Ibid [66].  
45  Ibid [67]. 
46  Western Australia v Brown [2014] HCA 8 (12 March 2014) [33]. 
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holders of freehold do not need to show that they have leased out their properties to 
prove that they have the right to do so. If there is evidence of witnesses accepted by 
the Court that there are traditional laws and customs which give a right to access and 
take for any purpose the resources of the country, then the right is established even if 
there is no evidence of trading activity.47 
8.38 The determination that was made in Akiba specified the non-existence of native 
title rights and interests in minerals and petroleum resources.
48
 The High Court in 
Ward held that native title rights and interests do not include rights to statutory 
minerals and petroleum.
49
 The Minerals Council of Australia submitted that 
minerals ownership (and ownership of some other natural resources including some 
water rights) is vested in the Crown in Australia imposing limits on the extent to 
which commercial rights and interests are able to be recognised.50 
Confirming the nature and content of native title rights and 
interests 
Proposal 8–1 Section 223(2) of the Native Title Act should be repealed 
and substituted with a provision that provides:  
  Without limiting subsection (1) but to avoid doubt, native title rights and 
interests in that subsection: 
    (a)  comprise rights in relation to any purpose; and 
    (b)  may include, but are not limited to, hunting, gathering, fishing, 
commercial activities and trade. 
8.39 Given the importance of the evidential basis in establishing the content of native 
title rights and interests, the ALRC proposes that the express inclusion of a right for 
any purpose in s 223(2) will allow sufficient flexibility to cover a variety of factual 
circumstances and will retain emphasis on the content being derived from Aboriginal 
people and Torres Strait Islander law and custom. 
8.40 Since Akiba it is clear that a native title determination may include a ‘right to 
access resources and to take for any purposes resources in the native title areas’,
51
 if the 
evidence supports it, and that the ‘right so framed could be exercised in a variety of 
                                                        
47  Willis on behalf of the Pilki People v Western Australia [2014] FCA 714 (4 July 2014) [118]; BP 
(Deceased) on behalf of the Birriliburu People v Western Australia [2014] FCA 715 (4 July 2014) [89]. 
48  Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209, [14]. 
49  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [22] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).  
50  Minerals Council of Australia, Submission 8. Some submissions called for the position to be reviewed. 
See, eg, J Altman, Submission 27; V Marshall, Submission 11. Another called for the statute to be 
amended to include ‘a commercial right to take and use minerals wholly owned by the Crown’: North 
Queensland Land Council, Submission 17.  
51  Note that the right was non-exclusive and that minerals and petroleum resources were excluded from the 
scope. 
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ways, including by taking fish for commercial or trading purposes’.
52
 In Akiba, ‘[n]o 
distinct or separate native title right to take fish for sale or trade was found’.
53
 
8.41 The key question for this Inquiry is whether there should be statutory 
‘clarification’
54
 of that case law. The ALRC proposes a statutory confirmation of the 
current statement of the law
55
 in Akiba as a platform for the courts to assess the 
evidence in each instance to determine the content of the native title rights and 
interests. The proposed reform of s 223(2) reflects the current case law. 
Is statutory confirmation necessary? 
Reasons for confirmation 
8.42 The ALRC considers that statutory confirmation of the case law in Akiba is 
warranted because it: 
 would accord with the Preamble and Objects of the Native Title Act; 
 may assist in unlocking the economic potential of native title; and 
 may assist in ensuring that the practice of all parties is in accordance with the 
stated case law and in accordance with the Preamble of the Act. 
8.43 First, the ALRC considers that statutory confirmation would accord with the 
principles of statutory construction outlined in Chapter 5 in respect of s 223.
56
 Such a 
statutory confirmation accords with Principle 1—acknowledging the importance of the 
recognition of native title
57
—and with Principle 4—consistency with international 
law.
58
 
8.44 Secondly, the ALRC considers that statutory confirmation that native title is a 
right for any purpose and that such rights may include commercial activities, may 
assist in unlocking the economic potential of native title. This reason accords with 
                                                        
52  Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209, [1] (French CJ and Crennan J). 
53  Ibid [67] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). Rather, the purpose, which the holder of the claimed right may have 
had for exercising the right on a particular occasion, ‘was simply a circumstance attending its exercise’: 
Ibid [66]. 
54  The ALRC considers that it is more appropriate to speak of ‘confirmation’ rather than ‘clarification’ of 
the law, which is the word used in the Terms of Reference for this Inquiry. This is because the Terms of 
Reference were issued on 3 August 2013—four days before the High Court of Australia handed down its 
judgments in Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209. While it might have been said, on 3 August 
2013, that the law needed ‘clarification’, the High Court has ‘clarified’ the law so it is apt to speak of 
whether statutory ‘confirmation’ of that case law is required.  
55  The ALRC is mindful of the High Court’s decision that s 12 of the Native Title Act as enacted was 
invalid: Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373. Section 12 had stated ‘Subject to this 
Act the common law of Australia in respect of native title has, after 30 June 1993, the force of a law of 
the Commonwealth’. It is not intended that a revised s 223(2) would seek to operate in the way that s 12 
sought to operate—that is, by making the common law immune from a valid State law.  
56  See Ch 1 and ‘Approach to statutory construction of s 223’ in Ch 5. 
57  Principle 1 provides ‘Reform should acknowledge the importance of the recognition and protection of 
native title for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and the Australian community’. 
58  Principle 4 provides ‘Reform should reflect Australia’s international obligations in respect of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people, and have regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’. 
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Principle 5—supporting sustainable futures. There was stakeholder support for this 
rationale.
59
 Many stakeholders submitted that there was a need for native title to afford 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples—and Prescribed Bodies Corporate
60
—
economic development opportunities.
61
 AIATSIS submitted that including economic 
rights ‘will help unlock some of the potential for native title holders to freely pursue 
the aspirations they hold for their traditional lands and waters’.
62
 Similarly, others 
submitted that statutory confirmation ‘would help native title groups that have achieved 
native title determinations become more future-focused’.
63
 
8.45 Thirdly, the ALRC considers that statutory confirmation may assist in ensuring 
that the practice of all parties is in accordance with the stated case law and in 
accordance with the Preamble. Again, this reason reflects Principle 1.
64
 
8.46 The view that statutory confirmation may assist in ensuring that the practice of 
all parties is in accordance with the stated case law was supported by a number of 
stakeholders.
65
 Angus Frith and Maureen Tehan submitted: 
While the recent decisions in Akiba and Brown do support arguments that native title 
rights and interests should be sufficiently broadly conceived to encompass rights to 
use land and waters subject to native title for commercial purposes, they may not 
suffice to ensure that native title rights and interests recognised in the future do enable 
commercial activities. 
The High Court has stated that if rights exist they can be exercised in the manner that 
the native title group wants to exercise them subject to regulation or extinguishment. 
However, there is no necessary implication that native title rights and interests can be 
exercised in a commercial manner. This should be made explicit in the NTA.66 
8.47 Some native title representative bodies submitted that the state governments, 
with whom they had been negotiating, had been unwilling to accept that native title 
                                                        
59  AIATSIS, Submission 36; Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30; J Altman, Submission 27; Native 
Title Services Victoria, Submission 18; Cape York Land Council, Submission 7; Australian Human 
Rights Commission, Submission 1; National Native Title Council, Submission No 14 to Senate 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title 
Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, 2011.  
60  Cape York Land Council, Submission 7 (‘rights of a commercial nature are potentially one of the 
mechanisms that could be employed to advance the future economic development of these 
organisations’).  
61  AIATSIS, Submission 36; J Altman, Submission 27; Native Title Services Victoria, Submission 18; Just 
Us Lawyers, Submission 2; Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1; Yamatji Marlpa 
Aboriginal Corporation, Submission No 8 to Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, July 2011; Australians 
for Native Title and Reconciliation, Submission No 6 to Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, June 2011.  
62  AIATSIS, Submission 36. See also National Native Title Council, Submission No 14 to Senate 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title 
Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, 2011.  
63  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12.  
64  See Ch 1. 
65  Central Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26; A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; Cape York 
Land Council, Submission 7.  
66  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12 (footnotes omitted). 
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included rights and interests of a commercial nature.
67
 Cape York Land Council 
expressed the view that ‘[t]here is evidence that groups across Cape York were 
involved in trade and barter at the time of sovereignty’.
68
 However, because of the 
State of Queensland’s view of the native title jurisprudence, prior to the High Court’s 
decision in Akiba, commercial rights were unable to be recognised.
69
 It submitted: 
Although there is case law to suggest that the purpose for which a holder of a right 
may have for exercising that right is not an incident of the right, the practical reality is 
that without clarification, it is likely that the State will continue to require non-
commercial qualifications on non-exclusive native title rights and interests.70 
8.48 Central Desert Native Title Services submitted that a number of native title 
claims in which it had been involved had asserted native title rights to take and use 
resources.
71
 However, the State of Western Australia has ‘not been prepared to agree to 
such a right’, and ‘attempted to limit the right to take resources for “non-commercial” 
or “domestic purposes only”’. It referred to the native title claims of the Pilki People 
and the Birriliburu People. The Federal Court subsequently found that the 
determinations in these claims should include a ‘native title right to access and take for 
any purpose the resources of the determination area’.
72
 
8.49 Governments submitted that their practice in respect of resolving native title 
claims was commendable.
73
 The Western Australian Government submitted that its 
‘consistent record’ of recognising native title by consent contradicts the premise that 
the Act’s provisions do not deliver just outcomes for Indigenous Australians.
74
 The 
South Australian Government submitted that six of the claims that had been resolved 
by consent determination in that jurisdiction ‘involved comprehensive settlement 
agreements that address broader issues including compensation, sustainability of the 
Prescribed Body Corporate, and future act issues’.
75
 
                                                        
67  Central Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26; Cape York Land Council, Submission 7.  
68  Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. See also Cape York Land Council, Submission No 5 to Senate 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title 
Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, July 2011 (‘In our experience, there is ample evidence to support the 
existence of trade and other commercial rights as part of the traditional laws and customs of Cape York 
groups’). 
69  Cape York Land Council, Submission No 5 to Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, July 2011. See also 
Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
70  Cape York Land Council, Submission 7.  
71  Central Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26. This may have been an uncommon practice amongst 
native title representative bodies. See Cape York Land Council, Submission 7 (‘because of the 
development of case law and Queensland native title determination precedents limiting the exercise of 
rights to non-commercial uses, that evidence has not been routinely prepared and commercial rights have 
not been routinely pursued’). 
72  Willis on behalf of the Pilki People v Western Australia [2014] FCA 714 (4 July 2014) [135]; BP 
(Deceased) on behalf of the Birriliburu People v Western Australia [2014] FCA 715 (4 July 2014) [104].  
73  South Australian Government, Submission 34; Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; 
Queensland Government Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Submission 28; Western 
Australian Government, Submission 20. 
74  Western Australian Government, Submission 20. 
75  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
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Reasons against confirmation 
8.50 Some stakeholders were opposed to a statutory confirmation, considering that it: 
 is unnecessary; 
 will cause uncertainty;
76
 and 
 will open the floodgates. 
8.51 Some stakeholders opposed amendment of the Native Title Act, considering such 
statutory confirmation to be unnecessary given that case law, namely Akiba, already so 
provides.
77
 The Law Society of Western Australia was of the view that the decision in 
Akiba ‘provides a sufficient statement of the law to deal with the issue of the possibility 
of native title rights comprising commercial interests’.
78
 The Chamber of Minerals and 
Energy of Western Australia (CME) made a similar point, stating ‘[i]n light of this, it is 
unclear why amendments to the [Act] to expressly recognise commercial native title 
rights and interests are required’.
79
 Statutory confirmation was seen as unnecessary 
given that the recognition of commercial rights will depend on the evidence.
80
 
8.52 A few stakeholders, notably those with minerals and energy resource interests, 
were opposed to amendment of the statute because they considered that such an 
amendment would introduce uncertainty.
81
 The Association of Mining and Exploration 
Companies (AMEC) expressed concern that uncertainties could outweigh any benefits 
of the proposal.
82
 The CME expressed concern about unintended consequences.
83
 Both 
the CME and the Minerals Council of Australia submitted that there was a need for the 
impacts of any change to be clearly understood and quantified.
84
 
8.53 Some state governments raised a ‘floodgates’ argument—that is, a fear that 
groups may seek to re-open existing determinations.
85
 The South Australian 
Government submitted that, 
                                                        
76  By contrast, the Cape York Land Council, which was in favour of statutory confirmation of the law stated 
in Akiba, was of the view that ‘[r]egulatory regimes would still address matters such as sustainability, 
safety and protection of the environment’: Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
77  Queensland Government Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Submission 28; Chamber of 
Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, Submission 21; Western Australian Government, Submission 
20; Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9.  
78  Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9.  
79  Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, Submission 21.  
80  Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; Western Australian Fishing Industry Council, 
Submission 23; Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, Submission 21; Western 
Australian Government, Submission 20.  
81  Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, Submission 21; Association of Mining and 
Exploration Companies, Submission 19.  
82  Association of Mining and Exploration Companies, Submission 19.  
83  Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, Submission 21.  
84  Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, Submission 21; Minerals Council of Australia, 
Submission 8.  
85  South Australian Government, Submission 34. See also Western Australian Government, Submission No 
18 to Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native 
Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, August 2011. Note that neither submission used the term 
‘floodgates’. Section 13(4) of the Native Title Act currently provides for the variation or revocation of a 
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Were the NTA to be amended to make commercial rights easier to establish, this 
would change the basis on which native title has been approached for 20 years and 
would most probably result in a number of groups seeking to re-open existing 
determinations.86 
Supporting sustainable futures 
8.54 Some stakeholders submitted that more than statutory confirmation is needed to 
deliver real economic returns to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
87
 Some 
stakeholders outlined other things which they considered could be done to create real 
economic benefit, such as: amending all existing native title determinations ‘to specify 
that the recognised native title rights and interests can be exercised in a commercial 
manner’;
88
 amending the future act regime;
89
 and enacting a comprehensive broader 
land settlement framework.
90
 Both the future act regime and the possibility of the 
enactment of a land settlement framework are outside the scope of this Inquiry.
91
 
8.55 Further, a number of submissions advocated consistency with,
92
 or drew upon 
key rights
93
 which are provided in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.
94
 
ALRC conclusion 
8.56 The ALRC proposes that there be a statutory confirmation of the wording in the 
case law.
95
 The ALRC considers that a statutory confirmation would provide 
overarching principles for the determination of native title. Further, amending the 
provision to reflect current case law accords with the original purpose of the provision 
in that the statute will continue to provide examples of the type of rights and interests 
                                                                                                                                             
determination and s 13(5) outlines the two grounds. These are: ‘(a) that events have taken place since the 
determination was made that have caused the determination no longer to be correct; or (b) that the 
interests of justice require the variation or revocation of the determination’. 
86  South Australian Government, Submission 34. 
87  The National Farmers’ Federation opposed a statutory confirmation. National Farmers’ Federation, 
Submission 14 (‘Indigenous people require a proprietary interest in land to derive a real economic benefit. 
Native title does not and cannot deliver that outcome’). See also Northern Territory Government, 
Submission 31; Western Australian Government, Submission 20. By contrast, others expressed the view 
that while a statutory confirmation may be of some use, outcomes would still be constrained: Central 
Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26; National Native Title Council, Submission 16. 
88  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
89  Native Title Services Victoria, Submission 18; National Native Title Council, Submission 16.  
90  National Native Title Council, Submission 16. See Ch 3. 
91  See Ch 1 and Ch 2.  
92  National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, Submission 32; J Altman, Submission 27; V Marshall, 
Submission 11; Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 1. For example, the Australian 
Human Rights Commission referred to the relevant provision in UNDRIP that provides that ‘Indigenous 
peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional 
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions’: Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA 
Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st Sess, 107th Plen Mtg, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 
2007) art 31. The issue of the protection or exercise of cultural knowledge is addressed later in this 
chapter. 
93  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
94  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st Sess, 107th Plen Mtg, 
Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007).  
95  Western Australia v Brown [2014] HCA 8 (12 March 2014); Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 
209. 
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that might comprise native title. The ALRC is mindful that the content of the native 
title rights and interests would still need to be established on the facts in each case. 
Respondents may still challenge whether the evidence substantiates that the claimed 
native title right and interest can include a right to take resources for any purpose, such 
as for commercial activities. 
8.57 The ALRC’s approach in proposing statutory confirmation is in contrast to the 
ALRC’s approach to the consideration of ‘whether there should be … confirmation 
that “connection with the land and waters” does not require physical occupation or 
continued or recent use’.
96
 The ALRC considers that statutory confirmation of the case 
law in Akiba is warranted as this case law is evolving—with only a couple of Federal 
Court decisions in this regard
97
—compared with the case law pertaining to physical 
occupation.
98
 
Rights in relation to any purpose 
8.58 Paragraph (a) of the ALRC’s proposal provides statutory confirmation of the 
case law statement that native title rights and interests may comprise rights in relation 
to any purpose. This reflects the High Court’s stated view of the nature of the right. 
8.59 A number of stakeholders supported the broadly defined, purpose-based native 
title right—namely the right to take resources.
99
 Central Desert Native Title Services 
submitted that the Native Title Act 
must be taken to recognise the existence of broadly stated rights which may be 
exercised in particular ways or for particular purposes without listing every way in 
which, or every activity by which, a right may be exercised, for example, the right to 
take and use resources without specifying how that right is to be, or may be, 
exercised.100 
8.60 AMEC contrasted the characterisation of rights in relation to purpose, 
submitting: 
rights and interests ‘of a commercial nature’ defines a category of native title rights by 
reference to their purpose. This contrasts to the accepted conceptualisation of native 
title as a ‘bundle of rights’ which are primarily defined by their content rather than 
their purpose.101 
                                                        
96  See Ch 6. 
97  See, eg, Willis on behalf of the Pilki People v Western Australia [2014] FCA 714 (4 July 2014); BP 
(Deceased) on behalf of the Birriliburu People v Western Australia [2014] FCA 715 (4 July 2014). 
98  See Ch 6. 
99  See, eg, AIATSIS, Submission 36; J Altman, Submission 27; Central Desert Native Title Services, 
Submission 26; Native Title Services Victoria, Submission 18. See also Lisa Strelein, ‘The Right to 
Resources and the Right to Trade—Native Title: A Vehicle for Change and Empowerment?’ (Paper 
Presented at UNSW Symposium, 5–6 April 2013) 13 (‘it could be that the appropriate approach, building 
on the formulation of right by Finn J in Akiba, is to clarify that the enjoyment of native title rights are not 
limited by purpose’). 
100  Central Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26.  
101  Association of Mining and Exploration Companies, Submission 19. 
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8.61 The question of how Aboriginal rights should be designated has arisen for 
decision in jurisdictions such as Canada.
102
 
8.62 The ALRC considers that the Native Title Act should be amended to make clear 
that rights and interests comprise rights in relation to any purpose to avoid the potential 
confusion over the characterisation of native title rights. 
Indicative activities for which a right might be exercised 
8.63 Paragraph (b) of the ALRC’s proposal provides that native title rights and 
interests may include, but are not limited to, hunting, gathering, fishing, commercial 
activities and trade. That is, this aspect of the proposal provides an indicative listing of 
examples or types of native title rights and interests. 
8.64 Section 223(2) of the Native Title Act provides that native title rights and 
interests can include hunting, gathering, or fishing, rights and interests. The ALRC’s 
proposal would continue to provide expressly that native title may encompass such 
rights and interests. 
8.65 The ALRC considers that a revised s 223(2) should include reference to both 
commercial activities and trade. A number of stakeholders, including a large number of 
native title representative bodies, supported the amendment of the Native Title Act so 
that it expressly states that native title rights and interests can include rights and 
interests of a commercial nature.
103
 Further, a number of stakeholders supported the 
express inclusion of ‘trade’ as indicative of commercial activities under law and 
custom.
104
 
8.66 While ‘commercial’ is a term that is capable of various meanings, typically it 
has been linked to native title rights to take resources for trade or exchange.
105
 What is 
meant by ‘trade’? Some submissions referred to anthropological and historical 
                                                        
102  Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada [2011] 3 SCR 535. 
103  See, eg, AIATSIS, Submission 36; Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30; Native Title Services 
Victoria, Submission 18; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; National Native Title Council, 
Submission 16; A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; Cape York Land Council, Submission 7; Australian 
Human Rights Commission, Submission 1.  
104  See, eg, Native Title Services Victoria, Submission 18; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; 
National Native Title Council, Submission 16; A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; Cape York Land 
Council, Submission 7; National Native Title Council, Submission No 14 to Senate Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 
2011, 2011; Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation, Submission No 8 to Senate Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 
2011, July 2011; Kimberley Land Council, Submission No 2 to Senate Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, 
June 2011.  
105  See, eg, Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2014 cl 19; Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill (No 
1) 2012 cl 19. The proposed amendment for s 223(2) would provide that native title rights and interests 
include ‘the right to trade and other rights and interests of a commercial nature’.  
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evidence of trade in various parts of Australia,
106
 including international trade.
107
 
AIATSIS submitted: 
[Dale] Kerwin, amongst others, has detailed extensive trade, including in pituri, ochre, 
furs, stone, shells, songs and stories, and notes the significance of market places/trade 
centres as being central to large ceremonial gatherings. 
Daryl Wesley and Mirani Lister … argue that glass beads were received from 
Macassan traders in exchange for fishing rights in areas off the coast of Arnhem 
land.108 
8.67 For some stakeholders, such trade and exchange exhibited by Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples ‘aligns to [a] general commercial mindset’.
109
 In Cape 
York Land Council’s view, it is 
logical that if native title rights and interests were traditionally exercised in a manner 
which involved trade or barter, then rights and interests of a commercial nature should 
be afforded to native title claimants.110 
Adaptation and native title 
8.68 Native title rights are understood as being possessed under laws and customs 
with origins in the period prior to annexation.
111
 While there can be some degree of 
change and adaptation of the traditional laws and customs, there cannot be new native 
title rights and interests.
112
 The Full Court of the Federal Court in Bodney v Bennell 
stated that ‘[s]o long as the changed or adapted laws and customs continue to sustain 
the same rights and interests that existed at sovereignty, they will remain traditional’.
113
 
In Chapter 5, the ALRC proposes that there be explicit acknowledgment in the Native 
Title Act that traditional laws and customs, under which native title rights and interests 
are possessed, may adapt, evolve or otherwise develop.
114
 
8.69 Views vary as to what might be included in any definition of ‘commercial’ and 
what could have evolved and adapted. For the National Farmers’ Federation, the 
commercial exploitation of activities done in accordance with traditional laws and 
customs, such as hunting and gathering, is ‘one thing’, but they see the ‘expan[sion of] 
the range of activities to encompass broad commercial rights’ as quite another, and one 
                                                        
106  AIATSIS, Submission 36; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; Cape York Land Council, 
Submission 7; Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. See also Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation, 
Submission No 8 to Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, 
Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, July 2011.  
107  AIATSIS, Submission 36; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; Just Us Lawyers, Submission 
2. See also Kimberley Land Council, Submission No 2 to Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, June 2011.  
108  AIATSIS, Submission 36.  
109  North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17 (‘a general understanding of trade, exchange and 
commerce, should be sufficient to demonstrate that commercial native title rights and interests were being 
exercised’). 
110  Cape York Land Council, Submission 7.  
111  Perry and Lloyd, above n 10, 13. 
112  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [43] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
113  Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84, [74].  
114  See Proposal 5–1 in Ch 5. 
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that they do not support.
115
 By contrast, Native Title Services Victoria submitted that 
‘[w]hen linked to an “unfrozen” definition of traditional, rights that are commercial in 
nature would not then imply a time-bound and stagnated view of the value of the 
interest’.
116
 An example here is the use of Aboriginal practices of fire management in 
northern Australia which formed the basis for generating carbon credits for native title 
holders under the carbon farming legislation.
117
 
8.70 In other jurisdictions there have been debates about the evolution and adaptation 
of indigenous rights to land and waters.
118
 In New Zealand, there have been several 
claims to rights in waters with a commercial aspect
119
 and cases seeking to establish 
commercial activities around a ‘right to development’.
120
 In 2013, the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal affirmed the existence of an Aboriginal commercial fishing right.
121
 
Major agreements
122
 and settlements
123
 with indigenous peoples often include a 
component that allows for commercial utilisation of land and waters. 
8.71 Just Us Lawyers submitted: 
If it is still traditional to hunt with a rifle rather than a spear, then the same logic 
should apply to commercial native title rights and interests. The source of the right to 
trade is in the ancestral connection to the land from where the commodity is 
obtained.124 
8.72 Dr Lisa Strelein has argued that the decision in Akiba at first instance is 
‘important’, because 
Finn J held that once a determination had been made that law and custom supported 
the right to take resources, the use made of those resources was irrelevant … That is, 
where the laws of the society in question support a right to take for any purpose 
available at the time sovereignty was asserted, there is no barrier to the development 
of new modes of use and taking advantage of new opportunities and purposes that 
may arise.125 
                                                        
115  National Farmers’ Federation, Submission 14. 
116  Native Title Services Victoria, Submission 18. 
117  Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth). See also J Altman, Submission 27. 
118  See, eg, Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada [2011] 3 SCR 535.  
119  Jacinta Ruru, ‘Indigenous Restitution in Settling Water Claims: The Developing Cultural and 
Commercial Redress Opportunities in Aotearoa, New Zealand’ (2013) 22 Pacific Rim Law & Policy 
Journal 342.  
120  Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director General of Conservation [1995] 3 NZLR 553.  
121  Ashousaht Indian Band and Nation v Canada (A-G) [2013] BCCA 300. 
122  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st Sess, 107th Plen Mtg, 
Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007). 
123  One of the most well known settlements is the ‘Sealords deal’, where compensation under a Waitangi 
Tribunal settlement facilitated purchase of shares in a commercial fishery on behalf of New Zealand 
Maori. See, Shane Heremaia, ‘Native Title to Commercial Fisheries in Aotearoa/New Zealand’ (2000) 4 
Indigenous Law Bulletin 15.  
124  Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. They observed that a ‘reasonable’ balance will need to be struck. 
125  Lisa Strelein, ‘The Right to Resources and the Right to Trade—Native Title: A Vehicle for Change and 
Empowerment?’ (Paper Presented at UNSW Symposium, 5–6 April 2013) 9 (submitted as an attachment 
to AIATSIS, Submission 36). 
166 Review of the Native Title Act 1993 
 
8.73 Chapter 5 contains further detail about the courts’ approach to statutory 
construction of s 223. Notably where legislation is identified as being beneficial and 
remedial, the High Court has stated that such legislation should be given a ‘fair, large 
and liberal’ interpretation, rather than one which is ‘literal or technical’.
126
 
 ‘Commercial activities’ and ‘trade’ should not be defined in the Act 
Proposal 8–2 The terms ‘commercial activities’ and ‘trade’ should not be 
defined in the Native Title Act. 
8.74 The ALRC considers that the terms ‘commercial activities’ and ‘trade’ should 
not be defined in the Native Title Act as it is unnecessary to define prescriptively the 
scope of commercial activities and trade. Statutory definitions of ‘commercial 
activities’ and ‘trade’ may introduce inflexibility which may not be warranted, and may 
actually be unhelpful, given the fact dependent nature of native title claims. 
8.75 In the Issues Paper, the ALRC asked, in the event that the Native Title Act 
defines ‘native title rights and interests of a commercial nature’, what the definition 
should contain.
127
 Some stakeholders submitted that any definition should be broadly 
defined,
128
 while others submitted that prescription of what is meant by commercial 
activities and trade is unnecessary,
129
 impossible
130
 or possibly distracting.
131
 Native 
Title Services Victoria was of the view that prescription was unnecessary because 
rights that are commercial in nature ‘will necessarily flow from traditional law and 
custom’.
132
 The South Australian Government, a stakeholder that opposed statutory 
confirmation, also made this point. In its view, it would be futile to prescribe the rights: 
the definition of commercial ‘cannot be comprehensively codified, as each example of 
any ongoing traditional commerce will turn on its own facts’.
133
 
8.76 As outlined earlier, native title rights and interests ‘derive from’ the traditional 
laws and customs of the relevant Indigenous communities.
134
 The nature and content of 
native title is a question of fact that is based on the relevant law and custom. 
                                                        
126  IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1, 12 (Brennan CJ, McHugh J); 39 (Gummow J). See also AB v 
Western Australia (2011) 244 CLR 390, [24]. 
127  Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Native Title Act 1993, Issues Paper No 45 (2013) Q 
14. 
128  Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17.  
129  Native Title Services Victoria, Submission 18; V Marshall, Submission 11.  
130  South Australian Government, Submission 34.  
131  Western Australian Fishing Industry Council, Submission 23 (‘the real question is how rights and 
interests are managed not how they are defined’). 
132  Native Title Services Victoria, Submission 18.  
133  South Australian Government, Submission 34.  
134  Perry and Lloyd, above n 10, 3; Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [20] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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Protection or exercise of cultural knowledge? 
Question 8–1 Should the indicative listing in the revised s 223(2)(b), as 
set out in Proposal 8–1, include the protection or exercise of cultural 
knowledge? 
Question 8–2 Should the indicative listing in the revised s 223(2)(b), as 
set out in Proposal 8–1, include anything else? 
8.77 The interpretation of s 223(1) has excluded the protection or exercise of cultural 
knowledge as a native title right and interest that can be recognised by the common 
law. The ALRC is interested in views on whether this exclusion is appropriate given 
the enhanced understanding of the links between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
laws and customs as expressed through cultural knowledge and connection with land 
and waters. Section 211 includes a savings provision for cultural or spiritual activities. 
Should the indicative listing in any revised s 223(2) include the protection or exercise 
of cultural knowledge? A reversal of the current interpretation may influence the 
content of commercial rights and interests. 
8.78 The term ‘cultural knowledge’ may encompass a number of different things. In 
Ward, the majority of the High Court, in joint reasons, complained of the ‘imprecision’ 
of the term.
135
 In that appeal, the submissions referred to ‘such matters as the 
inappropriate viewing, hearing or reproduction of secret ceremonies, artworks, song 
cycles and sacred narratives’.
136
 
8.79 A submission to this Inquiry used the term ‘traditional knowledge’ rather than 
‘cultural knowledge’.
137
 The concept of ‘traditional knowledge’ is ‘contested and there 
is ongoing debate about the merits of various definitions of the subject matter’.
138
 
8.80 In Ward, the majority of the High Court held that the Native Title Act cannot 
protect ‘a right to maintain, protect and prevent the misuse of cultural knowledge’ if it 
goes beyond denial or control of access to land or waters.
139
 The opening words of 
s 223(1) of the Native Title Act require native title rights and interests to be ‘in relation 
to’ land or waters.
140
 Section 223(1)(b) requires the Aboriginal people or Torres Strait 
                                                        
135  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [58] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See 
also Kirby J at [576] (‘The right to protect cultural knowledge was not well defined in submissions before 
this Court’; ‘I agree with the joint reasons that there is a need for a degree of specificity in determining 
such claims’). 
136  Ibid [58]. 
137  North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17. 
138  Christopher Antons, Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural Expressions and Intellectual Property 
Law in the Asia-Pacific Region (Kluwer, 2009) 1. 
139  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [468] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
140  Ibid [577] (Kirby J, viewing the key issue as pertaining to the opening words of s 223(1)); Western 
Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, [666] (Beaumont and von Doussa JJ, using the language of ‘in 
relation to’). North J did not specify a particular part of s 223(1) as the object of his focus. 
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Islanders, by their traditional laws acknowledged and their traditional customs 
observed, to have a ‘connection with’ the land or waters.
141
 
8.81 The majority of the High Court, stated in a joint judgment: 
To some degree, for example respecting access to sites where artworks on rock are 
located, or ceremonies are performed, the traditional laws and customs which are 
manifested at these sites answer the requirement of connection with the land 
… 
However, it is apparent that what is asserted goes beyond that to something 
approaching an incorporeal right akin to a new species of intellectual property to be 
recognised by the common law under par (c) of s 223(1). The ‘recognition’ of this 
right would extend beyond denial or control of access to land held under native title. It 
would, so it appears, involve, for example, the restraint of visual or auditory 
reproductions of what was to be found there or took place there, or elsewhere.142 
8.82 Native title rights and interests in respect of cultural knowledge—variously 
described
143
—had been claimed in some early cases. In Bulun Bulun v R & T Textiles 
Pty Ltd, von Doussa J remarked that the pleadings ‘appear to assert that intellectual 
property rights of the kind claimed by the applicants were an incident of native title in 
the land’,
144
 ‘such that they constituted some recognisable interest in the land itself’.
145
 
However, that was not a case for the determination of native title
146
 and the claim with 
respect to native title was not pressed.
147
 
8.83 In Commonwealth v Yarmirr, the majority of the High Court observed that, in 
the course of argument before them, there had been no discussion about what was 
meant by the rights and interests ‘to visit and protect places within the claimed area 
which are of cultural or spiritual importance’ that had been included in the 
determination ‘or how effect might be given to a right of access to “protect” places or 
“safeguard” knowledge’. They said nothing more about the issues.
148
 
                                                        
141  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [19], [60] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ, 
viewing the key issue as pertaining to s 223(1)(b)). 
142  Ibid [59] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). Olney J made a similar point in Yarmirr v 
Northern Territory [No 2] (1998) 82 FCR 533, 590 (‘[T]he right and duty according to traditional law 
and custom to safeguard [cultural] knowledge can only be classed as a “right or interest in relation to land 
or waters” to the extent that the exercise of the right and duty involves the physical presence of relevant 
persons on or at the estate or site in question. If … the need to safeguard the cultural knowledge 
associated with a site in the claimed area requires, for example, a senior yuwurrumu member to visit the 
site with those who it is his obligation to teach the culture, then the safeguarding of the cultural 
knowledge could fairly be said to be a right in relation to the site, and thus in relation to land or waters’). 
143  For example, von Doussa J used the language of ‘traditional ritual knowledge’ or ‘ritual knowledge’ 
rather than ‘cultural knowledge’ in his judgment in Bulun Bulun v R & T Textiles Pty Ltd (1998) 86 FCR 
244.  
144  Ibid 254.  
145  Ibid 256.  
146  Ibid 255–6. 
147  Ibid 256. 
148  Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, [2] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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8.84 The ALRC is aware that ‘[f]or Indigenous people there are unbreakable links 
between their knowledge systems, the land and waters, and its resources’.
149
 Further, 
for such communities, ‘spiritual or religious obligations could infiltrate almost all 
undertakings, including transactions, transfers, exchanges and activities undertaken for 
value or benefit’.
150
 Frith and Tehan quoted WEH Stanner, who, in 1968, said, ‘[n]o 
English words are good enough to give a sense of the links between an Aboriginal 
group and its homeland’.
151
 
8.85 In both the Full Court of the Federal Court and the High Court, the majority 
acknowledged that ‘the relationship of Aboriginal people to their land has a religious or 
spiritual dimension’.
152
 In their joint reasons, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ remarked: 
It is a relationship which sometimes is spoken of as having to care for, and being able 
to ‘speak for’, country. ‘Speaking for’ country is bound up with the idea that, at least 
in some circumstances, others should ask for permission to enter upon country or use 
it or enjoy its resources … The difficulty of expressing a relationship between a 
community or group of Aboriginal people and the land in terms of rights and interests 
is evident. Yet that is required by the NTA. The spiritual or religious is translated into 
the legal. This requires the fragmentation of an integrated view of the ordering of 
affairs into rights and interests which are considered apart from the duties and 
obligations which go with them.153 
8.86 Different views were expressed about the appropriate statutory construction of 
s 223(1) in respect of cultural knowledge in strong dissenting judgments in both the 
High Court
154
 and in the Full Federal Court.
155
 In the Full Federal Court, North J 
discussed an extract from the evidence—an anthropologist’s report—that showed that 
the respective knowledge was ‘intimately linked with the land’,
156
 and how ‘the secular 
and spiritual aspects of the aboriginal connection with the land are twin elements of the 
right to the land’:
157
 
The protection of ritual knowledge is required by traditional law. Traditional law 
treats both elements as incidents of native title. There is no reason why the common 
law recognition of native title should attach to one incident and not the other. Because 
common law recognition is accorded to the entitlement to land as defined by 
traditional laws and customs the contrary conclusion should follow.158 
8.87 Kirby J, in dissent in the High Court in Ward, focused on the ‘very broad’ 
phrase ‘in relation to’ in the opening words of s 223(1).
159
 He was of the view that 
                                                        
149  Chuulangun Aboriginal Corporation, Submission No 28 to Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, June 2011. 
150  Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30. 
151  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
152  Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, [666]. See also Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 
1, [14]. 
153  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [14]. 
154  Ibid (Kirby J). 
155  Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, (North J). 
156  Ibid [865]. 
157  Ibid [866]. 
158  Ibid. 
159  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [577]–[578]. 
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what is required ‘is a real relationship, or connection, between the interest claimed and 
the relevant land or waters’ and he saw the right to protect cultural knowledge as 
sufficiently connected to the area to be a right ‘in relation to’ the land or waters for the 
purpose of s 223(1).
160
 Kirby J concluded: 
Recognition of the native title right to protect cultural knowledge is consistent with 
the aims and objectives of the NTA, reflects the beneficial construction to be utilised 
in relation to such legislation and is consistent with international norms declared in 
treaties to which Australia is a party. It recognises the inherent spirituality and land-
relatedness of Aboriginal culture.161 
8.88 The ALRC did not expressly consult on cultural knowledge. Few submissions 
raised the express inclusion in the Native Title Act of the protection or exercise of 
cultural knowledge—or something like it.
162
 However, the ALRC considers that it is 
within the scope of the ALRC’s Inquiry to seek views on the express inclusion of the 
protection or exercise of cultural knowledge in the Native Title Act as part of 
examining the ‘connection requirements relating to the recognition and scope of native 
title rights and interests’. Further, the issue may be relevant in conceiving of 
commercial activities. The Kimberley Land Council submitted that ‘commercial 
activity should not be unduly limited by its current operation or understanding in 
modern secular societies’ but rather should encompass ‘an activity that may have a 
spiritual or religious component or derivation’.
163
 
8.89 The ALRC invites responses as to whether the indicative listing of native title 
rights and interests in s 223(2) should be amended to include the protection or exercise 
of cultural knowledge. The ALRC is also interested in what stakeholders understand is 
meant by the phrase ‘cultural knowledge’ and on views as to whether a definition is 
needed and what such a definition should contain. Some submissions to this Inquiry 
used different descriptions.
164
 With respect to Indigenous intellectual property, one 
stakeholder submitted to a Senate Inquiry that: 
Currently the native title system is not clear about the rights of Indigenous people to 
control valuable biological resources on their land and waters, rights that do exist 
under customary intellectual property systems (for example, the rights that people 
have over plants with which they have a totemic relationship).165 
8.90 The ALRC is also aware that some stakeholders may consider that the Native 
Title Act is not the appropriate statute for recognition of Indigenous customary 
intellectual property norms.
166
 
                                                        
160  Ibid [577], [580]. 
161  Ibid [587]. 
162  Law Council of Australia, Submission 35; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17.  
163  Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30. 
164  Law Council of Australia, Submission 35 (‘intellectual property rights’); North Queensland Land Council, 
Submission 17 (‘traditional knowledge’). 
165  Chuulangun Aboriginal Corporation, Submission No 28 to Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011, June 2011. 
166  Ibid. However, the Law Council of Australia took the opposite view, calling for the Act to be amended in 
order for ‘intellectual property rights’ to be recognised as native title rights: Law Council of Australia, 
Submission 35. 
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Anything else to be included in the indicative listing? 
8.91 The ALRC is aware that claims for other rights are evolving. For example, in 
Akiba, in respect of the claim for reciprocal rights, the High Court held that, 
‘intramural reciprocal relationships between members of different island communities 
giv[ing] rise to obligations relating to access to and use of resources’
167
 are not rights 
and interests ‘in relation to’ land or waters within the meaning of s 223 of the Native 
Title Act.
168
 Rather, on the basis of the evidence in that case, they were correctly 
characterised as ‘rights of a personal character dependent upon status’.
169
 
8.92 The ALRC is interested in views about whether any other purposes or activities 
should be included in the proposed indicative listing in revised s 223(2)(b). 
                                                        
167  Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209, [6]. 
168  Ibid [6], [45] (French CJ and Crennan J); [47] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
169  Ibid [45] (French CJ and Crennan J). Some submissions called for the Native Title Act to be amended so 
that reciprocal rights may be recognised as native title rights and interests. See, eg, Law Council of 
Australia, Submission 35; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17. 
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Summary 
9.1 This chapter considers ways in which certain procedural aspects of the native 
title process might be reformed. In particular, this chapter considers: 
 issues relating to the production of evidence in native title proceedings and for 
consent determinations; 
 the development of policies relating to the involvement of the Commonwealth in 
consent determinations; 
 the development of principles guiding assessment of connection reports; 
 the potential for a training and accreditation scheme for native title practitioners; 
and 
 the native title application inquiry process. 
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Evidentiary issues 
9.2 In a native title proceeding, claimants must provide evidence to establish the 
existence of native title as defined in s 223 of the Native Title Act.
1
 As discussed in 
Chapter 4, this will involve claimants bringing evidence to demonstrate that they 
possess communal, group or individual rights and interests in relation to land or waters 
under traditional laws acknowledged and customs observed by them, and that, by those 
laws and customs they have a connection with the land or waters claimed. Chapters 5, 
7 and 8 make proposals for reform of the definition of native title.   
9.3  This section considers the kind of evidence that may be brought to establish the 
existence of native title rights and interests in litigated and consent determinations. In 
particular, it considers the role of expert evidence in native title proceedings.  
9.4 The Federal Court assesses this evidence and makes a determination as to 
whether the legal requirements are satisfied or, in the case of a consent determination, 
makes a determination giving effect to the agreement between the parties. A 
determination provides the basis for recognising Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 
law, and the relationship between native title and other rights and interests, under 
Australian law. 
Expert evidence 
Question 9–1 Are current procedures for ascertaining expert evidence in 
native title proceedings and for connection reports, appropriate and effective? If 
not, what improvements might be suggested? 
9.5 Evidence to establish native title under s 223 draws on a wide range of expert 
evidence, including evidence provided by historians, archaeologists, botanists, 
palaeontologists, cartographers, and anthropologists: 
The historical reality of an indigenous society in occupation of land at the time of 
colonisation is the starting point for present day claims for recognition of native title 
rights and interests. The determination of its composition, the rules by which that 
composition is defined, the content of its traditional laws and customs in relation to 
rights and interest in land and waters, the continuity and existence of that society and 
those laws and customs since colonisation, are all matters which can be the subject of 
evidence in native title proceedings. Such evidence can be given, most importantly, by 
members of the society themselves and also by historians, archaeologists, linguists 
and anthropologists.2 
9.6 This expert evidence may have significant value to the Court.
3
 Vance Hughston 
SC and Tina Jowett have observed that expert evidence is often of particular 
                                                        
1  Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, [114]–[117] (Beaumont and von Doussa JJ); Daniel v 
Western Australia [2003] FCA 666 (3 July 2003) [146]; Harrington-Smith on behalf of the 
Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 9) (2007) 238 ALR 1, [339]. 
2  Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 (10 June 2005) [951]. 
3  Willis on behalf of the Pilki People v Western Australia [2014] FCA 714 (4 July 2014) [116] (North J). 
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importance where the collective memory of a claim group does not extend prior to the 
assertion of sovereignty. Therefore 
the expert evidence of anthropologists will most frequently be relied upon to 
overcome the inherent forensic difficulties in proving the content of pre-sovereignty 
laws and customs and the continuous acknowledgment and observance of those laws 
and customs down to the present day.4 
9.7 However, Hughston and Jowett identify several concerns with the processes 
surrounding the use of expert evidence: 
 concerns have at times been expressed that expert evidence is partisan or biased, 
possibly because experts are briefed by only one party and may have a long-
standing association with a particular claim group;
5
 
 there have been instances of experts giving evidence about matters extending 
beyond their professional expertise;
6
 
 expert evidence and anthropological reports may be highly technical and 
difficult to understand; 
 significant time may be required to take each expert through their evidence, 
particularly in an adversarial setting; and 
 the adversarial context may not provide the best way for an expert to assist the 
court, nor for the court to properly assess experts’ competing opinions.
7
 
9.8 Expert conferences (in which experts meet to discuss and prepare a report 
stating their areas of agreement and disagreement) and concurrent expert evidence (in 
which experts present and respond to questions about their evidence together) may be 
beneficial in avoiding some of these concerns. Expert conferences and concurrent 
evidence may be particularly useful in cases where there is disagreement about, for 
example, claim group composition or the laws and customs of the group. 
9.9 The Federal Court noted that it has, in particular claims, facilitated case 
management conferences 
at which the experts for the Applicant and State confer to identify the issues likely to 
be most contentious prior to the commencement of anthropological field work. The 
aim of these conferences is for the parties’ experts to discuss their knowledge of the 
relevant anthropological literature and related or neighbouring claims so that scarce 
research resources may be appropriately focused on areas of particular interest to the 
State, minimising the need for follow up research and reports.8 
                                                        
4  Vance Hughston and Tina Jowett, ‘In the Native Title “Hot Tub”: Expert Conferences and Concurrent 
Expert Evidence in Native Title’ (2014) 6 Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title 1. 
5  Hughston and Jowett refer to Jango v Northern Territory (2006) 152 FCR 150, [315]–[338]. 
6  Hughston and Jowett refer to Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia 
(No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424, [41]; Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western 
Australia (No 9) (2007) 238 ALR 1, [459]–[468]. 
7  Hughston and Jowett, above n 4, 1–2. 
8  Federal Court of Australia, Submission 40. 
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9.10 The Federal Court also noted that it has 
made orders that the experts confer under the supervision of a Registrar of the Court 
to identify those matters and issues about which their opinions are in agreement and 
those where they differ. These conferences have usually taken place in the absence of 
the parties’ lawyers and have been remarkably successful in narrowing connection 
issues, often resulting in agreement between the experts on all matters.9 
9.11 The Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provide the Federal Court with the power 
to make a range of directions relating to expert evidence,
10
 including, for example, that 
the experts: 
 confer, either before or after writing their expert reports;
11
 
 produce to the Court a document identifying where their opinions agree or 
differ;
12
 
 provide their evidence one after another;
13
 
 be sworn at the same time and that the cross-examination and re-examination be 
conducted by putting to each expert in turn each question relevant to one subject 
or issue at a time, until the cross-examination or re-examination is completed;
14
 
or 
 be cross-examined and re-examined in any particular manner or sequence.
15
 
9.12 As noted in Chapter 3, there is a lack of experts and anthropologists with 
expertise in native title matters. This was also noted by several stakeholders.
16
  
9.13 The ALRC seeks stakeholder views on whether the use of expert conferences 
and concurrent expert evidence are beneficial in native title proceedings, and, if so, 
whether any reforms to the law or legal frameworks are needed. The ALRC is also 
interested in other procedures that may lead to more effective use of expert evidence. 
Archiving evidence 
Question 9–2 What procedures, if any, are required to deal appropriately 
with the archival material being generated through the native title connection 
process? 
                                                        
9  Ibid. 
10  Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 5.04(3). 
11  Ibid r 23.15(a). 
12  Ibid r 23.15(b). 
13  Ibid r 23.15(f). 
14  Ibid r 23.15(g). 
15  Ibid r 23.15(i). 
16  Federal Court of Australia, Submission 40; Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9; Cape York 
Land Council, Submission 7. 
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9.14 The evidence used in native title proceedings provides information about the 
laws, customs, histories and cultures of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders peoples. 
The evidence may therefore hold significant value to persons outside proceedings, 
whether for the public, as contributing to a stronger understanding of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islanders peoples and their history. 
9.15 However, this information is generally not available to persons outside 
proceedings. As noted by Dr Paul Burke, this information ‘remains inaccessible … 
because it has been initiated within the legal context of native title and remains 
confidential’.
17
 Just Us Lawyers noted the value of archival information, and suggested 
that ‘archival information should be digitised, indexed and made searchable and 
available to claimants’ legal representatives’.
18
 
9.16 The ALRC seeks stakeholder comments on whether and, if so, how the material 
generated through the native title connection process should be dealt with, given that 
some of the information will, for example, be culturally sensitive or refer to person and 
family matters. For example, a publicly accessible database of key archival material 
may be of value, subject to appropriate consideration of cultural sensitivity and 
privacy. 
Consent determinations 
9.17 Once a native title application has been made and the parties determined, the 
Federal Court refers the application to mediation between the parties.
19
 The purpose of 
mediation is to assist the parties to reach agreement on matters including whether 
native title exists in the area claimed, who holds the native title, and the nature and 
extent of the native title rights and interests and of any other interests in the area.
20
 
9.18 Where mediation results in an agreement between the parties, the Court may 
make a determination consistent with, or giving effect to, the terms of that agreement 
(a ‘consent determination’).
21
 
9.19 The diversity of sources of evidence reveals the complexity and difficulties in 
proving the elements of native title. Preparation for the hearing of an application for a 
determination of native title requires extensive collection of factual material including 
affidavit evidence by native title claimants. For consent determinations, claims 
typically require ‘connection reports’ as part of developing ‘agreed facts’ between the 
parties. The amount of documentary material accompanying a claimant application 
varies from claim to claim. Whether the matter is ultimately resolved by a consent 
determination or litigation, there will typically be voluminous documentation provided 
to the Court and parties as the Court’s management of the case proceeds. 
                                                        
17  P Burke, Submission 33. 
18  Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. See also AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
19  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 86B. However, the Court must order that there be no mediation if it 
considers that it would be unnecessary; that there is no likelihood that the parties will reach agreement; or 
the applicant has not provided sufficient detail about certain matters: Ibid s 86B(3).  
20  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 86A. 
21  Ibid ss 87, 87A. 
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9.20 For example, Cape York Land Council submitted it is 
confident that most Cape York claim groups are able to meet current connection and 
authorisation requirements, but the time and expense required to do so means that the 
claim process continues to be lengthy and that means that other groups have to wait 
for long periods for their areas to be progressed.22 
Concurrence 
Question 9–3 What processes, if any, should be introduced to encourage 
concurrence in the sequence between the bringing of evidence to establish 
connection and tenure searches conducted by governments? 
9.21 Native title proceedings require the applicant to provide detailed factual 
evidence relating to connection and claim group membership. Compiling such 
evidence typically will require significant resources and the extensive use of experts, 
such as anthropologists. The amount of factual material required, as well as the 
sequence in which it is provided, may lead to inefficiencies in native title proceedings. 
For example, a complete connection report may be required before a state or territory 
respondent prepares a tenure analysis.
23
 The preparation of a connection report or a 
tenure analysis may be a laborious, time-consuming and costly process.
24
 Some costs 
might be reduced if, for example, a tenure analysis was made available at an early 
stage.
25
 
Best practice principles 
Question 9–4 Should the Australian Government develop a connection 
policy setting out the Commonwealth’s responsibilities and interests in relation 
to consent determinations? 
Question 9–5 Should the Australian Government, in consultation with 
state and territory governments and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
representative bodies, develop nationally-consistent, best practice principles to 
guide the assessment of connection in respect of consent determinations?  
9.22 A clear and transparent Commonwealth policy position on its responsibilities 
and interests with respect to connection as a party to consent determinations may assist 
in the resolution of claims. 
                                                        
22  Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
23  See Ch 3. 
24  South Australian Government, Submission 34; Western Australian Government, Submission 20; 
Department of Justice, Victoria, Submission 15. 
25  Graeme Neate, ‘Resolving Native Title Issues: Travelling on Train Tracks or Roaming the Range?’ 
(Paper Presented at Native Title and Cultural Heritage Conference, Brisbane, 26 October 2009). 
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9.23 Practically, such a document may guide the Commonwealth’s involvement in 
developing the ‘agreed statement of facts’ for consent determinations pursuant to ss 87 
and 87A of the Native Title Act.  
9.24 A Commonwealth policy should be consistent with the object of the Act to 
recognise and protect native title and reflect international best practice.
26
 
9.25 For a consent determination, variations exist from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in 
terms of what evidence the state or territory requires in order to pursue a consent 
determination. North Queensland Land Council noted that 
some States and Territories have not published connection guidelines and the 
observation is made that it may be difficult to determine the exact requirements of 
their connection policy. Some States do not require connection reports as such. There 
is no requirement in the [Act] to develop connection guidelines.27  
9.26 In recent years, there has been a departure from the large-scale documentation 
provided to support a consent determination, which typically may be similar in extent 
to that filed in litigation.
28
 A number of submissions to the Inquiry highlighted the 
conciliatory nature of parties’ relationships in negotiating native title matters. For 
example, South Australian Native Title Services stated that ‘we have established 
positive relationships with successive State Governments and other respondent parties 
to resolve native title through negotiation and consent’.
29
 The Northern Territory 
Government submission detailed the cooperative approach taken to developing 
processes to streamline the resolution of pastoral estate claims.
30
  
9.27 However, concerns have been raised that the ‘current method of assessing 
connection has simply relocated an adversarial evidentiary process from the Federal 
Court to State and Territory Governments’.
31
 Justice Barker, writing extra-curially, has 
commented that there is a danger that assessment of connection by state and territory 
respondents can ‘tend to become ritualistic, formulaic, cumbersome and 
bureaucratic’.
32
  
                                                        
26  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st Sess, 107th Plen Mtg, 
Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007). See also Principle 4: Consistency with 
international law in Ch 1. 
27  North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17. 
28  For example, in the Northern Territory: Northern Territory Government, Submission 31. 
29  South Australian Native Title Services, Submission 10. 
30  Northern Territory Government, Submission 31. 
31  Rita Farrell, John Catlin and Toni Bauman, ‘Getting Outcomes Sooner: Report on a Native Title 
Connection Workshop’ (National Native Title Tribunal and AIATSIS, 2007) 8. For an alternative 
perspective, see Stephen Wright, ‘The Legal Framework for Connection Reports’ (Paper Presented at 
National Native Title Conference, Coffs Harbour, 1–3 June 2005). 
32  Justice Michael Barker, ‘Innovation and Management of Native Title Claims: What Have the Last 20 
Years Taught Us?’ (Paper Presented at National Native Title Conference, Alice Springs, 3–5 June 2013) 
2013 [17]. 
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9.28 Connection guidelines shape assumptions about appropriate evidence and 
standards. Queensland South Native Title Services highlighted the perceived problem 
for the applicant: 
It has to be said our clients go to considerable lengths, and a lot of resources are 
expended on their behalf, to prepare connection material evidencing their native title 
for delivery to the State … The problem as it appears to us is that a client’s connection 
material has been prepared on the basis, amongst other things, of meeting Connection 
Guidelines prepared and required by the State for the purposes of reaching a 
negotiated agreement on native title. That in and of itself is problematic as it raises 
questions about the extent to which the connection material is implicitly shaped by 
assumptions within the Connection Guidelines about appropriate evidence and what 
standard of connection will be acceptable as indicative of connections between the 
claim group and the land.33 
9.29 However, the Queensland Government does not support a ‘substantive revision 
of the connection requirements’ given ‘the high rate of resolution of native title claims 
in Queensland over the last five years notwithstanding the existing connection 
requirements’.
34
 
9.30 Queensland South Native Title Services identified a lack of transparency as a 
concern: 
The State’s assessment of the test requirements is not a transparent process with an 
option of being contested, for example, their standard for what is an acceptable or 
requisite level of acknowledgement of traditional laws and observance of traditional 
customs has never been clearly articulated ... in the absence of clarity and the 
possibility of failing to reach agreement on the issues, matters will have to resort to 
formal litigation.35  
9.31 The Northern Territory Government submitted that legislative change is not 
necessary because significant reform has been achieved through ‘principles of 
negotiation agreed between the Territory, the native title party through the 
representative bodies, and stakeholders.’
36
   
9.32 Nationally consistent principles may not be appropriate given the specific state 
and territory interests, and the diverse nature and content of native title around 
Australia. However, it may be useful to develop or collate existing best practice 
principles which may be advanced in all jurisdictions with respect to consent 
determinations.  
9.33 For example, the Australian Government may choose to include relevant best 
practice principles for native title consent determinations in the Legal Services 
                                                        
33  Queensland South Native Title Services, Submission 24. 
34  Queensland Government Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Submission 28. 
35  Queensland South Native Title Services, Submission 24. 
36  Northern Territory Government, Submission 31. 
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Directions 2005 (Cth). Schedule 1 of the Legal Services Directions 2005 (Cth) contains 
the Commonwealth’s obligation to act as a model litigant.
37
  
9.34 There are Guidelines for Best Practice which were developed by the Joint 
Working Group on Indigenous Land Settlements for Flexible and Sustainable 
Agreement Making which may serve as a platform for reform.
38
 These Guidelines were 
designed to provide practical guidance for government parties to achieve ‘flexible, 
broad and efficient resolutions of native title’, particularly with respect to broader land 
settlements.
39
 The Guidelines emphasise early negotiation, cultural awareness and 
sensitivity and adherence to model litigant principles including good faith negotiations 
such as not relying on technical defences unless it would result in prejudice, not taking 
advantage of a claimant who lacks resources and demonstrating leadership to influence 
the behaviour of other parties.
40
 
9.35 The ALRC invites comment on these questions relating to the promotion of 
consent determinations. 
Certification and training of the legal profession  
Question 9–6 Should a system for the training and certification of legal 
professionals who act in native title matters be developed, in consultation with 
relevant organisations such as the Law Council of Australia and Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander representative bodies? 
9.36 A training and certification scheme for practitioners working in native title may 
have several benefits. Deloitte Access Economics noted that accreditation was one of a 
number of options for improving the level of service provided: 
A stronger form of regulation would be to operate a registration system for which 
native title practitioners require accreditation. Accreditation could be based on a 
simple test of competencies or qualifications in areas of law or relevant experience. 
Again, the registration could be voluntary, providing additional information to the 
market, or mandatory.41 
                                                        
37  Legal Services Directions 2005 (Cth) sch 1, app B. Model Litigant Rules include (a) dealing with claims 
promptly and not causing unnecessary delay in the handling of claims and litigation; (aa) making an early 
assessment of: (i) the Commonwealth’s prospects of success in legal proceedings that may be brought 
against the Commonwealth …; (d) endeavouring to avoid, prevent and limit the scope of legal 
proceedings wherever possible, including by giving consideration in all cases to alternative dispute 
resolution before initiating legal proceedings and by participating in alternative dispute resolution 
processes where appropriate. 
38 Joint Working Group on Indigenous Land Settlements, Guidelines for Best Practice: Flexible and 
Sustainable Agreement Making, August 2009. 
39 Ibid 4. 
40  Ibid 12. 
41  Deloitte Access Economics, ‘Review of the Roles and Functions of Native Title Organisations’ 
(Australian Government, March 2014) 39. 
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9.37 Certification may help to ensure that practitioners meet certain standards or 
requirements. This may reduce a problem, noted by AIATSIS, of applicants accessing 
legal representatives 
who carry none of the additional obligations that currently vest in officers of the 
NTRBs/NTSPs. These obligations exist in order to assist, consult with and have 
regard to the interests of RNTBCs, native title holders and persons who may hold 
native title and they also extend to requiring the NTRB to identify persons who may 
hold native title.42 
9.38 David Ritter and Merrilee Garnett have also suggested that there are ‘strong 
arguments for the development of an accreditation system for native title lawyers. At 
the very least we consider that there should be a specific code of ethics for native title 
lawyers’.
43
 
9.39 The ALRC is seeking comments on the possible costs or benefits of a legal 
training and certification scheme for native title practitioners, as well as the form that 
such a scheme might take.  
Native title application inquiries 
9.40 In this section, the ALRC poses several questions regarding the power to 
conduct a native title application inquiry under the Native Title Act. Under ss 138A–
138G of the Native Title Act the Court may direct the National Native Title Tribunal 
(the Tribunal) to hold an inquiry into matters or issues relevant to a determination of 
native title. The outcomes of the inquiry are non-binding, but may provide guidance to 
the parties or the Court. 
9.41 The inquiry process may be beneficial in native title proceedings. However, the 
process appears to have been rarely used. The questions in this chapter seek 
stakeholder views on possible reforms to ss 138A–138G that may increase the use of 
inquiries. 
Overview of the inquiry process 
9.42 Sections 138A–138G of the Native Title Act make provisions for the Tribunal to 
conduct a native title application inquiry.
44
 These sections apply where the Federal 
Court has referred proceedings to mediation under s 86B,
45
 and the proceedings raise a 
matter or an issue relevant to the determination of native title under s 225, including: 
 the persons or groups of persons holding native title rights; 
 the nature and extent of native title rights and interests in relation to the 
determination area; 
                                                        
42  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
43  David Ritter and Merrilee Garnett, ‘Building the Perfect Beast: Native Title Lawyers and the Practise of 
Native Title Lawyering’ (1999) 1 Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title 8. 
44  Native title application inquiries are distinct from other types of inquiries that may be conducted by the 
Tribunal, including special inquiries under s 137 of the Native Title Act. This chapter is concerned only 
with native title application inquiries. 
45  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 138A. 
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 the nature and extent of any other interests in relation to the determination area; 
and 
 the relationship between native title and other rights and interests. 
9.43 A direction for an inquiry may be made on the Court’s own motion, at the 
request of a party to the proceedings, or at the request of the person conducting the 
mediation.
46
 The Court may only make a direction for an inquiry if: 
 the Court is satisfied that resolution of the matter would be likely to lead to: an 
agreement on findings of facts; action that would resolve or amend the 
application to which the proceeding relates; or something being done in relation 
to the application to which the proceeding relates;
47
 and 
 the applicant agrees to participate in the inquiry.
48
 
9.44 An inquiry may cover more than one proceeding
49
 and more than one matter.
50
 
The parties to an inquiry include the applicant, the relevant state or territory Minister, 
the Commonwealth Minister and, with the leave of the Tribunal, any other person who 
notifies the Tribunal in writing that they wish to participate.
51
 
9.45 Following an inquiry, the Tribunal must make a report, stating any findings of 
fact.
52
 The Tribunal may make recommendations in the report, but these 
recommendations do not bind the parties.
53
 However, the Federal Court must consider 
whether to receive into evidence the transcript of evidence from a native title 
application inquiry, may draw any conclusions of fact that it thinks proper, and may 
adopt any recommendation, finding, decision or determination of the Tribunal in 
relation to the inquiry.
54
 
Question 9–7 Would increased use of native title application inquiries be 
beneficial and appropriate? 
9.46 Native title application inquiries appear to offer a number of benefits. The 
inquiry process ‘can be harnessed to collect and assess evidence and arrive at 
conclusions capable of being fed into the mediation process and is also capable of 
being received and adopted by the Court’.
55
 Inquiries could be used, for example, in 
disputes relating to connection, authorisation or joinder. The use of the inquiry power 
                                                        
46  Ibid s 138B(1). 
47  Ibid s 138B(2)(a). 
48  Ibid s 138B(2)(b). 
49  Ibid s 138G. 
50  Ibid s 140. 
51  Ibid s 141(5). The state, territory and Commonwealth Ministers may elect not to participate. 
52  Ibid s 163A. 
53  Ibid. 
54  Ibid s 86(2). 
55  Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Lifting the Burden of Native Title: Some Modest Proposals for 
Improvement’ (2009) 93 Australian Law Reform Commission Reform Journal 10. 
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in appropriate circumstances is in keeping with ‘the importance placed by the Act on 
mediation as the primary means of resolving native title applications’.
56
 
9.47 Despite the potential of the inquiry process, it has, to date, been underused. The 
ALRC is aware of only one example of the process being used. The ALRC is therefore 
seeking views on whether increased use of inquiries would be beneficial, and if so, 
what measures may lead to increased use of the process. To this end, the ALRC asks 
several questions about possible reforms which may increase the use of the process. 
Requirement for an applicant to agree to an inquiry 
Question 9–8 Section 138B(2)(b) of the Native Title Act requires that the 
applicant in relation to any application that is affected by a proposed native title 
application inquiry must agree to participate in the inquiry. Should the 
requirement for the applicant to agree to participate be removed? 
9.48 The Court may only direct the Tribunal to hold an inquiry if the applicant agrees 
to participate in the inquiry.
57
 Consideration might be given to the removal of this 
requirement. 
9.49 The requirement that the applicant agree to the inquiry reflects the intent that the 
inquiry process be voluntary. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Native Title 
Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) noted that: 
The native title application inquiry process is entirely voluntary. However, the 
applicant or applicants in an affected application are required … to be a party to the 
inquiry. Therefore, it is important that the applicants’ consent be obtained prior to 
conducting an inquiry. Furthermore, it is unlikely a native title application inquiry 
would have an effective outcome if the applicant does not participate in the inquiry 
process.58 
9.50 The Federal Court’s power to refer proceedings to alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) does not require the consent of the parties, except in the case of referrals to 
arbitration (which may result in a binding decision).
59
 The native title mediation 
process itself does not require the agreement of the applicant (or any other party).
60
 
Given that these ADR processes are useful despite not requiring the consent of parties, 
the inquiry process might have value even without the agreement of the applicant. 
9.51 This proposal would not affect s 141(5) of the Act, which provides that the 
applicant is a party to an inquiry. An applicant may find benefit in the inquiry despite 
initial reluctance. It has been noted of mediation that ‘some persons who do not agree 
                                                        
56  Lovett on behalf of the Gunditjmara People v State of Victoria [2007] FCA 474 (30 March 2007) [36]. 
57  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 138B(2). 
58  Explanatory Memorandum, Native Title Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) [4.278]. 
59  Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 53A(1A). 
60  The Court is required to refer an application to mediation unless the Court considers that mediation is 
unnecessary, that there is no likelihood of the mediation being successful, or that the applicant has 
provided insufficient information in their application: Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 86B(3). 
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to mediate, or who express a reluctance to do so, nevertheless participate in the process 
often leading to a successful resolution of the dispute’.
61
 The same may be true of 
parties to the inquiry process. 
Evidence gathering powers of the Tribunal 
Question 9–9 In a native title application inquiry, should the National 
Native Title Tribunal have the power to summon a person to appear before it? 
9.52 Under s 156(2) of the Act, the Tribunal has the power to summon a person to 
give evidence or produce documents. However, under s 156(7) of the Act, this power 
does not apply in respect of a native title application inquiry. 
9.53 The powers of the Tribunal could be strengthened by repealing s 156(7), so that 
the Tribunal would be empowered to summon a person to give evidence or produce 
documents in a native title application inquiry, as it is in other types of inquiries. 
9.54 The reason for the introduction of s 156(7) into the Act is given in the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Native Title Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth): 
Native title application inquiries are intended to be an entirely voluntary process 
which parties to proceedings may avail themselves of in order to facilitate resolution 
of the claim. Persons who agree to voluntarily participate may not be compelled to 
give evidence.62 
9.55 Empowering the Tribunal to summon a person to give evidence or produce 
documents would alter the voluntary nature of the inquiry process. If s 156(7) of the 
Act was repealed, and the Tribunal summoned a person to give evidence or produce 
documents, a failure of that person to attend the Tribunal or to produce the required 
documents would be an offence under ss 171 and 174 of the Act, respectively. 
However, the desirability of retaining an entirely voluntary inquiry process may need 
to be balanced against any benefits of strengthening the Tribunal’s powers. 
Application for inquiry orders by non-parties 
Question 9–10 Should potential claimants, who are not parties to 
proceedings, be able to request the Court to direct the National Native Title 
Tribunal to hold a native title application inquiry? If so, how could this occur? 
9.56 A direction for an inquiry may only be made on the Court’s own motion, at the 
request of a party, or at the request of the person conducting the mediation.
63
 Other 
persons who are not parties to proceedings are unable to request a direction for an 
                                                        
61  James Spigelman, ‘Mediation and the Court’ (2001) 39 Law Society of NSW Journal 63, 65. 
62  Explanatory Memorandum, Native Title Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) 4.308. 
63  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 138B(1). 
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inquiry. In particular, non-parties who are potential claimants are not able to request an 
inquiry. 
9.57 However, potential claimants who are not parties to proceedings may 
nevertheless have significant interests in claim areas. One way for potential claimants 
to represent their interests in native title proceedings is through joining proceedings as 
a respondent.
64
 However, an application for joinder by a potential claimant, and the 
introduction of an additional respondent in proceedings, may result in delays and 
increase costs for all parties. 
9.58 In some cases—for example, where there is a dispute about claim group 
membership—it may be appropriate to allow potential claimants to seek a direction for 
an inquiry. This would provide potential claimants with an alternative to a formal 
application for joinder as a respondent in proceedings. 
Other reforms of the inquiry process 
Question 9–11 What other reforms, if any, would lead to increased use of 
the native title application inquiry process? 
9.59 In addition to the specific questions above, the ALRC is interested in 
stakeholder views on the inquiry process. In particular, the ALRC is interested in 
whether or not the inquiry process would be useful to parties to proceedings, and what, 
if any, barriers there are to the use of the inquiry process. 
 
 
                                                        
64  See Ch 11. 
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Summary 
10.1 The Terms of Reference ask the ALRC to consider whether any barriers to 
access to justice are imposed by the Native Title Act’s authorisation provisions to 
claimants, potential claimants and respondents. The authorisation provisions of the Act 
require a claim group to authorise a person or persons (known as the applicant) to make 
an application for a native title determination. The provisions create a legal entity to 
perform the functions associated with the claim. They are also intended to ensure that 
the application is made with the approval of the claim group. 
10.2 Access to justice includes access to courts and lawyers, but also information and 
support to identify, prevent and resolve disputes.
1
 It can also encompass both 
procedural rights and access to the resources necessary to participate fully in the legal 
system. 
10.3 In this chapter, the ALRC proposes some changes to the authorisation provisions 
of the Native Title Act to 
 allow a claim group to choose its decision-making process; 
 clarify that the claim group can define the scope of the authority of the 
applicant; 
                                                        
1  Attorney-General’s Department, ‘A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil Justice 
System’ (2009); see also ‘Access to Justice Arrangements’ (Draft Report, Productivity Commission, 
2014) 77–78. 
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 simplify the procedure where a member of the applicant is unable or unwilling 
to act; and 
 clarify that the applicant may act by majority unless the terms of the 
authorisation provide otherwise. 
10.4 This chapter also considers whether the authorisation provisions should be 
altered to ensure that native title benefits are held for the benefit of the claim group. 
Finally, this chapter considers how the identification of claim group members, and 
disputes about claim group composition, affect access to justice for claimants, potential 
claimants and respondents. 
What is authorisation? 
10.5 The authorisation provisions were introduced into the Native Title Act in 1998.
2
 
Before this, any member of a claim group could apply for a determination of native 
title. This resulted in large numbers of conflicting and overlapping claims. Now, to 
make an application for a determination of native title, a person or group of people 
must be authorised by all the people who hold the native title claimed.
3
 The person or 
group of people is known as ‘the applicant’, and the people who hold the native title 
are known as ‘the native title claim group’. 
10.6 Applicants for compensation must also be authorised. The Native Title Act 
provides for applications for compensation for the extinguishment or impairment of 
native title arising from validation of certain past, intermediate or future acts.
4
 To make 
an application for compensation, a person or group of people must be authorised by all 
the people who claim to be entitled to the compensation. The person or group of people 
is ‘the applicant’, and the people who claim to be entitled to the compensation are ‘the 
compensation claim group’. The commentary in this section of the Discussion Paper 
refers to both native title claims and compensation claims, unless otherwise indicated. 
10.7 The Native Title Act does not require all members of a claim group to participate 
in the decision-making process. It is sufficient if all members have been given an 
opportunity to participate.
5
 The decision by the participants does not need to be 
unanimous.
6
 
10.8 Justice French (as he then was) described authorisation as 
a matter of considerable importance and fundamental to the legitimacy of native title 
determination applications. The authorisation requirement acknowledges the 
communal character of traditional law and custom which grounds native title.7 
                                                        
2  Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth). 
3  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 61. 
4  Ibid pt 2 div 5. 
5   Lawson on behalf of the ‘Pooncarie’ Barkandji (Paakantyi) People v Minister for Land and Water 
Conservation (NSW) [2002] FCAFC 1517 (9 December 2002) [25]. 
6   Ibid. 
7  Strickland v Native Title Registrar (1999) 168 ALR 242, [57]. 
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10.9 A claim cannot be registered unless the Registrar is satisfied that the applicant is 
authorised to make the application, or that the representative body has certified that the 
applicant is authorised.
8
 
Decision-making process 
Proposal 10–1 Section 251B of the Native Title Act should be amended to 
allow the claim group, when authorising an application, to use a decision-
making process agreed on and adopted by the group. 
Proposal 10–2 The Australian Government should consider amending 
s 251A of the Native Title Act to similar effect. 
10.10 The process for authorising an applicant is set out in s 251B. If the claim group 
has a traditional decision-making process that must be complied with in relation to 
authorising similar matters, the group must use that process to authorise an applicant. It 
may not choose to use a different, perhaps more straightforward, process. 
10.11 If a group does not have a traditional decision-making process for ‘authorising 
things of that kind’, it must use a process of decision-making that has been agreed to 
and adopted by the group.
9
 
10.12 The requirement to use a traditional decision-making process, where it exists, 
can create problems when it is unclear if such a process exists, and what it is.
10
 The 
lack of clarity is sometimes a result of the community having been denied the 
opportunity to make decisions about their land for many generations.
11
 
10.13 Where the group has a traditional decision-making process, it may not be one 
that is suited to making decisions in the native title context. Adapting the process for 
use in native title procedures can be complex and time consuming.
12
 The group may 
wish to change the decision-making process to be more inclusive.
13
 
10.14 Where the group does not have a traditional decision-making process it may be 
reluctant to declare that fact, when seeking recognition of rights and interests 
‘possessed under traditional laws and customs’.
14
 
10.15 The ALRC proposes that s 251B should simply provide that a claim group must 
use a process of decision-making agreed to and adopted by the group. The claim group 
                                                        
8  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 190C. 
9  Ibid s 251B. 
10  National Native Title Council, Submission 16; Cape York Land Council, Submission 7; Just Us Lawyers, 
Submission 2. See, eg, Butchulla People v Queensland (2006) 154 FCR 233; Holborow v Western 
Australia 2002 FCA 1428. 
11  Department of Justice, Victoria, Submission 15. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Butchulla People v Queensland (2006) 154 FCR 233, 30. In Butchulla, the group changed their decision-
making process so that elders no longer had the final say. See also National Native Title Council, 
Submission 16. 
14  Susan Phillips, ‘The Authorisation Trail’ (2000) 4 Indigenous Law Bulletin 13. 
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would still be able to use its traditional decision-making process if it wished. If it did 
not have such a process, or preferred another process, it could do so. 
10.16 Allowing the group to choose its own decision-making process promotes the 
autonomy of the group. It ‘maintains the ultimate authority of the claim group or native 
title holders’.
15
 
10.17 For some groups, the process of choosing a decision-making process will always 
be a difficult one.
16
 For example, the choice between one vote per family group (which 
can disempower members of large families) or one vote per adult (which can 
disempower members of small families) can be fraught.
17
 As AIATSIS noted, there is 
logical circularity in employing a decision-making process to choose a decision-
making process.
18
 The ALRC considers that the proposed amendment will remove 
some, but not all, of the difficulties of choosing a decision-making process. The 
alternative, of statutory prescription of a decision-making process, might remove some 
difficulties but would not promote the autonomy of claim groups. 
10.18 Stakeholders, including governments and representative bodies, supported such 
a change.
19
 
10.19 Section 251A of the Native Title Act regarding the authorisation of Indigenous 
Land Use Agreements (‘ILUAs’) is similar to s 251B regarding the authorisation of an 
applicant. Section 251A provides that native title holders may authorise an agreement 
using a traditional decision-making process, or if no such process exists, using a 
process agreed to and adopted by the group. Sections 251A and 251B are interpreted in 
a consistent way by the courts.
20
 
10.20 The Terms of Reference for this Inquiry specify that the ALRC is to consider 
whether the Native Title Act’s authorisation provisions impose barriers to access to 
justice on claimants, potential claimants or respondents. A person who authorises an 
ILUA is known as a party, rather than a claimant, so these Terms of Reference do not 
direct the ALRC to consider the authorisation of ILUAs. However the ALRC notes that 
it may be desirable for the two authorisation provisions to remain consistent. 
Scope of authorisation 
Proposal 10–3 The Native Title Act should be amended to clarify that the 
claim group may define the scope of the authority of the applicant. 
                                                        
15  Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9. 
16  Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. 
17  Ibid. 
18  AIATSIS, Submission 36. 
19  South Australian Government, Submission 34; Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30; NSW Young 
Lawyers Human Rights Committee, Submission 29; Queensland South Native Title Services, Submission 
24; Western Australian Government, Submission 20; North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; A 
Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12; Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9; Cape York Land 
Council, Submission 7. 
20  Fesl v Delegate of the Native Title Registrar (2008) 173 FCR 150, [72]. 
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Question 10–1 Should the Native Title Act include a non-exhaustive list of 
ways in which the claim group might define the scope of the authority of the 
applicant? For example: 
(a)  requiring the applicant to seek claim group approval before doing certain 
acts (discontinuing a claim, changing legal representation, entering into 
an agreement with a third party, appointing an agent); 
(b)  requiring the applicant to account for all monies received and to deposit 
them in a specified account; and 
(c)  appointing an agent (other than the applicant) to negotiate agreements 
with third parties. 
10.21 Section 62A of the Native Title Act provides that, once authorised, the applicant 
may deal with all matters arising under the Act in relation to the application.
21
 This 
provision is intended to ensure that those who deal with the applicant in relation to 
these matters can be assured that the applicant is authorised to do so.
22
 
10.22 It is not clear whether a claim group may authorise an applicant to act subject to 
conditions. The reference in Native Title Act s 66B(1)(a)(iv) to the replacement of an 
applicant, on the grounds that ‘the person has exceeded the authority given to him or 
her by the claim group to make the application’, suggests that the group may be able to 
define or limit the scope of the applicant’s authority. In Daniel v Western Australia 
(Daniel), French J said: 
If the original authority conferred upon an applicant for the purpose of making and 
dealing with matters in relation to a native title determination is subject to the 
continuing supervision and direction of the native title claim group, then it may be 
that an applicant whose authority is so limited is not authorised to act inconsistently 
with a resolution or direction of the claim group.23 
10.23 However in Daniel, the applicant was replaced on the basis that he was no 
longer authorised by the claim group,
24
 not on the basis that he exceeded his authority, 
so these comments are obiter. This approach has been endorsed in later judgments, but 
it is arguable that these comments were also obiter.
25
 
10.24 In Anderson on behalf of the Wulli Wulli People v Queensland, Collier J said ‘I 
do not consider that s 61(2)(c) ought be interpreted in such a way as to remove the 
autonomy of the native title claim group itself to place a condition on the manner in 
                                                        
21  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 62A. 
22  Explanatory Memorandum, Native Title Amendment Bill 1998 [25.41]. 
23  Daniel v Western Australia [2002] FCA 1147 (13 September 2002) [16]. 
24  Ibid [52]. 
25  See, eg, Far West Coast Native Title Claim v South Australia (No 5) [2013] FCA 717 (30 July 2013) [50]; 
KK (deceased) v Western Australia [2013] FCA 1234 (13 November 2013). 
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which the applicant can make effective decisions’. In this case, the claim group had 
authorised the applicant to make decisions by majority.
26
 
10.25 However, in Weribone on behalf of the Mandandanji People v Queensland, the 
submission that a claim group may direct the applicant in the performance of its duties 
was rejected.
27
 This case also concerned the question of whether an applicant can make 
decisions by majority. 
10.26 There is no Full Court authority on this matter, and it is appropriate for the Act 
to be clarified on this issue. A number of stakeholders called for the Act to be clear that 
the claim group may define the scope of authority of the applicant,
28
 or for clarity on 
this issue.
29
 Two stakeholders cautioned that amendments should not be made that are 
complex or prescriptive or contribute to disputes as to what has and has not been 
authorised.
30
 
10.27 There is a need for a legal personality to take responsibility for a native title 
claim. However, native title is a communal right and the ALRC considers that if the 
claim group wishes to retain decision-making power, or to disperse power—for 
example, between the claim group, the applicant, a bargaining agent, and a working 
group—it should be permitted to do so. For example, it was noted in Daniels that a 
claim group member and applicant said 
there is always discussion and consultation between members of the claim group both 
before and during the meeting. He said it is always a group decision. Young people 
help the old people by explaining ‘white fella’ laws to them. This, he said, is the way 
of making decisions under their traditional laws and customs. It is not just up to 
individual applicants to go their own way and make a separate decision. They must do 
what the group decides. Community meetings, he said, are accepted by the Ngarluma 
and Yindjibarndi People as the proper way to make decisions.31 
10.28 Some groups already use a working group, rather than the applicant, for 
decision-making, and require the applicant to seek claim group approval before doing 
certain acts. Other groups have placed conditions on an applicant’s authority which 
require it to account for funds received on behalf of the group. 
10.29 These initiatives indicate the development of governance structures that are 
suited to the needs of particular groups. The ALRC’s proposal ensures that those 
practices can be formalised. Consequential amendments to s 62A may be necessary to 
acknowledge that, while the applicant may deal with all matters arising under the Act, 
it does so subject to the conditions of its authorisation. 
                                                        
26  Anderson on behalf of the Wulli Wulli People v Queensland (2011) 197 FCR 404, [60]. 
27  Weribone on behalf of the Mandandanji People v Queensland [2011] FCA 1169 (6 October 2011) [15]. 
28  See, eg, South Australian Government, Submission 34; Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30; 
Queensland South Native Title Services, Submission 24; Western Australian Government, Submission 20; 
North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
29  Association of Mining and Exploration Companies, Submission 19. 
30  Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; National Native Title Council, Submission 16. 
31  Daniel v Western Australia [2002] FCA 1147 (13 September 2002) [27]. 
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Consequences for acting outside authority 
Question 10–2 What remedy, if any, should the Native Title Act contain, 
apart from replacement of the applicant, for a breach of a condition of 
authorisation? 
10.30 One representative body suggested that amendments to the Act should not only 
permit the group to define the scope of the applicant’s authority, but should ‘identify 
the consequence of breach of limits or conditions on authority’.
32
 The ALRC is 
exploring options in this regard, but, as the National Native Title Council (NNTC) 
cautioned, it is important to ensure that the process does not become more ‘complex, 
adversarial and... expensive to administer’.
33
 
10.31 It may be that different consequences should follow, depending on the type of 
condition breached. Where the conditional authority given to the applicant relates to 
acts mediated by legal representatives or courts—for example, limits on the applicant’s 
ability to change legal representatives or discontinue a claim—then the legal 
representative or court can decline to act if the applicant does not have the appropriate 
authority. In these cases no other remedy would be necessary. 
10.32 The Act already permits an applicant to be replaced on the ground that it has 
exceeded its authority.
34
 This is likely to be the appropriate response when an applicant 
does not enter into an agreement when directed to do so by the group.
35
 
10.33 As noted earlier, some groups have begun to place conditions on the applicant’s 
authority with regard to the applicant’s handling of funds. This is a useful way of 
clarifying the applicant’s duties and should serve to educate both the applicant and the 
broader community. Should the applicant fail to account for funds received, one 
response would be to remove the applicant. This would not, of course, assist in the 
recovery of funds. This issue is discussed further below. 
10.34 The ALRC is interested in views as to whether the Native Title Act should 
include a remedy, beyond replacement of the applicant, for a breach of a condition of 
authorisation. 
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Limits on the authority to enter into agreements 
Proposal 10–4 The Native Title Act should provide that, if the claim group 
limits the authority of the applicant with regard to entering agreements with 
third parties, those limits must be placed on a public register. 
10.35 Some groups may wish to limit the applicant’s authority to enter into an 
agreement with third parties. For example, in Roe v Western Australia, the group 
passed a resolution that the applicant must not enter into ‘any agreement that affects 
the land and waters covered by the GJJ claim unless authorised to do so by the GJJ 
claim group’.
36
 This poses difficult questions. First, it is not clear what the utility of 
such a limitation would be. An ILUA cannot be registered without the authorisation of 
the claim group,
37
 so the claim group already has the final say on these agreements. 
Such a limitation might prevent the entry into a s 31 agreement regarding a future act,
38
 
but would not necessarily prevent the future act, as the proponent may apply to the 
Tribunal for a determination if no agreement is made.
39
 
10.36 Second, such a limitation could create uncertainty for third parties as to the 
authority of the applicant to enter an agreement.
40
 This could be dealt with by requiring 
an applicant to disclose any limits to its authority to enter agreements with third parties, 
for example, by placing them on a register. The Register of Native Title Claims, which 
includes the name and address of the applicant, may be an appropriate place. 
10.37 Third, if an applicant entered into an agreement, when not authorised to do so, a 
question might arise as to whether the agreement is enforceable. Whether the third 
party had notice of the applicant’s limited authority would be relevant. 
Applicant can act by majority 
Proposal 10–5 The Native Title Act should be amended to provide that the 
applicant may act by majority, unless the terms of the authorisation provide 
otherwise. 
                                                        
36  See, eg, Roe v Western Australia (No 2) [2011] FCA 102 (15 February 2011) [141]. 
37  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 24CG. 
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10.38 The question of whether an applicant can act by majority is closely related to the 
question of whether a claim group can define the scope of the applicant’s authority. As 
noted above, the Federal Court has held that a claim group may authorise an applicant 
to make decisions by majority.
41
 However where the terms of the authorisation are 
silent, an applicant must act jointly.
42
 
10.39 There are some difficulties with the default position requiring a joint, or 
unanimous, decision. It gives a minority of the members of the applicant a veto power. 
If a disagreement cannot be resolved, the only recourse is to replace the applicant, 
which is expensive and time consuming, and does not necessarily resolve the 
disagreement. The default position in other areas of decision-making is usually a 
simple majority.
43
 The ALRC considers that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
applicants should not be required to use arguably more burdensome unanimous 
decision-making. As Muirhead J said 
I cannot accept the argument that... Parliament intended, as it were, to add a rider to 
the effect ‘there can be no consensus of Aboriginals without unanimity’. This would 
be contrary to the Aboriginal decision making processes as I understand them and 
would deny the wishes of the majority. It would mean that one dissident, one 
objector—however reasonable or unreasonable his dissent and whatever its motive—
could frustrate the Land Council’s role in assisting the Aboriginals to make decisions 
concerning the use or non-use of their land.44 
10.40 It is proposed that, if the authorisation is silent on the matter, the applicant 
should be able to act by majority. As Collier J noted, 
the purpose of ss 61(1), 62(2)(c) and 251B is to seek a workable and efficient method 
of prosecuting claims for native title determination, one which limits the potential for 
dispute which might stifle the progress of claims... An interpretation of ‘the applicant’ 
within the meaning of ss 61(1), 62(2)(c) and 251B, which gives effect to decisions of 
the majority of those persons comprising the applicant, is consistent with the purpose 
of achieving a workable and efficient method of prosecuting claims for native title 
determinations.45 
10.41 Should a claim group wish its applicant to act only after a unanimous decision, 
or after a decision made by more than 50 per cent plus one members, it may impose 
such a condition on its authorisation. 
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If a member of the applicant is unable or unwilling to act 
Proposal 10–6 Section 66B of the Native Title Act should provide that, 
where a member of the applicant is no longer willing or able to act, the 
remaining members of the applicant may continue to act without reauthorisation, 
unless the terms of the authorisation provide otherwise. The person may be 
removed as a member of the applicant by filing a notice with the court. 
10.42 Section 66B provides that a member or members of a claim group may seek an 
order that the applicant be replaced on the grounds that a person who is the applicant, 
or is a member of the applicant, consents to his or her removal or replacement, or has 
died or become incapacitated. Native title claims are usually lengthy, and a group often 
chooses elders to be members of the applicant. It is not infrequent for a member of the 
applicant to die, become incapacitated, or to be no longer willing to act. 
10.43 In order to bring an application under s 66B, the member or members of the 
claim group must be authorised by the claim group to do so. Section 66B is ‘directed to 
maintaining the ultimate authority of the native title claim group’.
46
 
10.44 It is unclear whether an application to replace the current applicant must be 
made if a person who is a member of the applicant dies or is unable to act. There are 
decisions indicating that, in this situation, the applicant may continue to act.
47
 These 
judgments refer to the significant expense and delay associated with further 
authorisation procedures.
48
 There are other decisions indicating that if a member of the 
applicant dies, the applicant is no longer authorised and must return to the claim group 
for reauthorisation.
49
 The ALRC has been told that claimants generally do not take this 
approach, but wait for the next meeting to replace the applicant or rely on s 84D, which 
provides that the court may hear and determine the application, despite a defect in 
authorisation. 
10.45 Cape York Land Council advised that ‘it is now common practice for original 
authorisation processes to include authorisation for the applicant to continue to act, 
even if one or more of the people constituting the applicant dies or is incapacitated’.
50
 
The Court has indicated that in this case, no reauthorisation is necessary.
51
 However, it 
is likely that there are many claims in existence where the authorisation does not 
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include that provision. Stakeholders have called for the Act to be amended to clarify 
that reauthorisation is not necessary.
52
 
10.46 The ALRC considers that where the removal of a member of the applicant is not 
controversial or disputed, a simple and inexpensive procedure should be available. The 
group should be able to file a notice with the court indicating that a member of the 
applicant has died or is no longer willing or able to act. 
Proposal 10–7 Section 66B of the Native Title Act should provide that a 
person may be authorised on the basis that, if that person becomes unwilling or 
unable to act, a designated person may take their place. The designated person 
may take their place by filing a notice with the court. 
10.47 Some applicants are structured to represent family groups, and the terms of the 
authorisation include a succession plan—they provide for the replacement of a member 
of the applicant with another person in that member’s family. In these situations, 
simply removing a member would leave a family unrepresented on the applicant.
 53
 The 
Native Title Act should acknowledge and encourage the use of succession planning. 
10.48 There may be concerns that allowing a member of the applicant to be removed 
without the supervision of the court at the time of the replacement would leave room 
for dishonest dealings. It is the duty of the solicitor on the record to take steps to ensure 
that the court is not misled.
54
 
Managing and protecting benefits 
10.49 The authorisation of an applicant has the predominant purpose of ensuring that a 
claim is made with the authority of the claim group. It also creates an entity to perform 
the functions and responsibilities associated with that claim under the Act.
55
 However 
it also creates opportunities for the applicant to receive funds that are intended for the 
native title group. For example, the applicant must be a party to an area ILUA
56
 and is 
a negotiation party for future acts.
57
 Some state legislation also creates opportunities 
for an applicant to enter into an agreement on behalf of the group.
58
 The Act does not 
regulate how funds arising from these agreements are held or disbursed. 
10.50 There are some concerns that funds are not always held for the benefit of the 
entire native title group, particularly when the applicant is represented by private 
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agents rather than representative bodies.
59
 The ALRC has not consulted on this issue 
and does not express a view as to whether there are widespread problems with private 
agents or applicants dealing inappropriately with the proceeds of future act agreements. 
10.51 While the draft Terms of Reference for this Inquiry included a reference to 
‘access to and protection of native title rights and benefits’, the final Terms of 
Reference did not. Accordingly, the ALRC has not investigated this area in depth. 
However, two recent inquiries have looked at these issues. 
10.52 The Taxation of Native Title and Traditional Owner Benefits and Governance 
Working Group (‘the Working Group’) considered ‘the adequacy of current 
arrangements for holding, managing and distributing (native title) benefits’. In 2013, 
the Working Group made recommendations to the Australian Government regarding 
the regulation of private agents, the establishment of a statutory trust, and amendments 
to the Native Title Act to clarify the ownership of benefits and the fiduciary duty of the 
applicant.
60
 
10.53 In 2014, the Review of the Roles and Functions of Native Title Organisations 
considered the role of private agents in the native title systems, and proposed a number 
of options for reform, including amendment of the Native Title Act to clarify the 
fiduciary duty of the applicant.
61
 
10.54 The ALRC has been directed to consider the Act’s authorisation provisions. 
Proposals have been made for changes to the authorisation provisions that are intended 
to support native title claim groups as they manage and protect benefits. However, the 
ALRC has not been directed to consider the important question of the protection of 
benefits more broadly. Further development of the options for reform outlined above 
(including statutory trusts, fiduciary duties, and the regulation of private agents) is not 
within the ALRC’s Terms of Reference.  
Claim group membership 
10.55 Before a claim can be authorised, the claim group must be identified. The native 
title claim group is all the persons ‘who, according to their traditional laws and 
customs, hold the common or group rights and interests comprising the particular 
native title claimed’.
62
 In the case of a compensation claim, the claim group is ‘all the 
persons... who claim to be entitled to the compensation’.
63
 The application for a native 
title determination or compensation must either name the members of the claim group 
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or ‘otherwise describe the persons sufficiently clearly so that it can be ascertained 
whether any particular person is one of those persons’.
64
 The same specificity is not 
required for a determination, which may name the group that holds the native title 
rights and interests, and leave the identification of individual members of the group to 
be determined by the registered native title body corporate.
65
 
10.56 In the Issues Paper, the ALRC canvassed some of the reasons a claim group may 
have difficulty determining its membership. These included: 
 the registration test requirement for a specific claim group description is not 
consistent with the complex nature of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
societies; 
 the impact of colonisation has disrupted the social organisation of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander groups; 
 in some areas there is uncertainty as to the status of people with a historical 
connection to land; and 
 the time pressure imposed by the hasty lodgement of claims in response to a 
future act notification.
66
 
10.57 Submissions agreed that the matters listed above contributed to difficulties 
identifying the claim group, and to subsequent disputes.
67
 Those disputes often result in 
litigation, and in particular, challenges to the authorisation of an applicant.
68
 Disputes, 
while inevitable in human interactions,
69
 can cause great pain within communities.
70
 
Delays caused by these disputes create a barrier to access to justice.
71
 Uncertainty 
around claim group composition also creates difficulties for third parties who are 
proposing future acts. 
10.58 The ALRC’s preliminary view is that these difficulties do not indicate a problem 
with the law or legal frameworks, but are a symptom of the very difficult factual and 
philosophical problems associated with translating Indigenous people’s relationships 
with each other and with land into the western legal system.
72
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10.59 One submission suggested that a group who has lodged a claim in haste in 
response to a proposed future act should be able to amend the claim without requiring 
re-authorisation and registration.
73
 The ALRC has not proceeded to make this proposal, 
because the authorisation and registration processes (including the notification 
provisions) serve important functions in the native title system, even where they cause 
expense and delay. Accordingly, the following discussion focuses on options for 
improved dispute resolution rather than on amendments to the Native Title Act. 
Current options for dispute resolution 
10.60 Representative bodies have statutory responsibility for dispute resolution, 
including assisting in promoting agreement between its constituents about native title 
matters.
74
 In performing these functions, the representative body may seek the 
assistance of the National Native Title Tribunal.
75
 The North Queensland Land Council 
reported that it has used this provision of the Native Title Act on two occasions and has 
found it to be very useful.
76
 
10.61 In some cases, allowing time in the court processes for research to be completed 
and for the group to consider the results of the research may prevent disputes from 
occurring.
77
 
Options for reform 
10.62 Where the representative body has made a decision that is not in the interests of 
some native title claimants or potential claimants, it is placed in a position of perceived 
conflict.
78
 It might be more effective for the representative body to fund independent 
mediation, or independent legal representation for the dissatisfied party.
79
 
Representative bodies are not sufficiently funded to fulfil all of their statutory duties
80
 
and additional funding for the purpose of engaging mediators or legal representation 
might assist.
81
 
10.63 Alternatively, the Law Society of Western Australia said it would be preferable 
for dispute resolution processes to be adopted which are independent of NTRBs 
entirely (for example, a referral to an independent, accredited mediator), and which 
are the subject of independent government funding, rather than compelling individual 
‘constituents’ to pursue costly and difficult relief in the courts if the NTRB process is 
unsatisfactory or not considered sufficiently independent.82 
                                                        
73  Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
74  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 203BF. 
75  Ibid s 203BK. 
76  North Queensland Land Council, Submission 17. 
77  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. 
78  Department of Justice, Victoria, Submission 15; Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9; Cape 
York Land Council, Submission 7; Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. 
79  Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. 
80  Deloitte Access Economics, above n 61. 
81  Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
82  Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9. 
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10.64 Just Us Lawyers made a similar suggestion, calling for a ‘panel of ex-Federal 
Court judges, assisted by qualified Indigenous mediators’ to be resourced by 
representative bodies. They suggested that the outcome of mediations should be 
confirmed by Court orders to ensure that outcomes are enforceable.
83
 
10.65 Culturally appropriate dispute resolution services may not be currently available. 
The AIATSIS Indigenous Facilitation and Mediation Project identified a need for a 
‘national fully supported and accredited network of Indigenous facilitators, mediators, 
and negotiators’ in 2006.
84
 The Federal Court of Australia’s Indigenous Dispute 
Resolution & Conflict Management Case Study Project also noted that, in many areas, 
timely, responsive and effective dispute management services are not available, and 
that there is a need for a national Indigenous dispute management service.
85
 Such a 
service could not only address native title disputes but other family, neighbourhood or 
community disputes. Some disputes in the native title arena are in fact a continuation of 
conflict that began elsewhere, and so resolution of non-native title conflict could 
contribute to improved native title processes.
86
 
10.66 Concerns have been raised that, in some proceedings, the anthropologist has ‘the 
last word’ in defining the claim group, and there is no avenue for a potential claimant 
to refute the conclusions of an anthropologist’s report, beyond joinder as a 
respondent.
87
 An Indigenous dispute resolution process might offer a forum for 
exploring these issues.
88
 
10.67 A proposal for the establishment and funding of a national Indigenous dispute 
management service would be outside the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference, which require 
a focus on the authorisation provisions of the Native Title Act. Instead, the ALRC 
suggests that the government consider establishing such a service. 
 
                                                        
83  Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. 
84  Toni Bauman, ‘Final Report of the Indigenous Facilitation and Mediation Project July 2003–June 2006: 
Research Findings, Recommendations and Implementation’ (AIATSIS, 2006) v. 
85  Federal Court of Australia, Indigenous, Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management. Case Study 
Project, ‘Solid Work You Mob  Are Doing’ (2009) xv–xvi. 
86  Law Society of Western Australia, Submission 9. 
87  J Hill, Submission 37. 
88  See also Ch 9, regarding the use of mediation and inquiries into matters including the composition of the 
claim group. 
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Summary 
11.1 Section 84 of the Native Title Act sets out party and joinder provisions. These 
provisions specify who is a party to native title proceedings, who may join native title 
proceedings, in what circumstances they may join, and when they may be dismissed. 
11.2 A determination of native title rights and interests by the Federal Court takes 
effect in rem. This means that the Court’s determination of native title rights and 
interests is enforceable not only against the parties to the application for a 
determination, but against all persons holding interests in the claim area and their 
successors in title. Given the legal finality of a determination, it is important that all 
persons who may be affected by, or have a relevant interest in, a determination in the 
proceedings have an opportunity to be involved. At the same time, it is important that 
proceedings are not unduly long, complicated or burdensome on the Court and on other 
parties. 
11.3 The Terms of Reference for the Inquiry ask the ALRC to consider any barriers 
to access to justice for claimants, potential claimants and respondents, imposed by the 
joinder provisions of the Native Title Act. In this chapter, the ALRC asks several 
questions and proposes several reforms designed to reduce burdens that may limit 
access to justice, while also ensuring that a wide range of interests are adequately 
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represented in native title proceedings. The ALRC also makes two proposals about 
allowing appeals from joinder and dismissal decisions, and two proposals regarding the 
Commonwealth’s participation in proceedings. 
Overview of the party and joinder provisions 
11.4 Section 84 of the Native Title Act includes provisions under which a person may 
become a party to native title proceedings. 
11.5 Most persons, other than the applicant and the Crown, become parties to native 
title proceedings by virtue of s 84(3). Section 84(3)(a) provides that persons falling 
within certain categories can become a party to native title proceedings by notifying the 
Federal Court that they wish to do so within a specified time period. These categories 
include, for example, registered native title claimants, native title bodies corporate, 
persons with a registered proprietary interest, the Commonwealth Minister, local 
government bodies, and any other persons who claim native title in relation to land or 
waters in the claim area. 
11.6 The joinder provision, s 84(5), allows the Federal Court to 
at any time join any person as a party to the proceedings, if the Court is satisfied that 
the person’s interests may be affected by a determination in the proceedings and it is 
in the interests of justice to do so.1 
11.7 If the threshold questions of identifying whether there is an interest
2
 and whether 
that interest may be affected by a determination, have been resolved in favour of the 
party making the application, the Court then considers whether it should exercise its 
discretion to join the person as a party.
3
 This discretionary power allows the Court to 
join as a party to proceedings a person who has not, or could not, become a party to 
proceedings under s 84(3).
4
 Legal action may be well advanced when a person seeks to 
become a party under s 84(5) (‘late joinder’). 
11.8 In exercising its discretion to join a person as a party to proceedings, the Court 
must first be satisfied that the person’s interests may be affected by a determination. 
The meaning of the term ‘interests that may be affected’ was considered in Byron 
Environment Centre Inc v Arakwal People.
5
 Those interests may include a ‘special, 
well-established non-proprietary connection with land or waters’, but must not be 
‘indirect, remote or lacking substance’.
6
 They must be ‘capable of clear definition and 
… be affected in a demonstrable way by a determination in relation to the 
                                                        
1  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 84(5). 
2  Wakka Wakka People No 2 v Queensland [2005] FCA 1578 (4 November 2005). 
3  Barunga v Western Australia (No 2) [2011] FCA 755 (25 May 2011) [162]–[168]. 
4  Kokatha Uwankara (Part A) Native Title Claim v South Australia [2013] FCA 856 (30 August 2013) 
[24]. 
5  Byron Environment Centre Inc v Arakwal People (1997) 78 FCR 1. 
6  Ibid 6. 
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application’.
7
 An interest in using the claim area for bushwalking, hunting or camping, 
for example, would not appear to be sufficient for joinder under s 84(5).
8
 
11.9 Section 84(5A) provides an additional discretionary power for the Federal Court 
to join a person whose interests may be affected by a determination because the person 
has a public right of access over, or use of, an area of land covered by the application. 
This section allows the joinder of many persons who would not be able to become 
parties to proceedings under s 84(3) and who would not be held to have a sufficient 
interest in the claim area following Byron. 
11.10 Section 84(8) allows the Federal Court to dismiss a party. Under s 84(9), the 
Court is to consider dismissing a party if that party’s interests in the claim area arise 
merely because of a public right of access and if the person’s interests are adequately 
represented by another party, or if the person never had (or no longer has) an interest 
that may be affected by a determination in the proceedings. 
11.11 Some stakeholders suggested that the party and joinder provisions in s 84 were 
operating adequately, and that reform of these provisions was unnecessary. The South 
Australian Government, for example, considered 
the current powers of the Federal Court to be adequate whereby the interests of justice 
can be taken into account. The jurisprudence that has developed in this area over the 
last ten years should not be undermined by making changes to the underlying 
provisions.9 
11.12 Other stakeholders expressed concerns about various aspects of the party 
provisions, such as: 
 the potential for costs and delays arising from participation of non-Crown 
respondents;
10
 
 the possible impact on parties when a new party is joined late in proceedings;
11
 
 the need for clarity and certainty around the party provisions;
12
 
                                                        
7  Ibid 7. The principles described in Arakwal continue to be applied: see, eg, Cheinmora v Western 
Australia [2013] FCA 727 (25 July 2013); Kokatha Uwankara (Part A) Native Title Claim v South 
Australia [2013] FCA 856 (30 August 2013).  
8  Atkinson on behalf of the Gunai/Kurnai People v State of Victoria (No 3) [2010] FCA 906 (16 August 
2010); Atkinson on behalf of the Gunai/Kurnai People v State of Victoria (No 4) [2010] FCA 907  
(16 August 2010). 
9  South Australian Government, Submission 34. See also Law Council of Australia, Submission 35; 
Northern Territory Government, Submission 31; Goldfields Land and Sea Council, Submission 22; 
Western Australian Government, Submission 20. 
10  Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30. 
11  See, eg, Central Desert Native Title Services, Submission 26; North Queensland Land Council, 
Submission 17; A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. The National Farmers’ Federation, on the other 
hand, suggested that the Court’s discretion when considering applications for joinder later in proceedings 
was a sufficient mechanism for avoiding the problems of late joinder: National Farmers’ Federation, 
Submission 14. 
12  Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, Submission 21; Association of Mining and 
Exploration Companies, Submission 19. 
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 the impact of parties participating in aspects of proceedings not affecting their 
interests;
13
 and 
 the desirability of mechanisms allowing parties to limit their involvement.
14
 
11.13 This chapter considers possible reforms to the party and joinder provisions that 
may address such concerns. In making these proposals, however, the ALRC recognises 
that the party and joinder provisions overall appear to be operating satisfactorily in 
many respects. The discussion in this chapter reflects Guiding Principle 2—that any 
reforms should continue to allow a wide range of interests to be represented in native 
title proceedings—and Guiding Principle 3—that any reforms should promote timely 
and practical outcomes for parties to a native title determination through effective 
claims resolution, while seeking to ensure the integrity of the process. 
The importance of representing a wide range of interests 
11.14 Native title proceedings differ from many other types of legal proceedings in 
that very large numbers of parties can be involved and affected by the outcome of the 
proceedings. Native title proceedings bring before the Court ‘all parties who hold or 
wish to assert a claim or interest in respect of the defined area of land’, in order to 
bring about a decision which finally determines the existence and nature of native title 
rights in the determination area, and which also identifies other rights and interests 
held by others in respect of that area. As the determination is to be declaratory of the 
rights and interests of all parties holding rights or interests in the area, the 
determination operates as a judgment in rem binding the whole world.15 
11.15 Stakeholders and commentators have noted the importance of the Native Title 
Act continuing to provide for a wide range of persons with interests in a claim area to 
participate in native title proceedings. Perhaps the most important reason is that the in 
rem nature of a native title determination means a determination will affect the interests 
of a large number of persons. It is important that these persons are provided with an 
opportunity to represent their interests.
16
 Wide community involvement in native title 
proceedings may also contribute to general community support and acceptance of the 
native title process.
17
 
The effect of large numbers of parties 
11.16 Some native title proceedings involve very large numbers of respondents. In the 
2012–2013 reporting year alone, the Federal Court dealt with 982 party applications 
under s 84(3),
18
 while over the five year period 2009–2013, 220 applications for 
                                                        
13  See, eg, Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
14  Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, Submission 21; Telstra, Submission 4. 
15  Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, [190]. 
16  See, eg, Western Australian Government, Submission 20; Association of Mining and Exploration 
Companies, Submission 19; Ergon Energy Corporation, Submission 5. 
17  Justice John Dowsett, ‘Beyond Mabo: Understanding Native Title Litigation through the Decisions of the 
Federal Court’ (2009) 10 Federal Judicial Scholarship. 
18  Federal Court of Australia, ‘Annual Report 2012–2013’ 143. 
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joinder were made to the Court under s 84(5) after the relevant notification period.
19
 As 
at 31 May 2013, the average number of respondents in Western Australian native title 
cases was 21.
20
 Claims made over geographically large areas, particularly if those areas 
are relatively closely settled, are likely to have many respondents. 
11.17 Large party numbers can complicate proceedings, slow outcomes and place an 
administrative burden on courts and on other parties. This is a particular concern where 
increased costs and delays are caused by the participation of parties whose interests are 
unlikely to be affected by the native title determination,
21
 or the participation of parties 
in aspects of the proceedings which do not bear on their interests. 
11.18 However, the ALRC considers that large party numbers need not, in and of 
themselves, present a problem, provided that the involvement of large numbers of 
parties in proceedings does not result in undue burdens on parties or the Court. 
Reforms should not seek to reduce party numbers if this has the result of unduly 
limiting the ability of persons to represent their interests in proceedings. 
Late joinder 
11.19 Several stakeholders noted the particular impact that may be caused by the 
joinder of a party to proceedings that are well advanced. For example, Angus Frith and 
Associate Professor Maureen Tehan submitted that late joinder may present a barrier to 
justice where 
the joinder confounds the legitimate expectations of the other parties involved in the 
proceedings that the matter will go to trial or be subject to a consent determination on 
a particular date, where they have worked to achieve that end over a long time.22 
11.20 In many cases, however, an application for late joinder may well be justified. 
The NSW Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC), for example, noted a number of 
reasons why it may be difficult or impossible for parties to join until later in 
proceedings. These reasons include, for example, limited resourcing, remoteness, and 
the possible lack of awareness of native title proceedings and their potential impact on 
interests held (or potentially to be held) under the Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW), until 
the proceedings are well advanced.
23
 Several stakeholders noted that it may be difficult 
for a third party to determine in advance whether their interests will be affected by a 
particular native title determination, and that a third party’s interests in the claim area 
may change over the course of proceedings.
24
 
                                                        
19  Figures provided by the Federal Court of Australia, December 2013.  
20  Justice Michael Barker, ‘Innovation and Management of Native Title Claims: What Have the Last 20 
Years Taught Us?’ (Paper Presented at National Native Title Conference, Alice Springs, 3–5 June 2013) 
2013 11. 
21  Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
22  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. See also South Australian Government, Submission 34; NSW 
Aboriginal Land Council, Submission 25; Western Australian Government, Submission 20; North 
Queensland Land Council, Submission 17; Cape York Land Council, Submission 7. 
23  NSW Aboriginal Land Council, Submission 25. 
24  See, eg, NSW Aboriginal Land Council, Submission 25; Western Australian Fishing Industry Council, 
Submission 23; Association of Mining and Exploration Companies, Submission 19; National Farmers’ 
Federation, Submission 14; Telstra, Submission 4. 
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11.21 It should also be noted that the Federal Court has an existing power to limit the 
participation of a party joined under s 84(5) to matters relevant to the party’s interests 
as set out in s 225(c) and (d).
25
 These matters include: 
 the nature and extent of interests (other than native title rights and interests) in 
relation to the determination area; and 
 the relationship between native title and non-native title rights and interests in 
relation to the determination area. 
11.22 This discretion appears to have been effectively exercised to reduce the impact 
of late joinder on other parties in proceedings, taking account of considerations such as 
whether the interests of the person applying for joinder late in proceedings can be 
protected in other ways,
26
 or any delay in making the joinder application.
27
 
State and territory parties 
11.23 Section 84(4) provides that the relevant State or Territory Minister is 
automatically a party to proceedings, unless the Minister otherwise notifies the Federal 
Court. 
11.24 The Federal Court has held that the State party acts in the capacity of parens 
patriae, or ‘parent of the nation’, to look after the interests of the community 
generally.
28
 It could be suggested that third party respondents, whose interests in the 
claim area derive from a Crown grant, should not be involved in proceedings on the 
basis that their interests could be adequately represented by the relevant state or 
territory government. There was some stakeholder support for this position: 
It is strongly arguable that the only parties that should be involved in native title 
litigation are the applicant, together with any other native title party, and the Crown. 
All other respondents take their rights and interests from [the] Crown, which, in the 
native title context, has a duty to protect them. 
The respondents themselves are not likely to be able to add very much to the litigation 
apart from the manner in which they exercise those rights and interests. The Crown is 
quite capable of asserting and describing the rights and interests it has granted.29 
11.25 However, other stakeholders expressed concerns about procedural fairness and 
about the capacity or suitability of the Crown or some other body to represent an 
individual interest. Ergon Energy, for example, submitted that there may be ‘a potential 
conflict between the State and Ergon Energy’s interests particularly where Ergon 
Energy holds or seeks an interest in State land’
30
 and that ‘an expectation that the State 
                                                        
25  Gamogab v Akiba (2007) 159 FCR 578, [65]–[66]; Watson v Western Australia (No 3) [2014] FCA 127 
(24 February 2014) [61]–[65]. 
26  Akiba on behalf of the Torres Strait Regional Seas Claim People v Queensland (No 1) [2006] FCA 1102 
(18 August 2006) [29]. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Munn for and on behalf of the Gunggari People v Queensland (2001) 115 FCR 109, [29]. 
29  A Frith and M Tehan, Submission 12. Similarly, Kimberley Land Council submitted that the ‘appropriate 
parties to address connection are Crown parties’, since ‘recognition of connection is a recognition of an 
imposition on sovereignty’: Kimberley Land Council, Submission 30. 
30  Ergon Energy Corporation, Submission 5. 
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will represent Ergon Energy’s interests in native title proceedings is unrealistic given 
the capacity of the State and the potential for conflict of interests to arise’.
31
 
Parties to proceedings under s 84(3) 
Only legal or equitable estates or interests in land or waters 
Question 11–1 Should s 84(3)(a)(iii) of the Native Title Act be amended to 
allow only those persons with a legal or equitable estate or interest in the land or 
waters claimed, to become parties to a proceeding under s 84(3)? 
11.26 Section 84(3) provides that certain persons are a party to native title proceedings 
if they notify the Federal Court in writing to that effect. These persons include: 
 under ss 84(3)(a)(i) and 66(3)(a)(i)–(vi), various categories of defined persons 
with an interest in the area covered by the application, such as registered native 
title bodies corporate, any person with a proprietary interest registered in a 
public register of interests, and local councils; 
 under s 84(3)(a)(ii), persons who claim to hold native title in relation to land or 
waters in the area covered by the application; and 
 under s 84(3)(a)(iii), persons whose interests in relation to land or waters may be 
affected by a determination in the proceedings. 
11.27 Question 11–1 is specifically concerned with s 84(3)(a)(iii), and not the 
participation of persons under s 84(3)(a)(i) and (3)(a)(ii). In order to become a party to 
proceedings under s 84(3)(a)(iii), a person must have an interest in relation to land or 
waters, as defined by s 253: 
interest, in relation to land or waters, means: 
(a)    a legal or equitable estate or interest in the land or waters; or 
(b)   any other right (including a right under an option and a right of redemption), 
charge, power or privilege over, or in connection with: 
  (i) the land or waters; or 
  (ii) an estate or interest in the land or waters; or 
(c)  a restriction on the use of the land or waters, whether or not annexed to other 
land or waters. 
11.28 This ‘very wide’
32
 definition explicitly includes interests which, at common law, 
would not be interests in relation to land or waters, including licences or permits, as 
well as restrictive covenants.
33
 The definition extends to a public right to fish,
34
 and to 
                                                        
31  Ibid. See also Western Australian Government, Submission 20. 
32  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [387]. 
33  Explanatory Memorandum, Native Title Bill 1993 (Cth), Part B 102–103. 
34  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [387]. 
210 Review of the Native Title Act 1993 
a ‘privilege’ such as the right of a member of the public to cross a recreational reserve 
managed by a public charitable trust.
35
 Due to the breadth of this definition, the range 
of persons who may become parties to proceedings under s 84(3)(a)(iii) is, arguably, 
wider than necessary. 
11.29 The ALRC is seeking stakeholder views on a restriction of the right to 
participate in proceedings under s 84(3)(a)(iii) to those persons with a legal or 
equitable estate or interest in the land or waters—that is, persons with an interest 
satisfying paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘interest’ in s 253. Persons whose interests 
were not legal or equitable estates or interests would not be able to become parties 
under s 84(3). However, such persons would still be able to join under s 84(5) and 
(5A), subject to the Federal Court making appropriate orders. This would ensure—
consistent with Guiding Principle 2—that their interests were represented in 
proceedings. 
11.30 A possible consequence of restricting s 84(3)(a)(iii) is that some persons who 
would previously have become parties automatically under s 84(3)(a)(iii) would 
instead seek to join by applications under s 84(5) and (5A). These applications would 
require consideration by the Court, and the costs and time involved making such 
applications may offset any other reductions in costs and time due to smaller party 
numbers. The ALRC is interested in stakeholder views as to whether this is likely to be 
a problem in practice. 
Notification of Aboriginal Land Councils 
Question 11–2 Should ss 66(3) and 84(3) of the Native Title Act be 
amended to provide that Local Aboriginal Land Councils under the Aboriginal 
Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) must be notified by the Registrar of a native title 
application and may become parties to the proceedings if they satisfy the 
requirements of s 84(3)? 
11.31 As noted in Chapters 1 and 3, there are often complex interactions between the 
Native Title Act and the land rights legislation of states and territories. In NSW, for 
example, the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) provides for Local Aboriginal 
Land Councils (LALCs) to make land claims resulting in freehold title over claim 
areas. The NSWALC noted that freehold title under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 
may be affected by a native title claim.
36
 
11.32 Once a claim has been determined under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act, a 
LALC has freehold title over the land, and would be able to become a party to native 
title proceedings under s 84(3) or to join proceedings under s 84(5). However, where a 
                                                        
35  Kanak v Minister for Land and Water Conservation (2000) 106 FCR 31, [28]. 
36  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 47A. 
 11. Joinder 211 
LALC has lodged a land claim but where the claim has not yet been determined, the 
claimant may hold an inchoate interest.
37
 
11.33 The NSWALC submitted that it unclear whether a LALC would receive 
notification of a native title claim under s 66(3) if the LALC’s interests were in land 
under a land rights claim, as opposed to land already owned, and that it may be 
appropriate to notify LALCs of a native title claim where their area overlaps with a 
native title claim.
38
 
11.34 The importance of the holder of an inchoate interest having an opportunity to 
represent their interests in native title proceedings is illustrated by s 36(1d) of the 
Aboriginal Land Rights Act, which provides that land which is the subject of a 
registered native title determination application cannot be claimed under the Aboriginal 
Land Rights Act. 
An option for respondents to limit their participation 
Proposal 11–1 The Native Title Act should be amended to allow persons 
who are notified under s 66(3) and who fulfil notification requirements to elect 
to become parties under s 84(3) in respect of s 225(c) and (d) only. 
11.35 A person who becomes a party to proceedings under s 84(3) will be a party to 
the entire proceedings. However, some persons may wish to participate only as far as is 
needed to represent their interests—namely, in relation to the matters raised in s 225(c) 
and (d).
39
 
11.36 Proposal 11–1 would allow a person who becomes a party to native title 
proceedings under s 84(3) to elect to join proceedings only when the proceedings 
concern matters affecting the party’s interests under s 225(c) and (d). Telstra noted the 
desirability of such a provision: 
legislative reform that permits respondent parties to formally limit their involvement 
in native title claims while questions of connection are being resolved would be a 
positive outcome.40 
11.37 In its submission, Telstra proposed a ‘secondary joinder portal’, allowing a 
person to give notice of an intention to join proceedings once the Federal Court has 
considered and made a determination on connection. This would have two main 
benefits: 
                                                        
37  Narromine Local Aboriginal Land Council v The Minister (1993) 79 LGERA 430, 433–434 (Stein J); see 
also New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council v The Minister (1988) 14 NSWLR 685, 696.  
38  NSW Aboriginal Land Council, Submission 25. 
39  Section 225(c) refers to ‘the nature and extent of any other interests in relation to the determination area’. 
Section 225(d) refers to the relationship between the rights and interests in s 225(c) and native title rights 
and interests in relation to the determination area. 
40  Telstra, Submission 4. 
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 a person would have the option of minimising time and resources spent on 
matters not directly affecting their interests; and 
 if there was no determination of connection, or if the claim was withdrawn or 
dismissed, the person would not have joined proceedings unnecessarily, 
minimising the costs for all parties. 
11.38 Proposal 11–1 would allow a person to avail themselves of the right to become a 
party to proceedings under s 84(3), while making it possible for that person to elect to 
limit their involvement to matters concerning their own interests. A person who 
participated in this way would be able to represent their interests to the Court and to 
stay informed about the proceedings, without a need to be actively involved in all 
aspects of the proceedings. Under this proposal, the option to participate only in certain 
aspects of proceedings would remain with the party. It would not prevent a party that 
wished to participate in the entirety of proceedings from doing so. 
Joinder of parties under s 84(5) and (5A) 
Joinder of claimants and potential claimants 
Proposal 11–2 Section 84(5) of the Native Title Act should be amended to 
clarify that: 
(a)  a claimant or potential claimant has an interest that may be affected by 
the determination in the proceedings; and 
(b)  when determining if it is in the interests of justice to join a claimant or 
potential claimant, the Federal Court should consider whether they can 
demonstrate a clear and legitimate objective to be achieved by joinder to 
the proceedings. 
11.39 Indigenous persons seeking to become respondent parties have consistently 
presented in cases concerning s 84(5) or its antecedents.
41
 As noted in the Issues Paper, 
there appear to be three types of situations represented: 
 a member (or members) of the claim group disputes matters, such as who has 
been authorised as the applicant, or the way in which a claim is being 
conducted; 
 a person (or persons) asserts that they are members of the claim group, but that 
they have been excluded from, or not included in, the claim group; and 
 a person (or persons) is a member of a competing claim group. 
                                                        
41  See, eg, Davis-Hurst on behalf of the Traditional Owners of Saltwater v Minister for Land and Water 
Conservation (NSW) [2003] FCA 541 (4 June 2003); Isaacs on behalf of the Turrbal People v 
Queensland [2011] FCA 828 (25 July 2011); Far West Coast Native Title Claim v South Australia (No 5) 
[2013] FCA 717 (30 July 2013). 
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11.40 Allowing claimants or potential claimants to join proceedings, in appropriate 
circumstances, is an important part of ensuring access to justice. In Bidjara People 
(No 2) v Queensland, Ryan J noted that, where members of a claim group were not 
satisfied with the authorisation of the applicant, ‘it would also lead to injustice if the 
dissentient members were thereafter denied a voice in the determination of the claim’.
42
 
Stakeholders also noted the importance of claimants and potential claimants being able 
to join proceedings, in appropriate circumstances, under s 84(5). The Department of 
Justice, Victoria submitted that 
joinder as a party to a native title proceeding by persons with a native title interest 
remains one of a fairly limited number of avenues for disaffected or competing 
claimants or native title parties to seek to have their interests taken into account.43 
11.41 Proposal 11–2 would make clear that a claimant or potential claimant in the 
claim area has an interest that may be affected by a native title determination. This 
would, in turn, clarify that a claimant or potential claimant with such an interest could 
be joined under s 84(5). Proposal 11–2 would codify a test, applied in Barunga v 
Western Australia and in Far West Coast Native Title Claim v South Australia (No 5), 
to determine whether a member of the claim group could be joined as a respondent. 
This test comprises three elements: 
(a)   whether the person has an interest; 
(b)    whether the interest may be affected by a determination in the proceedings; and 
(c)   whether, in any event, in the exercise of its discretion the Court should join the 
person as a party.44 
11.42 In Far West Coast [No 5], Mansfield J stated that it is 
clear … that native title rights and interests (and similar traditional rights-based 
interests) have been held in some circumstances to be interests capable of satisfying 
the s 84(5) criteria, and that those native title rights and interests need not have been 
certainly established in order to qualify under s 84(5) as a person whose interests may 
be affected by a determination.45 
11.43 However, as noted by Mansfield J in Starkey v South Australia, the ‘discretion 
to join [a member of the claim group] as a respondent party does exist, but in my view 
its favourable exercise to allow a member of a claim group to become a respondent 
party will be rare’.
46
 
                                                        
42  Bidjara People (No 2) v Queensland [2003] FCA 324 (7 April 2003) [7]. 
43  Department of Justice, Victoria, Submission 15. The value of late joinder under s 84(5) to disaffected 
claimants was also noted by, for example, AIATSIS, Submission 36; Just Us Lawyers, Submission 2. The 
needs of disaffected claim group members to participate in proceedings may also be met, to some extent, 
by reforms to the authorisation provisions of the NTA, as proposed in Ch 10. 
44  Barunga v Western Australia (No 2) [2011] FCA 755 (25 May 2011) [164]; Far West Coast Native Title 
Claim v South Australia (No 5) [2013] FCA 717 (30 July 2013) [26]. 
45  Far West Coast Native Title Claim v South Australia (No 5) [2013] FCA 717 (30 July 2013) [33]. 
46  Starkey v South Australia [2011] FCA 456 (9 May 2011) [68]. 
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11.44 Proposal 11–2 would also require that the Federal Court consider whether the 
claimant or potential claimant has a clear and legitimate objective in joining.
47
 This 
requirement would limit joinder of claimants or potential claimants who join for 
uncertain, frivolous or vexatious reasons. The joinder of a claimant or potential 
claimant who does not have a clear and legitimate objective would be likely to add 
time and cost burdens to other parties, with little benefit to the joined party. 
11.45 It is possible that this proposal would result in an increase in intra-indigenous 
disputes in native title proceedings.
48
 However, existing case management powers of 
the Court (including, for example, the dismissal power under s 84(8)) may alleviate any 
difficulties in this regard.
49
 
Representative organisations 
Proposal 11–3 The Native Title Act should be amended to allow 
organisations that represent persons, whose ‘interest may be affected by the 
determination’ in relation to land or waters in the claim area, to become parties 
under s 84(3) or to be joined under s 84(5) or (5A). 
11.46 Proposal 11–3 addresses the problem of large numbers of respondent parties in 
native title proceedings by allowing representative organisations to become parties or 
be joined. These organisations may themselves have no interest, proprietary or 
otherwise, in the claim area, and therefore may be unable to join under s 84(3), (5) or 
(5A). However, the members they represent may have interests that would be affected 
by the outcome of the proceedings. Allowing the representative organisations to 
participate would provide a means for these interests to be represented in proceedings, 
without the need for each member to participate. This would ensure that the interests of 
a wide range of persons were represented in proceedings—in accordance with Guiding 
Principle 2—while also helping to reduce party numbers—in accordance with Guiding 
Principle 3. 
11.47 This proposal is not limited to native title representative bodies (NTRBs). 
Organisations representing other persons or groups—such as recreational users of the 
                                                        
47  This element of Proposal 11–2 reflects that statement of Mansfield J that if a joinder applicant ‘can point 
to a clear and legitimate objective that he or she hopes to achieve by being joined, then it will generally be 
appropriate to exercise the Court’s discretion in favour of the application’: Far West Coast Native Title 
Claim v South Australia (No 5) [2013] FCA 717 (30 July 2013) [37]. 
48  See, eg, Graeme Neate, ‘“It’s the Constitution, It’s Mabo, It’s Justice, It’s Law, It’s the Vibe”: Reflections 
on Developments in Native Title since Mabo v Queensland [No 2]’ in Toni Bauman and Glick Lydia 
(eds), The Limits of Change: Mabo and Native Title 20 Years On (AIATSIS, 2012) 188, 205–206. Also 
see Ch 10. 
49  Cape York Land Council submitted that wider use of the dismissal power may be useful in this respect: 
‘Indigenous parties seem to be increasing in number in Cape York matters. It may be difficult for NTRBs 
to seek to remove Indigenous parties, particularly as there may be a perceived conflict, and it is usually a 
last resort. CYLC suggests that the Court could be more proactive in that regard’: Cape York Land 
Council, Submission 7. 
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claim area or industry—would also be able to become parties under s 84(3), (5) or 
(5A). 
11.48 As well as reducing the numbers of parties—and hence delays and expenses—in 
native title proceedings, Proposal 11–3 would relieve persons who are represented by 
an organisation from the need to actively participate in proceedings, which may be 
unfamiliar and complex. The represented persons would instead be able to rely on the 
organisation to represent their interests. 
11.49 Queensland South Native Title Services suggested that representative bodies 
should have automatic party status, as state and territory governments currently have 
under s 84(4).
50
 Proposal 11–3 would not provide such an automatic right. However, if 
a representative body could demonstrate an appropriate interest it would, under 
Proposal 11–3, be able to participate under either s 84(3), (5) or (5A). 
11.50 Proposal 11–3 may have the secondary effect that a person whose interests are 
likely to be represented by a representative organisation—whether or not that person is 
a member of the organisation—would not be allowed to join proceedings. This would, 
of course, depend on the specific circumstances. 
11.51 The ALRC is also seeking comment on whether it would be appropriate for the 
Native Title Act to provide that an Aboriginal Land Council with an inchoate interest in 
land within the claim area should be allowed to join proceedings. Such an inchoate 
interest may arise where a claim is made, but not yet determined, under the Aboriginal 
Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW). Such a provision may address the need, noted by the 
NSWALC, for Aboriginal Land Councils to join late in proceedings in order to 
represent their interests.
51
 
Dismissal of parties under s 84(8) 
Proposal 11–4 The Native Title Act should be amended to clarify that the 
Federal Court’s power to dismiss a party (other than the applicant) under s 84(8) 
is not limited to the circumstances contained in s 84(9). 
11.52 Proposal 11–4 would clarify that the Court, when considering whether to 
dismiss a party under s 84(8), may consider a wider range of circumstances than those 
set out in s 84(9). Section 84(8) of the Act provides that the Federal Court may at any 
time order a person, other than the applicant, to cease to be a party to the proceedings. 
Section 84(9) provides: 
The Federal Court is to consider making an order under subsection (8) in respect of a 
person who is a party to the proceedings if the Court is satisfied that: 
(a)    the following apply: 
                                                        
50  Queensland South Native Title Services, Submission 24. 
51   NSW Aboriginal Land Council, Submission 25. 
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 (i)    the person’s interests may be affected by a determination in the 
proceedings merely because the person has a public right of access over, 
or use of, any of the area covered by the application; and 
 (ii)   the person’s interests are properly represented in the proceedings by 
another party; or 
(b)   the person never had, or no longer has, interests that may be affected by a 
determination in the proceedings. 
11.53 In Watson v Western Australia (No 5), Gilmour J dismissed a party that 
indicated it would, apparently without basis, refuse its consent to a consent 
determination. In reaching the decision to dismiss that party, Gilmour J had regard to a 
range of matters, such as: 
 the purpose behind the Native Title Act, being to encourage the resolution of 
native title claims through conciliation and negotiation; 
 the time, money, and other resources which had been invested in the application 
and which would be required if the consent determination were delayed; 
 the inconvenience on the claimant group if the consent determination were not 
to proceed; and 
 the proximity of the remaining parties to reaching settlement. 
11.54 AIATSIS suggested that, in light of Watson v Western Australia (No 5), there 
may be uncertainty as to whether the Court must take the matters of s 84(9) into 
consideration when making a decision to dismiss a party, or whether those matters 
were merely possible considerations for the Court. Proposal 11–4 would remove this 
uncertainty.
52
 
Appeals from joinder and dismissal decisions 
Proposal 11–5 Section 24(1AA) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 
(Cth) should be amended to allow an appeal, with the leave of the Court, from a 
decision of the Federal Court to join, or not to join, a party under s 84(5) or (5A) 
of the Native Title Act. 
                                                        
52  The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia (CME) also noted that problems associated 
with large numbers of respondents: ‘could be addressed at least in part by amendments to make it easier 
for respondents to withdraw from claims. Presently, if a claim has been heard or part-heard, a respondent 
can only withdraw by making a formal application, which can involve significant time and resources. 
Allowing respondents to withdraw from a claim through a more informal process would reduce costs and 
help address the problem of having large numbers of respondents to claims’: Chamber of Minerals and 
Energy of Western Australia, Submission 21. 
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Proposal 11–6 Section 24(1AA) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 
(Cth) should be amended to allow an appeal, with the leave of the Court, from a 
decision of the Federal Court to dismiss, or not to dismiss, a party under s 84(8) 
of the Native Title Act. 
11.55 Section 24(1AA) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) prohibits 
appeals from certain judgments of the Court, including ‘a decision to join or remove a 
party, or not to join or remove a party’. As a result, an appeal cannot be made from a 
decision to join, or not to join, a person as a party to native title proceedings under 
s 84(5) or (5A). Similarly, an appeal cannot be made from a decision to dismiss, or not 
to dismiss, a party from native title proceedings under s 84(8). 
11.56 Section 24(1AA) may create a barrier to justice for participants in the native title 
system. Due to the operation of s 24(1AA), a person who is not joined to, or is 
dismissed from, proceedings may have no further opportunity to represent their 
interests to the Court. Section 24(1AA) may similarly impose a limit on access to 
justice for other parties, who have no avenue of appeal if another person is joined or is 
not dismissed. The limitations imposed by s 24(1AA) are particularly significant given 
the in rem nature of native title proceedings. Since native title proceedings result in 
determinations of the rights and interests of all persons in respect of the claim area, it is 
important to ensure that all persons are given an adequate opportunity to represent their 
interests. 
11.57 Excluding native title proceedings from the scope of s 24(1AA) would set native 
title proceedings apart from other proceedings in the Federal Court. Section 24(1AA) 
would continue to apply in other areas of law. For example, no appeal would be 
available from a decision to join or remove a party in proceedings under consumer law. 
However, given the interests involved in native title proceedings, the ALRC considers 
that providing an avenue of appeal in the specific context of native title proceedings is 
warranted. 
11.58 A requirement that an appeal from such decisions be subject to the leave of the 
Court would be an important way ensure that the appeals process was not misused. In 
the absence of a leave requirement, a party or other person could, for example, appeal a 
joinder or dismissal decision without merit, simply to delay proceedings.
53
 Section 
24(1AA) was specifically introduced in order to remove the right of appeal for ‘minor 
                                                        
53  It has been stated, with respect to exercises of judicial discretion relating to practice and procedure—such 
as the joinder of parties—that ‘if a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of Judges of 
first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice. The disposal of cases 
could be delayed interminably, and costs heaped up indefinitely, if a litigant with a long purse or a 
litigious disposition could, at will, in effect transfer all exercises of discretion in interlocutory applications 
from a Judge in Chambers to a Court of Appeal’: Re Will of F B Gilbert (deceased) 46 SR(NSW) 318, 
323. See generally Bernard Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (Thomson Reuters (Professional) 
Australia, 8th ed, 2009) [18.400]. 
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procedural decisions for which there should be no avenue of appeal’,
54
 in order to 
‘ensure the efficient administration of justice by reducing delays caused by appeals 
from these decisions’.
55
 While it may be desirable to allow appeals from joinder or 
dismissal decisions in the native title context, it is also desirable to continue to ensure 
the efficient administration of justice. 
Participation and joinder of the Commonwealth 
Proposal 11–7 The Australian Government should consider developing 
principles governing the circumstances in which the Commonwealth should 
either: 
(a) become a party to a native title proceeding under s 84; or 
(b) seek intervener status under s 84A. 
11.59 The Commonwealth may become a party to proceedings or join proceedings 
under the party provisions of s 84, particularly when the Commonwealth has interests 
within the claim area and when the claim area includes an offshore component.
56
 The 
Commonwealth may also seek intervener status in proceedings under s 84A of the 
Native Title Act. The role of an intervener is generally to represent the intervener’s own 
legal interests in proceedings that may affect those interests, without being a party to 
proceedings.
57
 In native title proceedings, the Commonwealth, as a party or an 
intervener, may also be able to take a role in ensuring that negotiations are carried out 
in a manner consistent with the policy goals underlying the Native Title Act. 
11.60 The development of principles setting out the circumstances in which the 
Commonwealth would seek to participate or intervene in native title proceedings may 
provide greater certainty for all parties about the likelihood of Commonwealth 
involvement in native title proceedings. 
11.61 Consideration might be given to whether the Commonwealth might elect to be 
involved only in parts of native title proceedings that deal with specific aspects of s 225 
of the Native Title Act. The Commonwealth could elect, for example, to limit its 
participation to representing the Commonwealth’s interests in a claim area. 
                                                        
54  Explanatory Memorandum, Access to Justice (Civil Litigation Reforms) Amendment Bill 2009 (Cth) 18, 
[81]. 
55  Ibid 18, 81. See also Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2010) 187 FCR 261, [17]–[18]. 
56  See, eg, Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1.  
57  Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 601–602 (Brennan CJ). 
